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idea or sensation exist in; or be produced by; anything but a
mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable。 And to assert that
which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?
。 Without doubt。
。 But; on the other hand; it is very conceivable that
they should exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is
no more than I daily experience in myself; inasmuch as I perceive
numberless ideas; and; by an act of my will; can form a great
variety of them; and raise them up in my imagination: though; it
must be confessed; these creatures of the fancy are not
altogether so distinct; so strong; vivid; and permanent; as those
perceived by my senses which latter are called 。
From all which I conclude; 。
; from the variety; order; and manner of these; I conclude
; ; ; 。 it well; I do not say; I see things by
perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible
Substance of God。 This I do not understand; but I say; the things
by me perceived are known by the understanding; and produced by
the will of an infinite Spirit。 And is not all this most plain
and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little
observation in our own minds; and that which passeth in them; not
only enables us to conceive; but also obliges us to acknowledge。
。 I think I understand you very clearly; and own the
proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is
surprising。 But; allowing that God is the supreme and universal
Cause of an things; yet; may there not be still a Third Nature
besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and
limited cause of our ideas? In a word; may there not for all that
be ?
。 How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow
the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere
without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which
is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing sensible
that exists without the mind。 The Matter; therefore; which you
still insist on is something intelligible; I suppose; something
that may be discovered by reason; and not by sense。
。 You are in the right。 {216}
。 Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of
Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is; in your present
sense of it。
。 I find myself affected with various ideas; whereof I
know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of
themselves; or of one another; or capable of subsisting by
themselves; as being altogether inactive; fleeting; dependent
beings。 They have therefore cause distinct from me and
them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is 。 And this thing; whatever it be; I call
Matter。
。 Tell me; Hylas; hath every one a liberty to change
the current proper signification attached to a common name in any
language? For example; suppose a traveller should tell you that
in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and; upon
explaining himself; you found he meant by the word fire that
which others call 。 Or; if he should assert that there are
trees that walk upon two legs; meaning men by the term 。
Would you think this reasonable?
。 No; I should think it very absurd。 Common custom is
the standard of propriety in language。 And for any man to affect
speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech; and can
never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply
disputes; where there is no difference in opinion。
。 And doth not ; in the common current
acceptation of the word; signify an extended; solid; moveable;
unthinking; inactive Substance?
。 It doth。
。 And; hath it not been made evident that no
substance can possibly exist? And; though it should be allowed to
exist; yet how can that which is be a ; or that
which is be a ? You may; indeed;
if you please; annex to the word a contrary meaning to
what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it; an
unextended; thinking; active being; which is the cause of our
ideas。 But what else is this than to play with words; and run
into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason?
I do by no means find fault with your reasoning; in that you
collect a cause from the : I deny that
cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter。
。 There is indeed something in what you say。 But I am
{217} afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning。 I would
by no means be thought to deny that God; or an infinite Spirit;
is the Supreme Cause of all things。 All I contend for is; that;
subordinate to the Supreme Agent; there is a cause of a limited
and inferior nature; which in the production of our
ideas; not by any act of will; or spiritual efficiency; but by
that kind of action which belongs to Matter; viz。 。
。 I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old
exploded conceit; of a moveable; and consequently an extended;
substance; existing without the mind。 What! Have you already
forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat
what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair
dealing in you; still to suppose the being of that which you have
so often acknowledged to have no being。 But; not to insist
farther on what has been so largely handled; I ask whether all
your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert; including nothing
of action in them。
。 They are。
。 And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
。 How often have I acknowledged that they are not。
。 But is not a sensible quality?
。 It is。
。 Consequently it is no action?
。 I agree with you。 And indeed it is very plain that
when I stir my finger; it remains passive; but my will which
produced the motion is active。
。 Now; I desire to know; in the first place; whether;
motion being allowed to be no action; you can conceive any action
besides volition: and; in the second place; whether to say
something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense: and;
lastly; whether; having considered the premises; you do not
perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our
ideas; other than ; is highly absurd and unreasonable?
。 I give up the point entirely。 But; though Matter may
not be a cause; yet what hinders its being an ;
subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?
。 An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure;
springs; wheels; and motions; of that instrument?
。 Those I pretend to determine nothing of; both the
substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me。
。 What? You are then of opinion it is made up of {218}
unknown parts; that it hath unknown motion