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incomplete； otherwise than upon your supposition that Matter
｛245｝ is an essential part of all corporeal things。 We both；
therefore； agree in this； that we perceive only sensible forms：
but herein we differ you will have them to be empty
appearances； I； real beings。 In short； you do not trust your
senses； I do。
。 You say you believe your senses； and seem to applaud
yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar。 According to
you； therefore； the true nature of a thing is discovered by the
senses。 If so； whence comes that disagreement？ Why is not the
same figure； and other sensible qualities； perceived all manner
of ways？ and why should we use a microscope the better to
discover the true nature of a body； if it were discoverable to
the naked eye？
。 Strictly speaking； Hylas； we do not see the same
object that we feel； neither is the same object perceived by the
microscope which was by the naked eye。 But； in case every
variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of
individual； the endless number of confusion of names would render
language impracticable。 Therefore； to avoid this； as well as
other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought； men
combine together several ideas； apprehended by divers senses； or
by the same sense at different times； or in different
circumstances； but observed； however； to have some connexion in
nature； either with respect to co…existence or succession； all
which they refer to one name； and consider as one thing。 Hence it
follows that when I examine； by my other senses； a thing I have
seen； it is not in order to understand better the same object
which I had perceived by sight； the object of one sense not being
perceived by the other senses。 And； when I look through a
microscope； it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I
perceived already with my bare eyes； the object perceived by the
glass being quite different from the former。 But； in both cases；
my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together； and the
more a man knows of the connexion of ideas； the more he is said
to know of the nature of things。 What； therefore； if our ideas
are variable； what if our senses are not in all circumstances
affected with the same appearances。 It will not thence follow
they are not to be trusted； or that they are inconsistent either
with themselves or anything else： except it be with your
preconceived notion of （I know not what） one single； unchanged；
unperceivable； real Nature； marked by each name。 Which prejudice
seems to have taken its rise from not rightly ｛246｝ understanding
the common language of men； speaking of several distinct ideas as
united into one thing by the mind。 And； indeed； there is cause to
suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing
to the same original： while they began to build their schemes not
so much on notions as on words； which were framed by the vulgar；
merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of
life； without any regard to speculation。
。 Methinks I apprehend your meaning。
。 It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our
senses are not real things； but images or copies of them。 Our
knowledge； therefore； is no farther real than as our ideas are
the true of those 。 But； as these
supposed originals are in themselves unknown； it is impossible to
know how far our ideas resemble them； or whether they resemble
them at all。 We cannot； therefore； be sure we have any real
knowledge。 Farther； as our ideas are perpetually varied； without
any change in the supposed real things； it necessarily follows
they cannot all be true copies of them： or； if some are and
others are not； it is impossible to distinguish the former from
the latter。 And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty。 Again；
when we consider the point； we cannot conceive how any idea； or
anything like an idea； should have an absolute existence out of a
mind： nor consequently； according to you； how there should be any
real thing in nature。 The result of ；all which is that we are
thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism。 Now； give
me leave to ask you； First； Whether your referring ideas to
certain absolutely existing unperceived substances； as their
originals； be not the source of all this scepticism？ Secondly；
whether you are informed； either by sense or reason； of the
existence of those unknown originals？ And； in case you are not；
whether it be not absurd to suppose them？ Thirdly； Whether； upon
inquiry； you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant
by the ？ Lastly； Whether； the premises considered； it be not
the wisest way to follow nature； trust your senses； and； laying
aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances；
admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived
by the senses？
。 For the present； I have no inclination to the
answering part。 I would much rather see how you can get over what
follows。 Pray are not the objects perceived by the ｛247｝
of one； likewise perceivable to others present？ If there were a
hundred more here； they would all see the garden； the trees； and
flowers； as I see them。 But they are not in the same manner
affected with the ideas I frame in my 。 Does not
this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the
latter？
。 I grant it does。 Nor have I ever denied a difference
between the objects of sense and those of imagination。 But what
would you infer from thence？ You cannot say that sensible objects
exist unperceived； because they are perceived by many。
。 I own I can make nothing of that objection： but it
hath led me into another。 Is it not your opinion that by our
senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds？
。 It is。
。 But the idea which is in my mind cannot be in
yours； or in any other mind。 Doth it not therefore follow； from
your principles； that no two can see the same thing？ And is not
this highly； absurd？
。 If the term be taken in the vulgar
acceptation； it is certain （and not at all repugnant to the
principles I maintain） that different persons may perceive the
same thing； or the same thing or idea exist in different minds。
Words are of arbitrary imposition； and； since men are used to
apply the word where no distinction or variety is
perceived； and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions； it
follows that； as men have said before； ； so they may； upon like occasions； still continue to use
the same phrase； without any deviation either from propriety of
language； or the truth of things。 But； if the term be used
in the acceptation of philosophers； who pretend to an abstracted
notion of identity； then； according to their sundry definitions
of this notion （for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic
identity consists）； it may or may not be possible for divers
persons to perceive the same thing。 But whether philosophers
shall think fit to a thing th