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be directed against the thought。 Such being the meanings of the
phrases in question； they clearly cannot describe two separate classes
of argument。 For； in the first place； it is possible for any such
argument as bears more than one meaning to be directed against the
expression and against the thought； and next it is possible for any
argument whatsoever； for the fact of being directed against the
thought consists not in the nature of the argument； but in the special
attitude of the answerer towards the points he concedes。 Next； all
of them may be directed to the expression。 For 'to be directed against
the expression' means in this doctrine 'not to be directed against the
thought'。 For if not all are directed against either expression or
thought； there will be certain other arguments directed neither
against the expression nor against the thought； whereas they say
that all must be one or the other； and divide them all as directed
either against the expression or against the thought； while others
（they say） there are none。 But in point of fact those that depend on
mere expression are only a branch of those syllogisms that depend on a
multiplicity of meanings。 For the absurd statement has actually been
made that the description 'dependent on mere expression' describes all
the arguments that depend on language： whereas some of these are
fallacies not because the answerer adopts a particular attitude
towards them； but because the argument itself involves the asking of a
question such as bears more than one meaning。
It is； too； altogether absurd to discuss Refutation without first
discussing Proof： for a refutation is a proof； so that one ought to
discuss proof as well before describing false refutation： for a
refutation of that kind is a merely apparent proof of the
contradictory of a thesis。 Accordingly； the reason of the falsity will
be either in the proof or in the contradiction （for mention of the
'contradiction' must be added）； while sometimes it is in both； if
the refutation be merely apparent。 In the argument that speaking of
the silent is possible it lies in the contradiction； not in the proof；
in the argument that one can give what one does not possess； it lies
in both； in the proof that Homer's poem is a figure through its
being a cycle it lies in the proof。 An argument that does not fail
in either respect is a true proof。
But； to return to the point whence our argument digressed； are
mathematical reasonings directed against the thought； or not？ And if
any one thinks 'triangle' to be a word with many meanings； and granted
it in some different sense from the figure which was proved to contain
two right angles； has the questioner here directed his argument
against the thought of the former or not？
Moreover； if the expression bears many senses； while the answerer
does not understand or suppose it to have them； surely the
questioner here has directed his argument against his thought！ Or
how else ought he to put his question except by suggesting a
distinction…suppose one's question to be speaking of the silent
possible or not？'…as follows； 'Is the answer 〃No〃 in one sense； but
〃Yes〃 in another？' If； then； any one were to answer that it was not
possible in any sense and the other were to argue that it was； has not
his argument been directed against the thought of the answerer？ Yet
his argument is supposed to be one of those that depend on the
expression。 There is not； then； any definite kind of arguments that is
directed against the thought。 Some arguments are； indeed； directed
against the expression： but these are not all even apparent
refutations； let alone all refutations。 For there are also apparent
refutations which do not depend upon language； e。g。 those that
depend upon accident； and others。
If； however； any one claims that one should actually draw the
distinction； and say； 'By 〃speaking of the silent〃 I mean； in one
sense this and in the other sense that'； surely to claim this is in
the first place absurd （for sometimes the questioner does not see
the ambiguity of his question； and he cannot possibly draw a
distinction which he does not think to be there）： in the second place；
what else but this will didactic argument be？ For it will make
manifest the state of the case to one who has never considered； and
does not know or suppose that there is any other meaning but one。
For what is there to prevent the same thing also happening to us in
cases where there is no double meaning？ 'Are the units in four equal
to the twos？ Observe that the twos are contained in four in one
sense in this way； in another sense in that'。 Also； 'Is the
knowledge of contraries one or not？ Observe that some contraries are
known； while others are unknown'。 Thus the man who makes this claim
seems to be unaware of the difference between didactic and dialectical
argument； and of the fact that while he who argues didactically should
not ask questions but make things clear himself； the other should
merely ask questions。
11
Moreover； to claim a 'Yes' or 'No' answer is the business not of a
man who is showing something； but of one who is holding an
examination。 For the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has
in view not the man who has knowledge； but the ignorant pretender。 He；
then； is a dialectician who regards the common principles with their
application to the particular matter in hand； while he who only
appears to do this is a sophist。 Now for contentious and sophistical
reasoning： （1） one such is a merely apparent reasoning； on subjects on
which dialectical reasoning is the proper method of examination；
even though its conclusion be true： for it misleads us in regard to
the cause： also （2） there are those misreasonings which do not conform
to the line of inquiry proper to the particular subject； but are
generally thought to conform to the art in question。 For false
diagrams of geometrical figures are not contentious （for the resulting
fallacies conform to the subject of the art）…any more than is any
false diagram that may be offered in proof of a truth…e。g。
Hippocrates' figure or the squaring of the circle by means of the
lunules。 But Bryson's method of squaring the circle； even if the
circle is thereby squared； is still sophistical because it does not
conform to the subject in hand。 So； then； any merely apparent
reasoning about these things is a contentious argument； and any
reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand；
even though it be genuine reasoning； is a contentious argument： for it
is merely apparent in its conformity to the subject…matter； so that it
is deceptive and plays foul。 For just as a foul in a race is a
definite type of fault； and is a kind of fo