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a new set of sensations； existing only in his mind？
。 It is undeniable。
。 But； to make it still more plain： is not
a line turned endwise to the eye？
。 It is。
。 And can a line so situated be perceived by sight？
。 It cannot。
。 Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not
properly and immediately perceived by sight？
。 It should seem so。
。 Again； is it your opinion that colours are at a
distance？
。 It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind。
。 But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting
in the same place with extension and figures？
。 They do。
。 How can you then conclude from sight that figures
exist without； when you acknowledge colours do not； the sensible
appearance being the very same with regard to both？
。 I know not what to answer。
。 But； allowing that distance was truly and
immediately perceived by the mind； yet it would not thence follow
it existed out of the mind。 For； whatever is immediately
perceived is an idea： and can any idea exist out of the mind？
。 To suppose that were absurd： but； inform me；
Philonous； can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas？
。 As for the rational deducing of causes from effects；
｛203｝ that is beside our inquiry。 And； by the senses you can best
tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately
perceived。 And I ask you； whether the things immediately
perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas？ You have
indeed more than once； in the course of this conversation；
declared yourself on those points； but you seem； by this last
question； to have departed from what you then thought。
。 To speak the truth； Philonous； I think there are two
kinds of objects： the one perceived immediately； which are
likewise called ； the other are real things or external
objects； perceived by the mediation of ideas； which are their
images and representations。 Now； I own ideas do not exist without
the mind； but the latter sort of objects do。 I am sorry I did not
think of this distinction sooner； it would probably have cut
short your discourse。
。 Are those external objects perceived by sense or by
some other faculty？
。 They are perceived by sense。
。 Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is
not immediately perceived？
。 Yes； Philonous； in some sort there is。 For example；
when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar； I may be
said after a manner to perceive him （though not immediately） by
my senses。
。 It seems then you will have our ideas； which alone
are immediately perceived； to be pictures of external things： and
that these also are perceived by sense； inasmuch as they have a
conformity or resemblance to our ideas？
。 That is my meaning。
。 And； in the same way that Julius Caesar； in himself
invisible； is nevertheless perceived by sight； real things； in
themselves imperceptible； are perceived by sense。
。 In the very same。
。 Tell me； Hylas； when you behold the picture of
Julius Caesar； do you see with your eyes any more than some
colours and figures； with a certain symmetry and composition of
the whole？
。 Nothing else。
。 And would not a man who had never known anything of
Julius Caesar see as much？ ｛204｝
。 He would。
。 Consequently he hath his sight； and the use of it；
in as perfect a degree as you？
。 I agree with you。
。 Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed
to the Roman emperor； and his are not？ This cannot proceed from
the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived； since you
acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect。 It
should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory： should
it not？
。 It should。
。 Consequently； it will not follow from that instance
that anything is perceived by sense which is not； immediately
perceived。 Though I grant we may； in one acceptation； be said to
perceive sensible things mediately by sense： that is； when； from
a frequently perceived connexion； the immediate perception of
ideas by one sense to the mind others； perhaps
belonging to another sense； which are wont to be connected with
them。 For instance； when I hear a coach drive along the streets；
immediately I perceive only the sound； but； from the experience I
have had that such a sound is connected with a coach； I am said
to hear the coach。 It is nevertheless evident that； in truth and
strictness； nothing can be ； and the coach is
not then properly perceived by sense； but suggested from
experience。 So likewise when we are said to see a red…hot bar of
iron； the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of
sight； but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure
which are properly perceived by that sense。 In short； those
things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense；
which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then
been first conferred on us。 As for other things； it is plain they
are only suggested to the mind by experience； grounded on former
perceptions。 But； to return to your comparison of Caesar's
picture； it is plain； if you keep to that； you must hold the real
things； or archetypes of our ideas； are not perceived by sense；
but by some internal faculty of the soul； as reason or memory。 I
would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason
for the existence of what you call 。 Or； whether you remember to have seen them formerly as
they are in themselves； or； if you have heard or read of any one
that did。 ｛205｝
。 I see； Philonous； you are disposed to raillery； but
that will never convince me。
。 My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at
the knowledge of 。 Whatever we perceive is
perceived immediately or mediately： by sense； or by reason and
reflexion。 But； as you have excluded sense； pray shew me what
reason you have to believe their existence； or what you
can possibly make use of to prove it； either to mine or your own
understanding。
。 To deal ingenuously； Philonous； now I consider the
point； I do not find I can give you any good reason for it。 But；
thus much seems pretty plain； that it is at least possible such
things may really exist。 And； as long as there is no absurdity in
supposing them； I am resolved to believe as I did； till you bring
good reasons to the contrary。
。 What！ Is it come to this； that you only
the existence of material objects； and that your belief is
founded barely on the possibility of its being true？ Then you
will have me bring reasons against it： though another would think
it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the
affirmative。 And； after all； this very point which you are now
resolved to maintain； without any reason； is in effect what