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。 I own I am at a loss what to think。
。 Your judgment will soon be determined； if you will
venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have
done concerning the rest。 Was it not admitted as a good argument；
that neither heat nor cold was in the water； because it seemed
warm to one hand and cold to the other？
。 It was。
。 Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude； there
is no extension or figure in an object； because to one eye it
shall seem little； smooth； and round； when at the same time it
appears to the other； great； uneven； and regular？
。 The very same。 But does this latter fact ever happen？
。 You may at any time make the experiment； by looking
with one eye bare； and with the other through a microscope。
。 I know not how to maintain it； and yet I am loath to
give up ； I see so many odd consequences following
upon such a concession。
。 Odd； say you？ After the concessions already made； I
hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness。 ＇But； on the
other hand； should it not seem very odd； if the general reasoning
｛190｝ which includes all other sensible qualities did not also
include extension？ If it be allowed that no idea； nor anything
like an idea； can exist in an unperceiving substance； then surely
it follows that no figure； or mode of extension； which we can
either perceive； or imagine； or have any idea of； can be really
inherent in Matter； not to mention the peculiar difficulty there
must be in conceiving a material substance； prior to and distinct
from extension to be the of extension。 Be the
sensible quality what it will figure； or sound； or colour； it
seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not
perceive it。＇＇2＇
。 I give up the point for the present； reserving still
a right to retract my opinion； in case I shall hereafter discover
any false step in my progress to it。
。 That is a right you cannot be denied。 Figures and
extension being despatched； we proceed next to 。 Can a
real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift
and very slow？
。 It cannot。
。 Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal
proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space？
Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times
faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three
hours。
。 I agree with you。
。 And is not time measured by the succession of ideas
in our minds？
。 It is。
。 And is it not possible ideas should succeed one
another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine； or in that
of some spirit of another kind？
。 I own it。
。 Consequently the same body may to another seem to
perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth
to you。 And the same reasoning will hold as to any other
proportion： that is to say； according to your principles （since
the motions perceived are both really in the object） it is
possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way
at once； both very swift and very slow。 How is this consistent
either with common sense； or with what you just now granted？
｛191｝
。 I have nothing to say to it。
。 Then as for ； either you do not mean any
sensible quality by that word； and so it is beside our inquiry：
or if you do； it must be either hardness or resistance。 But both
the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses： it
being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft
to another； who hath greater force and firmness of limbs。 Nor is
it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body。
。 I own the very of resistance； which is
all you immediately perceive； is not in the body； but the
of that sensation is。
。 But the causes of our sensations are not things
immediately perceived； and therefore are not sensible。 This point
I thought had been already determined。
。 I own it was； but you will pardon me if I seem a
little embarrassed： I know not how to quit my old notions。
。 To help you out； do but consider that if
be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind； the
same must necessarily be granted of motion； solidity； and
gravity； since they all evidently suppose extension。 It is
therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of
them。 In denying extension； you have denied them all to have any
real existence。
。 I wonder； Philonous； if what you say be true； why
those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real
existence should yet attribute it to the Primary。 If there is no
difference between them； how can this be accounted for？
。 It is not my business to account for every opinion
of the philosophers。 But； among other reasons which may be
assigned for this； it seems probable that pleasure and pain being
rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one。 Heat and
cold； tastes and smells； have something more vividly pleasing or
disagreeable than the ideas of extension； figure； and motion
affect us with。 And； it being too visibly absurd to hold that
pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance； men are
more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities。 You will be satisfied there
is something in this； if you recollect the difference you made
between an intense and more moderate degree of heat； allowing the
one a real existence； while you denied it to the other。 But；
after all； there is no rational ground for that distinction； for；
surely an indifferent sensation is as ｛191｝ truly
as one more pleasing or painful； and consequently should not any
more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject。
。 It is just come into my head； Philonous； that I have
somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible
extension。 Now； though it be acknowledged that and
； consisting merely in the relation which other extended
beings have to the parts of our own bodies； do not really inhere
in the substances themselves； yet nothing obliges us to hold the
same with regard to ； which is something
abstracted from and ； from this or that particular
magnitude or figure。 So likewise as to motion； and
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds。 But； it doth not follow； because those modifications of
motion exist not without the mind； that therefore absolute motion
abstracted from them doth not。
。 Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion； or
one part of extension； from another？ Is it not something
sensible； as some degree of swiftness or slowness； some certain
magnitude or figure peculiar to each？
。 I think so。
。 These qualities； therefore； stripped of all sensible
properties； are without all specific and numerical differences；
as the s