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support your body？
。 No； that is the literal sense。
。 Pray let me know any sense； literal or not literal；
that you understand it in。 How long must I wait for an answer；
Hylas？
。 I declare I know not what to say。 I once thought I
understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting
accidents。 But now； the more I think on it the less can I
comprehend it： in short I find that I know nothing of it。
。 It seems then you have no idea at all； neither
relative nor positive； of Matter； you know neither what it is in
itself； nor what relation it bears to accidents？
。 I acknowledge it。
。 And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how
qualities or accidents should really exist； without conceiving at
the same time a material support of them？
。 I did。
。 That is to say； when you conceive the real existence
of qualities； you do withal conceive Something which you cannot
conceive？
。 It was wrong； I own。 But still I fear there is some
fallacy or other。 Pray what think you of this？ It is just come
into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your
treating of each quality by itself。 Now； I grant that each
quality cannot singly subsist without the mind。 Colour cannot
without extension； neither can figure without some other sensible
quality。 But； as the several qualities united or blended together
form entire sensible things； nothing hinders why such things may
not be supposed to exist without the mind。
。 Either； Hylas； you are jesting； or have a very bad
memory。 Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name
one after another； yet my arguments or rather your concessions；
nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not
subsist each alone by itself； but； that they were not ｛200｝ without the mind。 Indeed； in treating of figure and motion
we concluded they could not exist without the mind； because it
was impossible even in thought to separate them from all
secondary qualities； so as to conceive them existing by
themselves。 But then this was not the only argument made use of
upon that occasion。 But （to pass by all that hath been hitherto
said； and reckon it for nothing； if you will have it so） I am
content to put the whole upon this issue。 If you can conceive it
possible for any mixture or combination of qualities； or any
sensible object whatever； to exist without the mind； then I will
grant it actually to be so。
。 If it comes to that the point will soon be decided。
What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by
itself； independent of； and unperceived by； any mind whatsoever？
I do at this present time conceive them existing after that
manner。
。 How say you； Hylas； can you see a thing which is at
the same time unseen？
。 No； that were a contradiction。
。 Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of
a thing which is ？
。 It is。
。 The； tree or house therefore which you think of is
conceived by you？
。 How should it be otherwise？
。 And what is conceived is surely in the mind？
。 Without question； that which is conceived is in the
mind。
。 How then came you to say； you conceived a house or
tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever？
。 That was I own an oversight； but stay； let me
consider what led me into it。 It is a pleasant mistake enough。
As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place； where no one was
present to see it； methought that was to conceive a tree as
existing unperceived or unthought of； not considering that I
myself conceived it all the while。 But now I plainly see that all
I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind。 I may indeed conceive
in my own thoughts the idea of a tree； or a house； or a mountain；
but that is all。 And this is far from proving that I can conceive
them 。
。 You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly
conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist
otherwise than in the mind？ ｛201｝
。 I do。
。 And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of
that which you cannot so much as conceive？
。 I profess I know not what to think； but still there
are some scruples remain with me。 Is it not certain I a distance？ Do we not perceive the stars and moon； for
example； to be a great way off？ Is not this； I say； manifest to
the senses？
。 Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like
objects？
。 I do。
。 And have they not then the same appearance of being
distant？
。 They have。
。 But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a
dream to be without the mind？
。 By no means。
。 You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible
objects are without the mind； from their appearance； or manner
wherein they are perceived。
。 I acknowledge it。 But doth not my sense deceive me in
those cases？
。 By no means。 The idea or thing which you immediately
perceive； neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually
exists without the mind。 By sense you only know that you are
affected with such certain sensations of light and colours； &c。
And these you will not say are without the mind。
。 True： but； beside all that； do you not think the
sight suggests something of ？
。 Upon approaching a distant object； do the visible
size and figure change perpetually； or do they appear the same at
all distances？
。 They are in a continual change。
。 Sight therefore doth not suggest； or any way inform
you； that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a
distance； or will be perceived when you advance farther onward；
there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each
other during the whole time of your approach。
。 It doth not； but still I know； upon seeing an object；
what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain
distance： ｛202｝ no matter whether it be exactly the same or no：
there is still something of distance suggested in the case。
。 Good Hylas； do but reflect a little on the point；
and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this： from
the ideas you actually perceive by sight； you have by experience
learned to collect what other ideas you will （according to the
standing order of nature） be affected with； after such a certain
succession of time and motion。
。 Upon the whole； I take it to be nothing else。
。 Now； is it not plain that if we suppose a man born
blind was on a sudden made to see； he could at first have no
experience of what may be by sight？
。 It is。
。 He would not then； according to you； have any notion
of distance annexed to the things he saw； but would take them for
a new set of sensations； existing only in his mind？
。 It