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on sophistical refutations-第5章

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'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing; or



to 'become equal' and to 'assume the same magnitude'。 For because what



has been generated has a beginning; he claims also that what has a



beginning has been generated; and argues as though both what has



been generated and what is finite were the same because each has a



beginning。 Likewise also in the case of things that are made equal



he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude



become equal; then also things that become equal assume one magnitude:



i。e。 he assumes the consequent。 Inasmuch; then; as a refutation



depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is;



clearly so also does a refutation depending on the consequent。 We



shall have further to examine this in another way as well。



  Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions



into one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of



'proposition'。 For a proposition is a single statement about a



single thing。 For the same definition applies to 'one single thing



only' and to the 'thing'; simply; e。g。 to 'man' and to 'one single man



only' and likewise also in other cases。 If; then; a 'single



proposition' be one which claims a single thing of a single thing; a



'proposition'; simply; will also be the putting of a question of



that kind。 Now since a proof starts from propositions and refutation



is a proof; refutation; too; will start from propositions。 If; then; a



proposition is a single statement about a single thing; it is



obvious that this fallacy too consists in ignorance of what a



refutation is: for in it what is not a proposition appears to be



one。 If; then; the answerer has returned an answer as though to a



single question; there will be a refutation; while if he has



returned one not really but apparently; there will be an apparent



refutation of his thesis。 All the types of fallacy; then; fall under



ignorance of what a refutation is; some of them because the



contradiction; which is the distinctive mark of a refutation; is



merely apparent; and the rest failing to conform to the definition



of a proof。







                                 7







  The deception comes about in the case of arguments that depend on



ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to divide



the ambiguous term (for some terms it is not easy to divide; e。g。



'unity'; 'being'; and 'sameness'); while in those that depend on



combination and division; it is because we suppose that it makes no



difference whether the phrase be combined or divided; as is indeed the



case with most phrases。 Likewise also with those that depend on



accent: for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a phrase is



thought not to alter its meaning…with any phrase; or not with many。



With those that depend on the of expression it is because of the



likeness of expression。 For it is hard to distinguish what kind of



things are signified by the same and what by different kinds of



expression: for a man who can do this is practically next door to



the understanding of the truth。 A special reason why a man is liable



to be hurried into assent to the fallacy is that we suppose every



predicate of everything to be an individual thing; and we understand



it as being one with the thing: and we therefore treat it as a



substance: for it is to that which is one with a thing or substance;



as also to substance itself; that 'individually' and 'being' are



deemed to belong in the fullest sense。 For this reason; too; this type



of fallacy is to be ranked among those that depend on language; in the



first place; because the deception is effected the more readily when



we are inquiring into a problem in company with others than when we do



so by ourselves (for an inquiry with another person is carried on by



means of speech; whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on quite



as much by means of the object itself); secondly a man is liable to be



deceived; even when inquiring by himself; when he takes speech as



the basis of his inquiry: moreover the deception arises out of the



likeness (of two different things); and the likeness arises out of the



language。 With those fallacies that depend upon Accident; deception



comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness



of terms; i。e。 their unity and multiplicity; or what kinds of



predicate have all the same accidents as their subject。 Likewise



also with those that depend on the Consequent: for the consequent is a



branch of Accident。 Moreover; in many cases appearances point to



this…and the claim is made that if is inseparable from B; so also is B



from With those that depend upon an imperfection in the definition



of a refutation; and with those that depend upon the difference



between a qualified and an absolute statement; the deception



consists in the smallness of the difference involved; for we treat the



limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as



adding nothing to the meaning; and so grant the statement universally。



Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point; and



those of false cause; and all that treat a number of questions as one:



for in all of them the deception lies in the smallness of the



difference: for our failure to be quite exact in our definition of



'premiss' and of 'proof' is due to the aforesaid reason。







                                 8







  Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend; we know



also on how many sophistical syllogisms and refutations may depend。 By



a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism



or refutation which appears to be valid but is not; but also one



which; though it is valid; only appears to be appropriate to the thing



in question。 These are those which fail to refute and prove people



to be ignorant according to the nature of the thing in question; which



was the function of the art of examination。 Now the art of examining



is a branch of dialectic: and this may prove a false conclusion



because of the ignorance of the answerer。 Sophistic refutations on the



other hand; even though they prove the contradictory of his thesis; do



not make clear whether he is ignorant: for sophists entangle the



scientist as well with these arguments。



  That we know them by the same line of inquiry is clear: for the same



considerations which make it appear to an audience that the points



required for the proof were asked in the questions and that the



conclusion was proved; would make the answerer think so as well; so



that false proof will occur through all or some of these means: for



what a man has not been asked but thinks he has granted; he would also



grant if he were asked。 Of course; in some cases the moment we add the



missing question; we also show up its fa
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