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properties； are without all specific and numerical differences；
as the schools call them。
。 They are。
。 That is to say； they are extension in general； and
motion in general。
。 Let it be so。
。 But it is a universally received maxim that
。 How then can motion in
general； or extension in general； exist in any corporeal
substance？ ｛193｝
。 I will take time to solve your difficulty。
。 But I think the point may be speedily decided。
Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or
that idea。 Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue。 If
you can frame in your thoughts a distinct of
motion or extension； divested of all those sensible modes； as
swift and slow； great and small； round and square； and the like；
which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind； I will then
yield the point you contend for。 But if you cannot； it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have
no notion of。
。 To confess ingenuously； I cannot。
。 Can you even separate the ideas of extension and
motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make
the distinction term ？
。 What！ is it not an easy matter to consider extension
and motion by themselves； abstracted from all other sensible
qualities？ Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them？
。 I acknowledge； Hylas； it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those qualities；
without mentioning any other； and； in this sense； to consider or
treat of them abstractedly。 But； how doth it follow that； because
I can pronounce the word by itself； I can form the idea
of it in my mind exclusive of body？ or； because theorems may be
made of extension and figures； without any mention of or
； or any other sensible mode or quality； that therefore it
is possible such an abstract idea of extension； without any
particular size or figure； or sensible quality；＇3 ＇ ＇should be
distinctly formed； and apprehended by the mind？ Mathematicians
treat of quantity； without regarding what other sensible。
qualities it is attended with； as being altogether indifferent to
their demonstrations。 But； when laying aside the words； they
contemplate the bare ideas； I believe you will find； they are not
the pure abstracted ideas of extension。
。 But what say you to ？ May not
abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty？
。 Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all； it is
plain I cannot frame them by the help of ； ｛194｝
whatsoever faculty you understand by those words。 Besides； not to
inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual
objects； as ； ； ； or the like； thus much
seems manifest that sensible things are only to be perceived
by sense； or represented by the imagination。 Figures； therefore；
and extension； being originally perceived by sense； do not belong
to pure intellect： but； for your farther satisfaction； try if you
can frame the idea of any figure； abstracted from all
particularities of size； or even from other sensible qualities。
。 Let me think a little I do not find that I can。
。 And can you think it possible that should really
exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception？
。 By no means。
。 Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind
to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other
sensible qualities； doth it not follow； that where the one exist
there necessarily the other exist likewise？
。 It should seem so。
。 Consequently； the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are；
without any farther application of force； against the Primary
too。 Besides； if you will trust your senses； is it not plain all
sensible qualities coexist； or to them appear as being in the
same place？ Do they ever represent a motion； or figure； as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities？
。 You need say no more on this head。 I am free to own；
if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings
hitherto； that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied
existence without the mind。 But； my fear is that I have been too
liberal in my former concessions； or overlooked some fallacy or
other。 In short； I did not take time to think。
。 For that matter； Hylas； you may take what time you
please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry。 You are at
liberty to recover any slips you might have made； or offer
whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion。
。 One great oversight I take to be this that I did
not sufficiently distinguish the from the 。
Now； though this latter may not exist without the mind； yet it
will not thence follow that the former cannot。
。 What object do you mean？ the object of the senses？
。 The same。
。 It is then immediately perceived？ ｛195｝
。 Right。
。 Make me to understand the difference between what is
immediately perceived and a sensation。
。 The sensation I take to be an act of the mind
perceiving； besides which； there is something perceived； and this
I call the 。 For example； there is red and yellow on that
tulip。 But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me
only； and not in the tulip。
。 What tulip do you speak of？ Is it that which you
see？
。 The same。
。 And what do you see beside colour； figure； and
extension？
。 Nothing。
。 What you would say then is that the red and yellow
are coexistent with the extension； is it not？
。 That is not all； I would say they have a real
existence without the mind； in some unthinking substance。
。 That the colours are really in the tulip which I see
is manifest。 Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist
independent of your mind or mine； but； that any immediate object
of the senses； that is； any idea； or combination of ideas
should exist in an unthinking substance； or exterior to
minds； is in itself an evident contradiction。 Nor can I imagine
how this follows from what you said just now； to wit； that the
red and yellow were on the tulip ； since you do not
pretend to that unthinking substance。
。 You have an artful way； Philonous； of diverting our
inquiry from the subject。
。 I see you have no mind to be pressed that way。 To
return then to your distinction between and ；
if I take you right； you distinguish in every perception two
things； the one an action of the mind； the other not。
。 True。
。 And this action cannot exist in； or belong to； any
unthinking thing； but； whatever beside is implied in a perception
may？ ｛196｝
。 That is my meaning。
。 So that if there was a perception without any ac