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ourselves with some true idea； whose object we know for certain to be
dependent on our power of thinking； and to have nothing corresponding to
it in nature。 （2） With an idea of this kind before us； we shall； as appears
from what has just been said； be more easily able to carry on the research
we have in view。 （72：3） For instance； in order to form the conception of a
sphere； I invent a cause at my pleasure … namely； a semicircle revolving
round its center； and thus producing a sphere。 （4） This is indisputably a
true idea； and； although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually
been so formed； the perception remains true； and is the easiest manner of
conceiving a sphere。 （72：5） We must observe that this perception asserts
the rotation of a semicircle … which assertion would be false； if it were not
associated with the conception of a sphere； or of a cause determining a
motion of the kind； or absolutely； if the assertion were isolated。 （6） The
mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a
semicircle； which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle； and
does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such
motion。 （72：7） Thus falsity consists only in this； that something is
affirmed of a thing； which is not contained in the conception we have
formed of that thing； as motion or rest of a semicircle。 （8） Whence it
follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true … e。g。； the simple idea
of a semicircle； of motion； of rest； of quantity； &c。 （72：9）
Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed；
and does not extend further。 （10） Wherefore we form as many simple
ideas as we please； without any fear of error。
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＇73＇ （1） It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind
can form true ideas； and how far such power extends。 （2） It is certain
that such power cannot extend itself infinitely。 （3） For when we affirm
somewhat of a thing； which is not contained in the concept we have
formed of that thing； such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception；
or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas。 （4） Thus we
have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the
mind； but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere； or of
some cause determining such a motion。 （73：5） But if it be the nature of a
thinking being； as seems； prima facie； to be the case； to form true or
adequate thoughts； it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because
we are parts of a thinking being； whose thoughts … some in their entirety；
others in fragments only … constitute our mind。
＇74＇ （1） But there is another point to be considered； which was not
worth raising in the case of fiction； but which give rise to complete
deception … namely； that certain things presented to the imagination also
exist in the understanding … in other words； are conceived clearly and
distinctly。 （2） Hence； so long as we do not separate that which is distinct
from that which is confused； certainty； or the true idea； becomes mixed
with indistinct ideas。 （3） For instance； certain Stoics heard； perhaps； the
term 〃soul；〃 and also that the soul is immortal； yet imagined it only
confusedly； they imaged； also； and understood that very subtle bodies
penetrate all others； and are penetrated by none。 （74：4） By combining
these ideas； and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom；
they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle
bodies； that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c。
＇75＇ （1） But we are freed from mistakes of this kind； so long as we
endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true
idea。 （2） We must take care； as has been said； to separate such
perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified
experience。 （3） Moreover； such mistakes arise from things being
conceived too much in the abstract； for it is sufficiently self…evident that
what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything else。
（75：4） Lastly； they arise from a want of understanding of the primary
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On the Improvement of the Understanding
elements of nature as a whole； whence we proceed without due order； and
confound nature with abstract rules； which； although they be true enough
in their sphere； yet； when misapplied； confound themselves； and pervert
the order of nature。 （5） However； if we proceed with as little abstraction
as possible； and begin from primary elements … that is； from the source and
origin of nature； as far back as we can reach； … we need not fear any
deceptions of this kind。
＇76＇ （1） As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned；
there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions。 （2） For when
a thing is conceived in the abstract； as are all universal notions； the said
universal notions are always more extensive in the mind than the number
of individuals forming their contents really existing in nature。 （3） Again；
there are many things in nature； the difference between which is so slight
as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding； so that it may readily
happen that such things are confounded together； if they be conceived
abstractedly。 （4） But since the first principle of nature cannot （as we
shall see hereafter） be conceived abstractedly or universally； and cannot
extend further in the understanding than it does in reality； and has no
likeness to mutable things； no confusion need be feared in respect to the
idea of it； provided （as before shown） that we possess a standard of truth。
（5） This is； in fact； a being single and infinite ＇76z＇ ； in other words； it is
the sum total of being； beyo