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is deceptive and plays foul。 For just as a foul in a race is a
definite type of fault； and is a kind of foul fighting； so the art
of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation： for in the
former case those who are resolved to win at all costs snatch at
everything； and so in the latter case do contentious reasoners。 Those；
then； who do this in order to win the mere victory are generally
considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons； while those
who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are
sophistical。 For the art of sophistry is； as we said；' a kind of art
of money…making from a merely apparent wisdom； and this is why they
aim at a merely apparent demonstration： and quarrelsome persons and
sophists both employ the same arguments； but not with the same
motives： and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious；
but not in the same respect； rather； it will be contentious in so
far as its aim is an apparent victory； while in so far as its aim is
an apparent wisdom； it will be sophistical： for the art of sophistry
is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality。 The contentious
argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as
the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician； for it beguiles by
misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses； just as the
drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician。 But whereas the
latter is not a contentious reasoner； because he bases his false
diagram on the principles and conclusions that fall under the art of
geometry； the argument which is subordinate to the principles of
dialectic will yet clearly be contentious as regards other subjects。
Thus； e。g。 though the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules
is not contentious； Bryson's solution is contentious： and the former
argument cannot be adapted to any subject except geometry； because
it proceeds from principles that are peculiar to geometry； whereas the
latter can be adapted as an argument against all the number of
people who do not know what is or is not possible in each particular
context： for it will apply to them all。 Or there is the method whereby
Antiphon squared the circle。 Or again； an argument which denied that
it was better to take a walk after dinner； because of Zeno's argument；
would not be a proper argument for a doctor； because Zeno's argument
is of general application。 If； then； the relation of the contentious
argument to the dialectical were exactly like that of the drawer of
false diagrams to the geometrician； a contentious argument upon the
aforesaid subjects could not have existed。 But； as it is； the
dialectical argument is not concerned with any definite kind of being；
nor does it show anything； nor is it even an argument such as we
find in the general philosophy of being。 For all beings are not
contained in any one kind； nor； if they were； could they possibly fall
under the same principles。 Accordingly； no art that is a method of
showing the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions： for it
does not permit a man to grant whichever he likes of the two
alternatives in the question： for they will not both of them yield a
proof。 Dialectic； on the other hand； does proceed by questioning；
whereas if it were concerned to show things； it would have refrained
from putting questions； even if not about everything； at least about
the first principles and the special principles that apply to the
particular subject in hand。 For suppose the answerer not to grant
these； it would then no longer have had any grounds from which to
argue any longer against the objection。 Dialectic is at the same
time a mode of examination as well。 For neither is the art of
examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry； but one
which a man may possess； even though he has not knowledge。 For it is
possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of
one who is without knowledge； if also the latter grants him points
taken not from thing that he knows or from the special principles of
the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences
attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing
the theory of the subject； but which if he do not know； he is bound to
be ignorant of the theory。 So then clearly the art of examining does
not consist in knowledge of any definite subject。 For this reason；
too； it deals with everything： for every 'theory' of anything
employs also certain common principles。 Hence everybody； including
even amateurs； makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of
examining： for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who
profess to know things。 What serves them here is the general
principles： for they know these of themselves just as well as the
scientist； even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go
wildly astray from them。 All； then； are engaged in refutation； for
they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic
is concerned professionally； and he is a dialectician who examines
by the help of a theory of reasoning。 Now there are many identical
principles which are true of everything； though they are not such as
to constitute a particular nature； i。e。 a particular kind of being；
but are like negative terms； while other principles are not of this
kind but are special to particular subjects； accordingly it is
possible from these general principles to hold an examination on
everything； and that there should be a definite art of so doing；
and； moreover； an art which is not of the same kind as those which
demonstrate。 This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in
the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram：
for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from
any definite class of principles； but will deal with every class。
These； then； are the types of sophistical refutations： and that it
belongs to the dialectician to study these； and to be able to effect
them； is not difficult to see： for the investigation of premisses
comprises the whole of this study。
12
So much； then； for apparent refutations。 As for showing that the
answerer is committing some fallacy； and drawing his argument into
paradox…for this was the second item of the sophist's programme…in the
first place； then； this is best brought about by a certain manner of
questioning and through the question。 For to put the question
without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good
bait for these purposes： for people are more inclined to make mistakes
when they talk at large； and they talk at large when they have no
definite subject before them。 Also the putting of several questions；
even though th