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know the man who is coming towards them； but do know Corsicus； they
assert that they do know and don't know the same object； but not in
the same respect。 Yet； as we have already remarked； the correction
of arguments that depend upon the same point ought to be the same；
whereas this one will not stand if one adopts the same principle in
regard not to knowing something； but to being； or to being is a in a
certain state； e。g。 suppose that X is father； and is also yours： for
if in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not to
know the same thing； yet with that case the solution stated has
nothing to do。 Certainly there is nothing to prevent the same argument
from having a number of flaws； but it is not the exposition of any and
every fault that constitutes a solution： for it is possible for a
man to show that a false conclusion has been proved； but not to show
on what it depends； e。g。 in the case of Zeno's argument to prove
that motion is impossible。 So that even if any one were to try to
establish that this doctrine is an impossible one； he still is
mistaken； and even if he proved his case ten thousand times over；
still this is no solution of Zeno's argument： for the solution was all
along an exposition of false reasoning； showing on what its falsity
depends。 If then he has not proved his case； or is trying to establish
even a true proposition； or a false one； in a false manner； to point
this out is a true solution。 Possibly； indeed； the present
suggestion may very well apply in some cases： but in these cases； at
any rate； not even this would be generally agreed： for he knows both
that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure is
approaching。 To know and not to know the same thing is generally
thought to be possible； when e。g。 one knows that X is white； but
does not realize that he is musical： for in that way he does know
and not know the same thing； though not in the same respect。 But as to
the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is
approaching and that he is Coriscus。
A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that of
those who solve the proof that every number is a small number： for if；
when the conclusion is not proved； they pass this over and say that
a conclusion has been proved and is true； on the ground that every
number is both great and small； they make a mistake。
Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the
aforesaid reasonings； e。g。 the proof that 'X is your father'； or
'son'； or 'slave'。 Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proof
depends upon a plurality of meanings； the term； or the expression in
question； ought to bear a number of literal senses； whereas no one
speaks of A as being 'B's child' in the literal sense； if B is the
child's master； but the combination depends upon Accident。 'Is A
yours？' 'Yes。' 'And is A a child？' 'Yes。' 'Then the child A is yours；'
because he happens to be both yours and a child； but he is not 'your
child'。
There is also the proof that 'something 〃of evils〃 is good'； for
wisdom is a 'knowledge 〃of evils〃'。 But the expression that this is
'of so and…so' （='so…and…so's'） has not a number of meanings： it means
that it is 'so…and…so's property'。 We may suppose of course； on the
other hand； that it has a number of meanings…for we also say that
man is 'of the animals'； though not their property； and also that
any term related to 'evils' in a way expressed by a genitive case is
on that account a so…and…so 'of evils'； though it is not one of the
evils…but in that case the apparently different meanings seem to
depend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely。 'Yet it
is conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase
〃Something of evils is good〃。' Perhaps； but not with regard to the
phrase in question。 It would occur more nearly； suppose that 'A
servant is good of the wicked'； though perhaps it is not quite found
even there： for a thing may be 'good' and be 'X's' without being at
the same time 'X's good'。 Nor is the saying that 'Man is of the
animals' a phrase with a number of meanings： for a phrase does not
become possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose we express
it elliptically： for we express 'Give me the Iliad' by quoting half
a line of it； e。g。 'Give me 〃Sing； goddess； of the wrath。。。〃'
25
Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a
particular thing； or in a particular respect； or place； or manner；
or relation； and not valid absolutely； should be solved by considering
the conclusion in relation to its contradictory； to see if any of
these things can possibly have happened to it。 For it is impossible
for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to
belong to the same thing absolutely； there is； however； nothing to
prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation or
manner； or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular
respect and the other absolutely。 So that if this one belongs
absolutely and that one in a particular respect； there is as yet no
refutation。 This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion by
examining it in comparison with its contradictory。
All arguments of the following kind have this feature： 'Is it
possible for what is…not to be？ 〃No。〃 But； you see； it is something；
despite its not being。' Likewise also； Being will not be； for it
will not he some particular form of being。 Is it possible for the same
man at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath？' 'Can
the same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man？'
Or isn't it the case that being something in particular and Being
are not the same？ On the other hand； Not…being； even if it be
something； need not also have absolute 'being' as well。 Nor if a man
keeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particular
respect； is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely； but he
who swears that he will break his oath； and then breaks it； keeps this
particular oath only； he is not a keeper of his oath： nor is the
disobedient man 'obedient'； though he obeys one particular command。
The argument is similar； also； as regards the problem whether the same
man can at the same time say what is both false and true： but it
appears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to see
in which of the two connexions the word 'absolutely' is to be
rendered…with 'true' or with 'false'。 There is； however； nothing to
prevent it from being false absolutely； though true in some particular
respect or relation； i。e。 being true in some things； though not 'true'
absolutely。 Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and
place and time。 For all arguments of the following ki