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persons to perceive the same thing。 But whether philosophers
shall think fit to a thing the no； is； I
conceive； of small importance。 Let us suppose several men
together； all endued with the same faculties； and consequently
affected in like sort by their senses； and who had yet never
known the use of language； they would； without question； agree in
their perceptions。 Though perhaps； when they came to the use of
speech； some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived；
might call it the thing： others； especially ｛248｝
regarding the diversity of persons who perceived； might choose
the denomination of things。 But who sees not that all
the dispute is about a word？ to wit； whether。 what is perceived
by different persons may yet have the term applied to it？
Or； suppose a house； whose walls or outward shell remaining
unaltered； the chambers are all pulled down； and new ones built
in their place； and that you should call this the ； and I
should say it was not the house。 would we not； for all
this； perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house； considered in
itself？ And would not all the difference consist in a sound？ If
you should say； We differed in our notions； for that you super…
added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of
identity； whereas I did not； I would tell you； I know not what
you mean by ； and should desire
you to look into your own thoughts； and be sure you understood
yourself。 Why so silent； Hylas？ Are you not yet satisfied men
may dispute about identity and diversity； without any real
difference in their thoughts and opinions； abstracted from names？
Take this farther reflexion with you： that whether Matter be
allowed to exist or no； the case is exactly the same as to the
point in hand。 For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what
we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas。 Your
difficulty； therefore； that no two see the same thing； makes
equally against the Materialists and me。
。 ＇Ay； Philonous；＇＇10＇ But they suppose an external
archetype； to which referring their several ideas they may truly
be said to perceive the same thing。
。 And （not to mention your having discarded those
archetypes） so may you suppose an external archetype on my
principles； ； ； ： though
indeed it must be' supposed to exist in that Mind which
comprehends all things； but then； this serves all the ends of
； as well as if it existed out of a mind。 And I am sure
you yourself will not say it is less intelligible。
。 You have indeed clearly satisfied me either that
there is no difficulty at bottom in this point； or； if there be；
that it makes equally against both opinions。
。 But that which makes equally against two
contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither。
。 I acknowledge it。 But； after all； Philonous； when I
consider ｛249｝ the substance of what you advance against
； it amounts to no more than this： We are sure that
we really see； hear； feel； in a word； that we are affected with
sensible impressions。
。 And how are concerned any farther？ I see this
cherry； I feel it； I taste it： and I am sure cannot be
seen； or felt； or。 tasted： it is therefore red。 Take away the
sensations of softness； moisture； redness； tartness； and you take
away the cherry； since it is not a being distinct from
sensations。 A cherry； I say； is nothing but a congeries of
sensible impressions； or ideas perceived by various senses： which
ideas are united into one thing （or have one name given them） by
the mind； because they are observed to attend each other。 Thus；
when the palate is affected with such a particular taste； the
sight is affected with a red colour； the touch with roundness；
softness； &c。 Hence； when I see； and feel； and taste； in such
sundry certain manners； I am sure the cherry exists； or is real；
its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those
sensations。 But if by the word you； mean an unknown
nature； distinct from all those sensible qualities； and by its
something distinct from its being perceived； then；
indeed； I own； neither you nor I； nor any one else； can be sure
it exists。
。 But； what would you say； Philonous； if I should bring
the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things
； which you have offered against their existing ？
。 When I see your reasons； you shall hear what I have
to say ；to them。
。 Is the mind extended or unextended？
。 Unextended； without doubt。
。 Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind？
。 They are。
。 Again； have I not heard you speak of sensible
impressions？
。 I believe you may。
。 Explain to me now； 0 Philonous！ how it is possible
there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in
your mind。 Can extended things be contained in that which is
unextended？ Or； are we to imagine impressions made on a thing
void of all solidity？ You cannot say objects are in your mind； as
books in your study： or that things are imprinted on it； as the
figure of a seal upon wax。 In what sense； therefore； are we to
understand those expressions？ Explain me this if you can： and I
shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put
to me about my 。
。 Look you； Hylas； when I speak of objects as existing
in the mind； or imprinted on the senses； I would not be
understood in the gross literal sense； as when bodies are said to
exist in a place； or a seal to make an impression upon wax。 My
meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them； and
that it is affected from without； or by some being distinct from
itself。 This is my explication of your difficulty； and how it can
serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material
intelligible； I would fain know。
。 Nay； if that be all； I confess I do not see what use
can be made of it。 But are you not guilty of some abuse of
language in this？
。 None at all。 It is no more than common custom； which
you know is the rule of language； hath authorised： nothing being
more usual； than for philosophers to speak of the immediate
objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind。 'Nor
is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general
analogy of language； most part of the mental operations being
signified by words borrowed from sensible things； as is plain in
the terms ； reflect； ； &。； which； being
applied to the mind； must not be taken in their gross； original
sense。
。 You have； I own； satisfied me in this point。 But
there still remains one great difficulty； which I know not how
you will get over。 And； indeed； it is of such importance that if
you could solve all others； without being able to find a solution
for this； you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your
principles。