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no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple; so it is
in these cases of double questions too。 Whenever; then; the several
attributes belong to the one subject; or the one to the many; the
man who gives a simple answer encounters no obstacle even though he
has committed this mistake: but whenever an attribute belongs to one
subject but not to the other; or there is a question of a number of
attributes belonging to a number of subjects and in one sense both
belong to both; while in another sense; again; they do not; then there
is trouble; so that one must beware of this。 Thus (e。g。) in the
following arguments: Supposing to be good and B evil; you will; if you
give a single answer about both; be compelled to say that it is true
to call these good; and that it is true to call them evil and likewise
to call them neither good nor evil (for each of them has not each
character); so that the same thing will be both good and evil and
neither good nor evil。 Also; since everything is the same as itself
and different from anything else; inasmuch as the man who answers
double questions simply can be made to say that several things are
'the same' not as other things but 'as themselves'; and also that they
are different from themselves; it follows that the same things must be
both the same as and different from themselves。 Moreover; if what is
good becomes evil while what is evil is good; then they must both
become two。 So of two unequal things each being equal to itself; it
will follow that they are both equal and unequal to themselves。
Now these refutations fall into the province of other solutions as
well: for 'both' and 'all' have more than one meaning; so that the
resulting affirmation and denial of the same thing does not occur;
except verbally: and this is not what we meant by a refutation。 But it
is clear that if there be not put a single question on a number of
points; but the answerer has affirmed or denied one attribute only
of one subject only; the absurdity will not come to pass。
31
With regard to those who draw one into repeating the same thing a
number of times; it is clear that one must not grant that predications
of relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves;
e。g。 that 'double' is a significant term apart from the whole phrase
'double of half' merely on the ground that it figures in it。 For ten
figures in 'ten minus one' and in 'not do'; and generally the
affirmation in the negation; but for all that; suppose any one were to
say; 'This is not white'; he does not say that it is white。 The bare
word 'double'; one may perhaps say; has not even any meaning at all;
any more than has 'the' in 'the half': and even if it has a meaning;
yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination。 Nor is
'knowledge' the same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it;
e。g。 to be 'medical knowledge') as it is in general: for in general it
was the 'knowledge of the knowable'。 In the case of terms that are
predicated of the terms through which they are defined; you should say
the same thing; that the term defined is not the same in abstraction
as it is in the whole phrase。 For 'concave' has a general meaning
which is the same in the case of a snub nose; and of a bandy leg;
but when added to either substantive nothing prevents it from
differentiating its meaning; in fact it bears one sense as applied
to the nose; and another as applied to the leg: for in the former
connexion it means 'snub' and in the latter 'bandyshaped'; i。e。 it
makes no difference whether you say 'a snub nose' or 'a concave nose'。
Moreover; the expression must not be granted in the nominative case:
for it is a falsehood。 For snubness is not a concave nose but
something (e。g。 an affection) belonging to a nose: hence; there is
no absurdity in supposing that the snub nose is a nose possessing
the concavity that belongs to a nose。
32
With regard to solecisms; we have previously said what it is that
appears to bring them about; the method of their solution will be
clear in the course of the arguments themselves。 Solecism is the
result aimed at in all arguments of the following kind: 'Is a thing
truly that which you truly call it?' 'Yes'。 'But; speaking of a stone;
you call him real: therefore of a stone it follows that 〃him is
real〃。' No: rather; talking of a stone means not saying which' but
'whom'; and not 'that' but 'him'。 If; then; any one were to ask; 'Is a
stone him whom you truly call him?' he would be generally thought
not to be speaking good Greek; any more than if he were to ask; 'Is he
what you call her?' Speak in this way of a 'stick' or any neuter word;
and the difference does not break out。 For this reason; also; no
solecism is incurred; suppose any one asks; 'Is a thing what you say
it to be?' 'Yes'。 'But; speaking of a stick; you call it real:
therefore; of a stick it follows that it is real。' 'Stone'; however;
and 'he' have masculine designations。 Now suppose some one were to
ask; 'Can 〃he〃 be a she〃 (a female)?'; and then again; 'Well; but is
not he Coriscus?' and then were to say; 'Then he is a 〃she〃;' he has
not proved the solecism; even if the name 'Coriscus' does signify a
'she'; if; on the other hand; the answerer does not grant this: this
point must be put as an additional question: while if neither is it
the fact nor does he grant it; then the sophist has not proved his
case either in fact or as against the person he has been
questioning。 In like manner; then; in the above instance as well it
must be definitely put that 'he' means the stone。 If; however; this
neither is so nor is granted; the conclusion must not be stated:
though it follows apparently; because the case (the accusative);
that is really unlike; appears to be like the nominative。 'Is it
true to say that this object is what you call it by name?' 'Yes'。 'But
you call it by the name of a shield: this object therefore is 〃of a
shield〃。' No: not necessarily; because the meaning of 'this object' is
not 'of a shield' but 'a shield': 'of a shield' would be the meaning
of 'this object's'。 Nor again if 'He is what you call him by name';
while 'the name you call him by is Cleon's'; is he therefore
'Cleon's': for he is not 'Cleon's'; for what was said was that 'He;
not his; is what I call him by name'。 For the question; if put in
the latter way; would not even be Greek。 'Do you know this?' 'Yes。'
'But this is he: therefore you know he'。 No: rather 'this' has not the
same meaning in 'Do you know this?' as in 'This is a stone'; in the
first it stands for an accusative; in the second for a nominative
case。 'When you have understanding of anything; do you understand it?'
'Yes。' 'But you ha