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three dialogues-第4章

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     。 Hold; Philonous; I now see what it was delude time。
You asked whether heat and cold; sweetness at were not particular
sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply; that they were。
Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities; as
perceived by us; are pleasures or pair existing in the external
objects。 We must not therefore conclude absolutely; that there is
no heat in the fire; or sweetness in the sugar; but only that
heat or sweetness; as perceived by us; are not in the fire or
sugar。 What say you to this?

     。 I say it is nothing to the purpose。 Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things; which you
defined to be; 。 Whatever other qualities; therefore; you speak of as
distinct from these; I know nothing of them; neither do they at
all belong to the point in dispute。 You may; indeed; pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive; and
assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar。 But
what use can be made of this to your present purpose; I am at a
loss to conceive。 Tell me then once more; do you acknowledge that
heat and cold; sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses); do not exist without the
mind?

     。 I see it is to no purpose to hold out; so I give up
the cause as to those mentioned qualities。 Though I profess it
sounds oddly; to say that sugar is not sweet。

     。 But; for your farther satisfaction; take this along
with you: that which at other times seems sweet; shall; to a
distempered palate; appear bitter。 And; nothing can be plainer
than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same
food; since that which one man delights in; another abhors。 And
how could this be; if the taste was something really inherent in
the food?

     。 I acknowledge I know not how。

     。 In the next place;  are to be considered。
And; with regard to these; I would fain know whether what hath
{181} been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are
they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?

     。 They are。

     。 Can you then conceive it possible that they should
exist in an unperceiving thing?

     。 I cannot。

     。 Or; can you imagine that filth and ordure affect
those brute animals that feed on them out of choice; with the
same smells which we perceive in them?

     。 By no means。

     。 May we not therefore conclude of smells; as of the
other forementioned qualities; that they cannot exist in any but
a perceiving substance or mind?

     。 I think so。

     。 Then as to ; what must we think of them: are
they accidents really inherent in external bodies; or not?

     。 That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an
air…pump sends forth no sound。 The air; therefore; must be
thought the subject of sound。

     。 What reason is there for that; Hylas?

     。 Because; when any motion is raised in the air; we
perceive a sound greater or lesser; according to the air's
motion; but without some motion in the air; we never hear any
sound at all。

     。 And granting that we never hear a sound but when
some motion is produced in the air; yet I do not see how you can
infer from thence; that the sound itself is in the air。

     。 It is this very motion in the external air that
produces in the mind the sensation of 。 For; striking on
the drum of the ear; it causeth a vibration; which by the
auditory nerves being communicated to the brain; the soul is
thereupon affected with the sensation called 。

     。 What! is sound then a sensation?

     。 I tell you; as perceived by us; it is a particular
sensation in the mind。

     。 And can any sensation exist without the mind?

     。 No; certainly。

     。 How then can sound; being a sensation; exist in the
air; if by the  you mean a senseless substance existing
without the mind?

     。 You must distinguish; Philonous; between sound as it
is {182} perceived by us; and as it is in itself; or (which is
the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive; and
that which exists without us。 The former; indeed; is a particular
kind of sensation; but the latter is merely a vibrative or
undulatory motion the air。

     。 I thought I had already obviated that distinction;
by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before。
But; to say no more of that; are you sure then that sound is
really nothing but motion?

     。 I am。

     。 Whatever therefore agrees to real sound; may with
truth be attributed to motion?

     。 It may。

     。 It is then good sense to speak of  as of a
thing that is ; ; ; 。

     。  see you are resolved not to understand me。 Is it
not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible
sound; or  the common acceptation of the word; but not
to  in the real and philosophic sense; which; as I just
now told you; is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

     。 It seems then there are two sorts of sound  the
one vulgar; or that which is heard; the other philosophical and
real?

     。 Even so。

     。 And the latter consists in motion?

     。 I told you so before。

     。 Tell me; Hylas; to which of the senses; think you;
the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

     。 No; certainly; but to the sight and touch。

     。 It should follow then; that; according to you; real
sounds may possibly be ; but never 。

     。 Look you; Philonous; you may; if you please; make a
jest of my opinion; but that will not alter the truth of things。
I own; indeed; the inferences you draw me into sound something
oddly; but common language; you know; is framed by; and for the
use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions
adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the
way。

     。 Is it come to that? I assure you; I imagine myself
to have gained no small point; since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part
of our inquiry; to examine whose notions are widest of the {183}
common road; and most repugnant to the general sense of the
world。 But; can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox; to say that ; and that the
idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

     。 To deal ingenuously; I do not like it。 And; after the
concessions already made; I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind。

     。 And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of 。

     。 Pardon me: the case of colours is very different。 Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects
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