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the premiss proposed is usually meant…whether as maxims are （for
people call by the name of 'maxims' both true opinions and general
assertions） or like the doctrine 'the diagonal of a square is
incommensurate with its side'： and moreover （2） whenever opinions
are divided as to the truth； we then have subjects of which it is very
easy to change the terminology undetected。 For because of the
uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth；
one will not be thought to be playing any trick； while because of
the division of opinion； one will not be thought to be telling a
falsehood。 Change the terminology therefore； for the change will
make the position irrefutable。
Moreover； whenever one foresees any question coming； one should
put in one's objection and have one's say beforehand： for by doing
so one is likely to embarrass the questioner most effectually。
18
Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning；
showing on what kind of question the falsity depends； and whereas
'false reasoning' has a double meaning…for it is used either if a
false conclusion has been proved； or if there is only an apparent
proof and no real one…there must be both the kind of solution just
described；' and also the correction of a merely apparent proof； so
as to show upon which of the questions the appearance depends。 Thus it
comes about that one solves arguments that are properly reasoned by
demolishing them； whereas one solves merely apparent arguments by
drawing distinctions。 Again； inasmuch as of arguments that are
properly reasoned some have a true and others a false conclusion；
those that are false in respect of their conclusion it is possible
to solve in two ways； for it is possible both by demolishing one of
the premisses asked； and by showing that the conclusion is not the
real state of the case： those； on the other hand； that are false in
respect of the premisses can be solved only by a demolition of one
of them； for the conclusion is true。 So that those who wish to solve
an argument should in the first place look and see if it is properly
reasoned； or is unreasoned； and next； whether the conclusion be true
or false； in order that we may effect the solution either by drawing
some distinction or by demolishing something； and demolishing it
either in this way or in that； as was laid down before。 There is a
very great deal of difference between solving an argument when being
subjected to questions and when not： for to foresee traps is
difficult； whereas to see them at one's leisure is easier。
19
Of the refutations； then； that depend upon ambiguity and amphiboly
some contain some question with more than one meaning； while others
contain a conclusion bearing a number of senses： e。g。 in the proof
that 'speaking of the silent' is possible； the conclusion has a double
meaning； while in the proof that 'he who knows does not understand
what he knows' one of the questions contains an amphiboly。 Also the
double…edged saying is true in one context but not in another： it
means something that is and something that is not。
Whenever； then； the many senses lie in the conclusion no
refutation takes place unless the sophist secures as well the
contradiction of the conclusion he means to prove； e。g。 in the proof
that 'seeing of the blind' is possible： for without the
contradiction there was no refutation。 Whenever； on the other hand；
the many senses lie in the questions； there is no necessity to begin
by denying the double…edged premiss： for this was not the goal of
the argument but only its support。 At the start； then； one should
reply with regard to an ambiguity； whether of a term or of a phrase；
in this manner； that 'in one sense it is so； and in another not so'；
as e。g。 that 'speaking of the silent' is in one sense possible but
in another not possible： also that in one sense 'one should do what
must needs be done'； but not in another： for 'what must needs be'
bears a number of senses。 If； however； the ambiguity escapes one；
one should correct it at the end by making an addition to the
question： 'Is speaking of the silent possible？' 'No； but to speak of
while he is silent is possible。' Also； in cases which contain the
ambiguity in their premisses； one should reply in like manner： 'Do
people…then not understand what they know？ 〃Yes； but not those who
know it in the manner described'： for it is not the same thing to
say that 'those who know cannot understand what they know'； and to say
that 'those who know something in this particular manner cannot do
so'。 In general； too； even though he draws his conclusion in a quite
unambiguous manner； one should contend that what he has negated is not
the fact which one has asserted but only its name； and that
therefore there is no refutation。
20
It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that
depend upon the division and combination of words： for if the
expression means something different when divided and when combined；
as soon as one's opponent draws his conclusion one should take the
expression in the contrary way。 All such expressions as the
following depend upon the combination or division of the words： 'Was X
being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten？' and
'Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being
beaten？' This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the
questions； but it really depends upon combination。 For the meaning
that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double
meaning （for the expression when divided is not the same）； unless also
the word that is pronounced； according to its breathing； as eros and
eros is a case of double meaning。 （In writing； indeed； a word is the
same whenever it is written of the same letters and in the same
manner… and even there people nowadays put marks at the side to
show the pronunciation… but the spoken words are not the same。）
Accordingly an expression that depends upon division is not an
ambiguous one。 It is evident also that not all refutations depend upon
ambiguity as some people say they do。
The answerer； then； must divide the expression： for
'I…saw…a…man…being…beaten with my eyes' is not the same as to say 'I
saw a man being…beaten…with…my…eyes'。 Also there is the argument of
Euthydemus proving 'Then you know now in Sicily that there are
triremes in Piraeus'： and again； 'Can a good man who is a cobbler be
bad？' 'No。' 'But a good man may be a bad cobbler： therefore a good
cobbler will be bad。' Again； 'Things the knowledge of which is good；
are good things to learn； aren't they？' 'Yes。' 'The knowledge；
however； of ev