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think it hath； I would fain know farther from you； what certain
distance and position of the object； what peculiar texture and
formation of the eye； what degree or kind of light is necessary
for ascertaining that true colour； and distinguishing it from
apparent ones。
。 I own myself entirely satisfied； that they are all
equally apparent； and that there is no such thing as colour
really inhering in external bodies； but that it is altogether in
the light。 And what confirms me in this opinion is； that in
proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid； and
if there be no light； then are there no colours perceived。
Besides； allowing there are colours on external objects； yet； how
is it possible for us to perceive them？ For no external body
affects the mind； unless it acts first on our organs of sense。
But the only action of bodies is motion； and motion cannot be
communicated otherwise than by impulse。 A distant object
therefore cannot act on the eye； nor consequently make itself or
its properties perceivable to the soul。 Whence it plainly follows
that it is immediately some contiguous substance； which；
operating on the eye； occasions a perception of colours： and such
is light。
。 Howl is light then a substance？
。。 I tell you； Philonous； external light is nothing but
a thin fluid substance； whose minute particles being agitated
with a brisk motion； and in various manners reflected from the
different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes； communicate
different motions to the optic nerves； which； being propagated to
the brain； cause therein various impressions； and these are
attended with the sensations of red； blue； yellow； &c。
。 It seems then the light doth no more than shake the
optic nerves。 ｛187｝
。 Nothing else。
。 And consequent to each particular motion of the
nerves； the mind is affected with a sensation； which is some
particular colour。
。 Right。
。 And these sensations have no existence without the
mind。
。 They have not。
。 How then do you affirm that colours are in the
light； since by you understand a corporeal substance
external to the mind？
。 Light and colours； as immediately perceived by us； I
grant cannot exist without the mind。 But in themselves they are
only the motions and configurations of certain insensible
particles of matter。
。 Colours then； in the vulgar sense； or taken for the
immediate objects of sight； cannot agree to any but a perceiving
substance。
。 That is what I say。
。 Well then； since you give up the point as to those
sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind
beside； you may hold what you please with regard to those
invisible ones of the philosophers。 It is not my business to
dispute about ； only I would advise you to bethink
yourself； whether； considering the inquiry we are upon； it be
prudent for you to affirm ； 。 Are not these shocking
notions； and are not they subject to as many ridiculous
inferences； as those you were obliged to renounce before in the
case of sounds？
。 I frankly own； Philonous； that it is in vain to
longer。 Colours； sounds； tastes； in a word all those termed
； have certainly no existence without the
mind。 But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to
derogate； the reality of Matter； or external objects； seeing it
is no more than several philosophers maintain； who nevertheless
are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter。 For the clearer
understanding of this； you must know sensible qualities are by
philosophers divided into and 。 The former
are Extension； Figure； Solidity； Gravity； Motion； and Rest； ｛188｝
and these they hold exist really in bodies。 The latter are those
above enumerated； or； briefly； ； which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas
existing nowhere but in the mind。 But all this； I doubt not； you
are apprised of。 For my part； I have been a long time sensible
there was such an opinion current among philosophers； but was
never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now。
。 You are still then of opinion that and
inherent in external unthinking substances？
。 I am。
。 But what if the same arguments which are brought
against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also？
。 Why then I shall be obliged to think； they too exist
only in the mind。
。 Is it your opinion the very figure and extension
which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or
material substance？
。 It is。
。 Have all other animals as good grounds to think the
same of the figure and extension which they see and feel？
。 Without doubt； if they have any thought at all。
。 Answer me； Hylas。 Think you the senses were bestowed
upon all animals for their preservation and well…being in life？
or were they given to men alone for this end？
。 I make no question but they have the same use in all
other animals。
。 If so； is it not necessary they should be enabled by
them to perceive their own limbs； and those bodies which are
capable of harming them？
。 Certainly。
。 A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own
foot； and things equal or even less than it； as bodies of some
considerable dimension； though at the same time they appear to
you scarce discernible； or at best as so many visible points？
。 I cannot deny it。
。 And to creatures less than the mite they will seem
yet larger？
。 They will。
。 Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to
another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain？
｛189｝
。 All this I grant。
。 Can one and the same thing be at the same time in
itself of different dimensions？
。 That were absurd to imagine。
。 But； from what you have laid down it follows that
both the extension by you perceived； and that perceived by the
mite itself； as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals；
are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot； that is
to say； by your own principles you are led into an absurdity。
。 There seems to be some difficulty in the point。
。 Again； have you not acknowledged that no real
inherent property of any object can be changed without some
change in the thing itself？
。 I have。
。 But； as we approach to or recede from an object； the
visible extension varies； being at one distance ten or a hundred
times greater than another。 Doth it not therefore follow from
hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object？
。 I own I am at a loss what to think。
。 Your judgment will soon be determined； if you will