按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
one； and either confess their defeat by failing to answer the
question； or are exposed to an apparent refutation。 Thus 'Is A and
is B a man？' 'Yes。' 'Then if any one hits A and B； he will strike a
man' （singular）；'not men' （plural）。 Or again； where part is good and
part bad； 'is the whole good or bad？' For whichever he says； it is
possible that he might be thought to expose himself to an apparent
refutation or to make an apparently false statement： for to say that
something is good which is not good； or not good which is good； is
to make a false statement。 Sometimes； however； additional premisses
may actually give rise to a genuine refutation； e。g。 suppose a man
were to grant that the descriptions 'white' and 'naked' and 'blind'
apply to one thing and to a number of things in a like sense。 For if
'blind' describes a thing that cannot see though nature designed it to
see； it will also describe things that cannot see though nature
designed them to do so。 Whenever； then； one thing can see while
another cannot； they will either both be able to see or else both be
blind； which is impossible。
6
The right way； then； is either to divide apparent proofs and
refutations as above； or else to refer them all to ignorance of what
'refutation' is； and make that our starting…point： for it is
possible to analyse all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breaches
of the definition of a refutation。 In the first place； we may see if
they are inconclusive： for the conclusion ought to result from the
premisses laid down； so as to compel us necessarily to state it and
not merely to seem to compel us。 Next we should also take the
definition bit by bit； and try the fallacy thereby。 For of the
fallacies that consist in language； some depend upon a double meaning；
e。g。 ambiguity of words and of phrases； and the fallacy of like verbal
forms （for we habitually speak of everything as though it were a
particular substance）…while fallacies of combination and division
and accent arise because the phrase in question or the term as altered
is not the same as was intended。 Even this； however； should be the
same； just as the thing signified should be as well； if a refutation
or proof is to be effected； e。g。 if the point concerns a doublet； then
you should draw the conclusion of a 'doublet'； not of a 'cloak'。 For
the former conclusion also would be true； but it has not been
proved； we need a further question to show that 'doublet' means the
same thing； in order to satisfy any one who asks why you think your
point proved。
Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratio
elenchi when once 'proof' has been defined。 For the same definition
ought to hold good of 'refutation' too； except that a mention of
'the contradictory' is here added： for a refutation is a proof of
the contradictory。 If； then； there is no proof as regards an
accident of anything； there is no refutation。 For supposing； when A
and B are； C must necessarily be； and C is white； there is no
necessity for it to be white on account of the syllogism。 So； if the
triangle has its angles equal to two right…angles； and it happens to
be a figure； or the simplest element or starting point； it is not
because it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that it
has this character。 For the demonstration proves the point about it
not qua figure or qua simplest element； but qua triangle。 Likewise
also in other cases。 If； then； refutation is a proof； an argument
which argued per accidens could not be a refutation。 It is； however；
just in this that the experts and men of science generally suffer
refutation at the hand of the unscientific： for the latter meet the
scientists with reasonings constituted per accidens； and the
scientists for lack of the power to draw distinctions either say 'Yes'
to their questions； or else people suppose them to have said 'Yes'；
although they have not。
Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain
respect only or said absolutely； are clear cases of ignoratio
elenchi because the affirmation and the denial are not concerned
with the same point。 For of 'white in a certain respect' the
negation is 'not white in a certain respect'； while of 'white
absolutely' it is 'not white； absolutely'。 If； then； a man treats
the admission that a thing is 'white in a certain respect' as though
it were said to be white absolutely； he does not effect a
refutation； but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what
refutation is。
The clearest cases of all； however； are those that were previously
described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation'： and
this is also why they were called by that name。 For the appearance
of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition；
and if we divide fallacies in the above manner； we ought to set
'Defective definition' as a common mark upon them all。
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause； are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof。 For the
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so'； and this
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it： and again it
should come about without taking into account the original point；
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
begging the original point。
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause； are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof。 For the
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so'； and this
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it： and again it
should come about without taking into account the original point；
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
begging the original point。
Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident：
for the consequent is an accident； only it differs from the accident
in this； that you may secure an admission of the accident in the
case of one thing only （e。g。 the identity of a yellow thing and
honey and of a white thing and swan）； whereas the consequent always
involves more than one thing： for we claim that things that are the
same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another； and
this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent。 It is；
however； not always true； e。g。 suppose that and B are the same as C
per accidens； for both 'snow' and the 'swan' are the same as something
white'。 Or again； as in Melissus' argument； a man assumes that to
'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing； or