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senses; and at the same time not really exist; is to me a plain
contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract; even in
thought; the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived。 Wood; stones; fire; water; flesh; iron; and the like
things; which I name and discourse of; are things that I know。
And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my
senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas
cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists
in being perceived; when; therefore; they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence。 Away then with all that
scepticism; all those ridiculous philosophical doubts。 What a
jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of
sensible things; till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of
intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own
being; as of the being of those things I actually see and feel。
。 Not so fast; Philonous: you say you cannot conceive
how sensible things should exist without the mind。 Do you not?
。 I do。
。 Supposing you were annihilated; cannot you conceive
it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?
。 can; but then it must be in another mind。 When I
deny sensible things an existence out of the mind; I do not mean
my mind in particular; but all minds。 Now; it is plain they have
an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience
to be independent of it。 There is therefore some other Mind
wherein they exist; during the intervals between the times of
{231} my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth;
and would do after my supposed annihilation。 And; as the same is
true with regard to all other finite created spirits; it
necessarily follows there is an ; which
knows and comprehends all things; and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner; and according to such rules; as He Himself hath
ordained; and are by us termed the 。
。 Answer me; Philonous。 Are all our ideas perfectly
inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?
。 They are altogether passive and inert。
。 And is not God an agent; a being purely active?
。 I acknowledge it。
。 No idea therefore can be like unto; or represent the
nature of God?
。 It cannot。
。 Since therefore you have no of the mind of
God; how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in
His mind? Or; if you can conceive the mind of God; without having
an idea of it; why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence
of Matter; notwithstanding I have no idea of it?
。 As to your first question: I own I have properly no
; either of God or any other spirit; for these being
active; cannot be represented by things perfectly inert; as our
ideas are。 I do nevertheless know that 1; who am a spirit or
thinking substance; exist as certainly a s I know my ideas exist。
Farther; I know what I mean by the terms I ; and I
know this immediately or intuitively; though I do not perceive it
as I perceive a triangle; a colour; or a sound。 The Mind; Spirit;
or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks; acts;
and perceives。 I say ; because unextended; and
; because extended; figured; moveable things are
ideas; and that which perceives ideas; which thinks and wills; is
plainly itself no idea; nor like an idea。 Ideas are things
inactive; and perceived。 And Spirits a sort of beings altogether
different from them。 I do not therefore say my soul is an idea;
or like an idea。 However; taking the word in a large
sense; my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea; that is;
an image or likeness of God though indeed extremely
inadequate。 For; all the notion I have of God is obtained by
reflecting on my own soul; heightening its powers; and removing
its {232} imperfections。 I have; therefore; though not an
inactive idea; yet in some sort of an active thinking
image of the Deity。 And; though I perceive Him not by sense; yet
I have a notion of Him; or know Him by reflexion and reasoning。
My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of;
and; by the help of these; do mediately apprehend the possibility
of the existence of other spirits and ideas。 Farther; from my own
being; and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas; I
do; by an act of reason; necessarily infer the existence of a
God; and of all created things in the mind of God。 So much for
your first question。 For the second: I suppose by this time you
can answer it yourself。 For you neither perceive Matter
objectively; as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it; as
you do yourself; by a reflex act; neither do you mediately
apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet
collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately。 All
which makes the case of widely different from that of
the 。
'。 You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of
an idea or image of God。 But; at the same time; you acknowledge
you have; properly speaking; no of your own soul。 You even
affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different
from ideas。 Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit。 We
have therefore no idea of any spirit。 You admit nevertheless that
there is spiritual Substance; although you have no idea of it;
while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance;
because you have no notion or idea of it。 Is this fair dealing?
To act consistently; you must either admit Matter or reject
Spirit。 What say you to this?
。 say; in the first place; that I do not deny the
existence of material substance; merely because I have no notion
of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or; in other
words; because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of
it。 Many things; for aught I know; may exist; whereof neither I
nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever。
But then those things must be possible; that is; nothing {233}
inconsistent must be included in their definition。 I say;
secondly; that; although we believe things to exist which we do
not perceive; yet we may not believe that any particular thing
exists; without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason
for believing the existence of Matter。 I have no immediate
intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations;
ideas; notions; actions; or passions; infer an unthinking;
unperceiving; inactive Substance either by probable deduction;
or necessary consequence。 Whereas the being of my Self; that is;
my own soul; mind; or thinking principle; I evidently know by
reflexion。 You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in
answer to the same objections。 In the very notion or definition
of ; there is included a manifest repugnance
and inconsistency。