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of sciences？ But these you know are universal intellectual
notions； and consequently independent of Matter。 The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them。
。 I grant it。 But are there no other things？ What think
you of distrusting the senses； of denying the real existence of
sensible things； or pretending to know nothing of them。 Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a ？
。 Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things； or professes the greatest
ignorance of them； since； if I take you rightly； he is to be
｛174｝ esteemed the greatest ？
。 That is what I desire。
。 What mean you by Sensible Things？
。 Those things which are perceived by the senses。 Can
you imagine that I mean anything else？
。 Pardon me； Hylas； if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions； since this may much shorten our inquiry。
Suffer me then to ask you this farther question。 Are those things
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately？ Or；
may those things properly be said to be which are
perceived mediately； or not without the intervention of others？
。 I do not sufficiently understand you。
。 In reading a book； what I immediately perceive are
the letters； but mediately； or by means of these； are suggested
to my mind the notions of God； virtue； truth； &c。 Now； that the
letters are truly sensible things； or perceived by sense； there
is no doubt： but I would know whether you take the things
suggested by them to be so too。
。 No； certainly： it were absurd to think or
sensible things； though they may be signified and
suggested to the mind by sensible marks； with which they have an
arbitrary connexion。
。 It seems then； that by you mean
those only which can be perceived by sense？
。 Right。
。 Doth it not follow from this； that though I see one
part of the sky red； and another blue； and that my reason doth
thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that
diversity of colours； yet that cause cannot be said to be a
sensible thing； or perceived by the sense of seeing？
。 It doth。
。 In like manner； though I hear variety of sounds； yet
I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds？
。 You cannot。
。 And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot
and heavy； I cannot say； with any truth or propriety； that I feel
the cause of its heat or weight？
。 To prevent any more questions of this kind； I tell
you once for all； that by I mean those only
which are perceived by sense； and that in truth the senses
perceive nothing which they do not perceive ： for
they make no ｛175｝ inferences。 The deducing therefore of causes
or occasions from effects and appearances； which alone are
perceived by sense； entirely relates to reason。
。 This point then is agreed between us That
。 You will farther inform me； whether we immediately
perceive by sight anything beside light； and colours； and
figures； or by hearing； anything but sounds； by the palate；
anything beside tastes； by the smell； beside odours； or by the
touch； more than tangible qualities。
。 We do not。
。 It seems； therefore； that if you take away all
sensible qualities； there remains nothing sensible？
。 I grant it。
。 Sensible things therefore are ｛250｝ nothing else but
so many sensible qualities； or combinations of sensible
qualities？
。 Nothing else。
。 then is a sensible thing？
。 Certainly。
。 Doth the of sensible things consist in
being perceived？ or； is it something distinct from their being
perceived； and that bears no relation to the mind？
。 To is one thing； and to be is
another。
。 I speak with regard to sensible things only。 And of
these I ask； whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind； and distinct from their being
perceived？
。 I mean a real absolute being； distinct from； and
without any relation to； their being perceived。
。 Heat therefore； if it be allowed a real being； must
exist without the mind？
。 It must。
。 Tell me； Hylas； is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat； which we perceive； or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some； and deny it to
others？ And if there be； pray let me know that reason。
。 Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense； we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it。
。 What！ the greatest as well as the least？
。 tell you； the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both。 They are both perceived by sense； nay； the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived； and
consequently； if there is ｛176｝ any difference； we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree。
。 But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain？
。 No one can deny it。
。 And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure？
。 No； certainly。
。 Is your material substance a senseless being； or a
being endowed with sense and perception？
。 It is senseless without doubt。
。 It cannot therefore be the subject of pain？
。 By no means。
。 Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense； since you acknowledge this to be no small pain？
。 I grant it。
。 What shall we say then of your external object； is
it a material Substance； or no？
。 It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it。
。 How then can a great heat exist in it； since you own
it cannot in a material substance？ I desire you would clear this
point。
。 Hold； Philonous； I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain。 It should seem rather； that pain is something
distinct from heat； and the consequence or effect of it。
。 Upon putting your hand near the fire； do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation； or two distinct
sensations？
。 But one simple sensation。
。 Is not the heat immediately perceived？；
。 It is。
。 And the pain？
。 True。
。 Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time； and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea； it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived； and the pain； and；
consequently； that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain。
。 It seems so。
。 Again； try in your thoughts； Hylas； if you can
conceive a