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Coriscus unmusical。 But this will not do； for to say 'this Coriscus is
unmusical'； or 'musical'； and to say 'this Coriscus' is so； is to
use the same expression： and this he is both affirming and denying
at once。 'But perhaps they do not mean the same。' Well； nor did the
simple name in the former case： so where is the difference？ If；
however； he is to ascribe to the one person the simple title
'Coriscus'； while to the other he is to add the prefix 'one' or
'this'； he commits an absurdity： for the latter is no more
applicable to the one than to the other： for to whichever he adds
it； it makes no difference。
All the same； since if a man does not distinguish the senses of an
amphiboly； it is not clear whether he has been confuted or has not
been confuted； and since in arguments the right to distinguish them is
granted； it is evident that to grant the question simply without
drawing any distinction is a mistake； so that； even if not the man
himself； at any rate his argument looks as though it had been refuted。
It often happens； however； that； though they see the amphiboly； people
hesitate to draw such distinctions； because of the dense crowd of
persons who propose questions of the kind； in order that they may
not be thought to be obstructionists at every turn： then； though
they would never have supposed that that was the point on which the
argument turned； they often find themselves faced by a paradox。
Accordingly； since the right of drawing the distinction is granted；
one should not hesitate； as has been said before。
If people never made two questions into one question； the fallacy
that turns upon ambiguity and amphiboly would not have existed either；
but either genuine refutation or none。 For what is the difference
between asking 'Are Callias and Themistocles musical？' and what one
might have asked if they； being different； had had one name？ For if
the term applied means more than one thing； he has asked more than one
question。 If then it be not right to demand simply to be given a
single answer to two questions； it is evident that it is not proper to
give a simple answer to any ambiguous question； not even if the
predicate be true of all the subjects； as some claim that one
should。 For this is exactly as though he had asked 'Are Coriscus and
Callias at home or not at home？'； supposing them to be both in or both
out： for in both cases there is a number of propositions： for though
the simple answer be true； that does not make the question one。 For it
is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different
questions when put to one； all together with either a 'Yes' or a 'No'：
but still one should not answer them with a single answer： for that is
the death of discussion。 Rather； the case is like as though
different things has actually had the same name applied to them。 If
then； one should not give a single answer to two questions； it is
evident that we should not say simply 'Yes' or 'No' in the case of
ambiguous terms either： for the remark is simply a remark； not an
answer at all； although among disputants such remarks are loosely
deemed to be answers； because they do not see what the consequence is。
As we said； then； inasmuch as certain refutations are generally
taken for such； though not such really； in the same way also certain
solutions will be generally taken for solutions； though not really
such。 Now these； we say； must sometimes be advanced rather than the
true solutions in contentious reasonings and in the encounter with
ambiguity。 The proper answer in saying what one thinks is to say
'Granted'； for in that way the likelihood of being refuted on a side
issue is minimized。 If； on the other hand； one is compelled to say
something paradoxical； one should then be most careful to add that 'it
seems' so： for in that way one avoids the impression of being either
refuted or paradoxical。 Since it is clear what is meant by 'begging
the original question'； and people think that they must at all costs
overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion； and plead in
excuse for refusing to grant him some of them that he is begging the
original question； so whenever any one claims from us a point such
as is bound to follow as a consequence from our thesis； but is false
or paradoxical； we must plead the same： for the necessary consequences
are generally held to be a part of the thesis itself。 Moreover；
whenever the universal has been secured not under a definite name； but
by a comparison of instances； one should say that the questioner
assumes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor in which he
proposed it in the premiss： for this too is a point upon which a
refutation often depends。
If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument
that the conclusion has not been properly shown； approaching it in the
light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of
fallacy。
In the case； then； of names that are used literally one is bound
to answer either simply or by drawing a distinction： the tacit
understandings implied in our statements； e。g。 in answer to
questions that are not put clearly but elliptically…it is upon this
that the consequent refutation depends。 For example； 'Is what
belongs to Athenians the property of Athenians？' Yes。 'And so it is
likewise in other cases。 But observe； man belongs to the animal
kingdom； doesn't he？' Yes。 'Then man is the property of the animal
kingdom。' But this is a fallacy： for we say that man 'belongs to'
the animal kingdom because he is an animal； just as we say that
Lysander 'belongs to' the Spartans； because he is a Spartan。 It is
evident； then； that where the premiss put forward is not clear； one
must not grant it simply。
Whenever of two things it is generally thought that if the one is
true the other is true of necessity； whereas； if the other is true；
the first is not true of necessity； one should； if asked which of them
is true； grant the smaller one： for the larger the number of
premisses； the harder it is to draw a conclusion from them。 If； again；
the sophist tries to secure that has a contrary while B has not；
suppose what he says is true； you should say that each has a contrary；
only for the one there is no established name。
Since； again； in regard to some of the views they express； most
people would say that any one who did not admit them was telling a
falsehood； while they would not say this in regard to some； e。g。 to
any matters whereon opinion is divided （for most people have no
distinct view whether the soul of animals is destructible or
immortal）； accordingly （1） it is uncertain in which of two senses
the premiss proposed is usually meant…whether as maxims are （for
people call by the name of 'maxims' both true opinions and g