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are good things to learn； aren't they？' 'Yes。' 'The knowledge；
however； of evil is good： therefore evil is a good thing to know。'
'Yes。 But； you see； evil is both evil and a thing…to…learn； so that
evil is an evil…thing…to…learn； although the knowledge of evils is
good。' Again； 'Is it true to say in the present moment that you are
born？' 'Yes。' 'Then you are born in the present moment。' 'No； the
expression as divided has a different meaning： for it is true to
say…in…the…present…moment that 〃you are born〃； but not 〃You are
born…in…the…present…moment〃。' Again； 'Could you do what you can； and
as you can？' 'Yes。' 'But when not harping； you have the power to harp：
and therefore you could harp when not harping。' 'No： he has not the
power to harp…while…not…harping； merely； when he is not doing it； he
has the power to do it。' Some people solve this last refutation in
another way as well。 For； they say； if he has granted that he can do
anything in the way he can； still it does not follow that he can
harp when not harping： for it has not been granted that he will do
anything in every way in which he can； and it is not the same thing'
to do a thing in the way he can' and 'to do it in every way in which
he can'。 But evidently they do not solve it properly： for of arguments
that depend upon the same point the solution is the same； whereas this
will not fit all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the
questions： it is valid against the questioner； but not against his
argument。
21
Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments； either as
written or as spoken； except perhaps some few that might be made up；
e。g。 the following argument。 'Is ou katalueis a house？' 'Yes。' 'Is
then ou katalueis the negation of katalueis？' 'Yes。' 'But you
said that ou katalueis is a house： therefore the house is a
negation。' How one should solve this； is clear： for the word does
not mean the same when spoken with an acuter and when spoken with a
graver accent。
22
It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend on
the identical expressions of things that are not identical； seeing
that we are in possession of the kinds of predications。 For the one
man； say； has granted； when asked； that a term denoting a substance
does not belong as an attribute； while the other has shown that some
attribute belongs which is in the Category of Relation or of Quantity；
but is usually thought to denote a substance because of its
expression； e。g。 in the following argument： 'Is it possible to be
doing and to have done the same thing at the same time？' 'No。' 'But；
you see； it is surely possible to be seeing and to have seen the
same thing at the same time； and in the same aspect。' Again； 'Is any
mode of passivity a mode of activity？' 'No。' 'Then 〃he is cut〃； 〃he is
burnt〃； 〃he is struck by some sensible object〃 are alike in expression
and all denote some form of passivity； while again 〃to say〃； 〃to run〃；
〃to see〃 are like one like one another in expression： but； you see；
〃to see〃 is surely a form of being struck by a sensible object；
therefore it is at the same time a form of passivity and of activity。'
Suppose； however； that in that case any one； after granting that it is
not possible to do and to have done the same thing in the same time；
were to say that it is possible to see and to have seen it； still he
has not yet been refuted； suppose him to say that 'to see' is not a
form of 'doing' （activity） but of 'passivity'： for this question is
required as well； though he is supposed by the listener to have
already granted it； when he granted that 'to cut' is a form of
present； and 'to have cut' a form of past； activity； and so on with
the other things that have a like expression。 For the listener adds
the rest by himself； thinking the meaning to be alike： whereas
really the meaning is not alike； though it appears to be so because of
the expression。 The same thing happens here as happens in cases of
ambiguity： for in dealing with ambiguous expressions the tyro in
argument supposes the sophist to have negated the fact which he （the
tyro） affirmed； and not merely the name： whereas there still wants the
question whether in using the ambiguous term he had a single meaning
in view： for if he grants that that was so； the refutation will be
effected。
Like the above are also the following arguments。 It is asked if a
man has lost what he once had and afterwards has not： for a man will
no longer have ten dice even though he has only lost one die。 No：
rather it is that he has lost what he had before and has not now；
but there is no necessity for him to have lost as much or as many
things as he has not now。 So then； he asks the questions as to what he
has； and draws the conclusion as to the whole number that he has：
for ten is a number。 If then he had asked to begin with； whether a man
no longer having the number of things he once had has lost the whole
number； no one would have granted it； but would have said 'Either
the whole number or one of them'。 Also there is the argument that 'a
man may give what he has not got'： for he has not got only one die。
No： rather it is that he has given not what he had not got； but in a
manner in which he had not got it； viz。 just the one。 For the word
'only' does not signify a particular substance or quality or number；
but a manner relation； e。g。 that it is not coupled with any other。
It is therefore just as if he had asked 'Could a man give what he
has not got？' and； on being given the answer 'No'； were to ask if a
man could give a thing quickly when he had not got it quickly； and； on
this being granted； were to conclude that 'a man could give what he
had not got'。 It is quite evident that he has not proved his point：
for to 'give quickly' is not to give a thing； but to give in a certain
manner； and a man could certainly give a thing in a manner in which he
has not got it； e。g。 he might have got it with pleasure and give it
with pain。
Like these are also all arguments of the following kind： 'Could a
man strike a blow with a hand which he has not got； or see with an eye
which he has not got？' For he has not got only one eye。 Some people
solve this case； where a man has more than one eye； or more than one
of anything else； by saying also that he has only one。 Others also
solve it as they solve the refutation of the view that 'what a man
has； he has received'： for A gave only one vote； and certainly B； they
say； has only one vote from A。 Others； again； proceed by demolishing
straight away the proposition asked； and admitting that it is quite
possible to have what one has not received； e。g。 to have received
sweet wine； but then； owing to its goin