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commits a solecism； though he does not seem to do so to other
people； where he who calls it a 'destructor' （oulomenon） commits no
solecism though he seems to do so。 It is clear； then； that any one
could produce this effect by art as well： and for this reason many
arguments seem to lead to solecism which do not really do so； as
happens in the case of refutations。
Almost all apparent solecisms depend upon the word 'this' （tode）；
and upon occasions when the inflection denotes neither a masculine nor
a feminine object but a neuter。 For 'he' （outos） signifies a
masculine； and 'she' （aute） feminine； but 'this' （touto）； though
meant to signify a neuter； often also signifies one or other of the
former： e。g。 'What is this？' 'It is Calliope'； 'it is a log'； 'it is
Coriscus'。 Now in the masculine and feminine the inflections are all
different； whereas in the neuter some are and some are not。 Often；
then； when 'this' （touto） has been granted； people reason as if 'him'
（touton） had been said： and likewise also they substitute one
inflection for another。 The fallacy comes about because 'this'
（touto） is a common form of several inflections： for 'this' signifies
sometimes 'he' （outos） and sometimes 'him' （touton）。 It should
signify them alternately； when combined with 'is' （esti） it should be
'he'； while with 'being' it should be 'him'： e。g。 'Coriscus
（Kopiskos） is'； but 'being Coriscus' （Kopiskon）。 It happens in the
same way in the case of feminine nouns as well； and in the case of the
so…called 'chattels' that have feminine or masculine designations。 For
only those names which end in o and n； have the designation proper
to a chattel； e。g。 xulon （'log'）； schoinion （'rope'）； those which do
not end so have that of a masculine or feminine object； though some of
them we apply to chattels： e。g。 askos （'wineskin'） is a masculine
noun； and kline （'bed'） a feminine。 For this reason in cases of this
kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a
construction with 'is' （esti） or with 'being' （to einai）。 Also；
Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said
to depend on the like expression of unlike things。 For； just as
there we come upon a material solecism； so here we come upon a verbal：
for 'man' is both a 'matter' for expression and also a 'word'： and
so is white'。
It is clear； then； that for solecisms we must try to construct our
argument out of the aforesaid inflections。
These； then； are the types of contentious arguments； and the
subdivisions of those types； and the methods for conducting them
aforesaid。 But it makes no little difference if the materials for
putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to
concealment； as in the case of dialectics。 Following then upon what we
have said； this must be discussed first。
15
With a view then to refutation； one resource is length…for it is
difficult to keep several things in view at once； and to secure length
the elementary rules that have been stated before' should be employed。
One resource； on the other hand； is speed； for when people are left
behind they look ahead less。 Moreover； there is anger and
contentiousness； for when agitated everybody is less able to take care
of himself。 Elementary rules for producing anger are to make a show of
the wish to play foul； and to be altogether shameless。 Moreover； there
is the putting of one's questions alternately； whether one has more
than one argument leading to the same conclusion； or whether one has
arguments to show both that something is so； and that it is not so：
for the result is that he has to be on his guard at the same time
either against more than one line； or against contrary lines； of
argument。 In general； all the methods described before of producing
concealment are useful also for purposes of contentious argument：
for the object of concealment is to avoid detection； and the object of
this is to deceive。
To counter those who refuse to grant whatever they suppose to help
one's argument； one should put the question negatively； as though
desirous of the opposite answer； or at any rate as though one put
the question without prejudice； for when it is obscure what answer one
wants to secure； people are less refractory。 Also when； in dealing
with particulars； a man grants the individual case； when the induction
is done you should often not put the universal as a question； but take
it for granted and use it： for sometimes people themselves suppose
that they have granted it； and also appear to the audience to have
done so； for they remember the induction and assume that the questions
could not have been put for nothing。 In cases where there is no term
to indicate the universal； still you should avail yourself of the
resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose； for resemblance
often escapes detection。 Also； with a view to obtaining your
premiss； you ought to put it in your question side by side with its
contrary。 E。g。 if it were necessary to secure the admission that 'A
man should obey his father in everything'； ask 'Should a man obey
his parents in everything； or disobey them in everything？'； and to
secure that 'A number multiplied by a large number is a large number'；
ask 'Should one agree that it is a large number or a small one？' For
then； if compelled to choose； one will be more inclined to think it
a large one： for the placing of their contraries close beside them
makes things look big to men； both relatively and absolutely； and
worse and better。
A strong appearance of having been refuted is often produced by
the most highly sophistical of all the unfair tricks of questioners；
when without proving anything； instead of putting their final
proposition as a question； they state it as a conclusion； as though
they had proved that 'Therefore so…and…so is not true'
It is also a sophistical trick； when a paradox has been laid down；
first to propose at the start some view that is generally accepted；
and then claim that the answerer shall answer what he thinks about it；
and to put one's question on matters of that kind in the form 'Do
you think that。。。？' For then； if the question be taken as one of the
premisses of one's argument； either a refutation or a paradox is bound
to result； if he grants the view； a refutation； if he refuses to grant
it or even to admit it as the received opinion； a paradox； if he
refuses to grant it； but admits that it is the received opinion；
something very like a refutation； results。
Moreover； just as in rhetorical discourses； so also in those aimed
at refutation； you should examine the discrepancies of the
answerer's position either with his own statements； or with those of
persons whom he admit