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answerer's position either with his own statements； or with those of
persons whom he admits to say and do aright； moreover with those of
people who are generally supposed to bear that kind of character； or
who are like them； or with those of the majority or of all men。 Also
just as answerers； too； often； when they are in process of being
confuted； draw a distinction； if their confutation is just about to
take place； so questioners also should resort to this from time to
time to counter objectors； pointing out； supposing that against one
sense of the words the objection holds； but not against the other；
that they have taken it in the latter sense； as e。g。 Cleophon does
in the Mandrobulus。 They should also break off their argument and
cut down their other lines of attack； while in answering； if a man
perceives this being done beforehand； he should put in his objection
and have his say first。 One should also lead attacks sometimes against
positions other than the one stated； on the understood condition
that one cannot find lines of attack against the view laid down； as
Lycophron did when ordered to deliver a eulogy upon the lyre。 To
counter those who demand 'Against what are you directing your
effort？'； since one is generally thought bound to state the charge
made； while； on the other hand； some ways of stating it make the
defence too easy； you should state as your aim only the general result
that always happens in refutations； namely the contradiction of his
thesis …viz。 that your effort is to deny what he has affirmed； or to
affirm what he denied： don't say that you are trying to show that
the knowledge of contraries is； or is not； the same。 One must not
ask one's conclusion in the form of a premiss； while some
conclusions should not even be put as questions at all； one should
take and use it as granted。
16
We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions； and the
methods of questioning in contentious disputations： next we have to
speak of answering； and of how solutions should be made； and of what
requires them； and of what use is served by arguments of this kind。
The use of them； then； is； for philosophy； twofold。 For in the first
place； since for the most part they depend upon the expression； they
put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is
used； and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur
between things and between their names。 In the second place they are
useful for one's own personal researches； for the man who is easily
committed to a fallacy by some one else； and does not perceive it；
is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions。
Thirdly and lastly； they further contribute to one's reputation；
viz。 the reputation of being well trained in everything； and not
inexperienced in anything： for that a party to arguments should find
fault with them； if he cannot definitely point out their weakness；
creates a suspicion； making it seem as though it were not the truth of
the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper。
Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind； if our
previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came； and
also our distinctions adequate of the forms of dishonesty in putting
questions。 But it is not the same thing take an argument in one's hand
and then to see and solve its faults； as it is to be able to meet it
quickly while being subjected to questions： for what we know； we often
do not know in a different context。 Moreover； just as in other
things speed is enhanced by training； so it is with arguments too；
so that supposing we are unpractised； even though a point be clear
to us； we are often too late for the right moment。 Sometimes too it
happens as with diagrams； for there we can sometimes analyse the
figure； but not construct it again： so too in refutations； though we
know the thing on which the connexion of the argument depends； we
still are at a loss to split the argument apart。
17
First then； just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to
prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth； so
also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general
estimation than according to the truth。 For it is a general rule in
fighting contentious persons； to treat them not as refuting； but as
merely appearing to refute： for we say that they don't really prove
their case； so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel
the appearance of it。 For if refutation be an unambiguous
contradiction arrived at from certain views； there could be no need to
draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambiguity： they do not
effect a proof。 The only motive for drawing further distinctions is
that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation。 What； then； we
have to beware of； is not being refuted； but seeming to be； because of
course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon
ambiguity； and all the other tricks of that kind； conceal even a
genuine refutation； and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is
not。 For since one has the right at the end； when the conclusion is
drawn； to say that the only denial made of One's statement is
ambiguous； no matter how precisely he may have addressed his
argument to the very same point as oneself； it is not clear whether
one has been refuted： for it is not clear whether at the moment one is
speaking the truth。 If； on the other hand； one had drawn a
distinction； and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the
amphiboly； the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty。
Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers； though
less so nowadays than formerly； would have been fulfilled； namely that
the person questioned should answer either 'Yes' or 'No'： whereas
nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions
compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in
correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put： for certainly；
if the questioner distinguishes his meaning adequately； the answerer
is bound to reply either 'Yes' or 'No'。
If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon
ambiguity is a refutation； it will be impossible for an answerer to
escape being refuted in a sense： for in the case of visible objects
one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted； and to
assert what one has denied。 For the remedy which some people have
for this is quite unavailing。 They say； not that Coriscus is both
musical and unmusical； but that this Coriscus is musical and this
Coriscus unmusical。 But this will not do； for to say 'this Coriscus is
unmusical'； or 'musical'；