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on sophistical refutations-第1章

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                           ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS





                                  by Aristotle





                     translated by W。 A。 Pickard…Cambridge













                              Book I







                                 1







  LET us now discuss sophistic refutations; i。e。 what appear to be



refutations but are really fallacies instead。 We will begin in the



natural order with the first。



  That some reasonings are genuine; while others seem to be so but are



not; is evident。 This happens with arguments; as also elsewhere;



through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham。 For



physically some people are in a vigorous condition; while others



merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the



tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are



beautiful thanks to their beauty; while others seem to be so; by



dint of embellishing themselves。 So it is; too; with inanimate things;



for of these; too; some are really silver and others gold; while



others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e。g。 things



made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver; while those made of



yellow metal look golden。 In the same way both reasoning and



refutation are sometimes genuine; sometimes not; though inexperience



may make them appear so: for inexperienced people obtain only; as it



were; a distant view of these things。 For reasoning rests on certain



statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of



something other than what has been stated; through what has been



stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the



given conclusion。 Now some of them do not really achieve this;



though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the



most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names



only。 It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things



discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and



therefore we suppose that what follows in the names; follows in the



things as well; just as people who calculate suppose in regard to



their counters。 But the two cases (names and things) are not alike。



For names are finite and so is the sum…total of formulae; while things



are infinite in number。 Inevitably; then; the same formulae; and a



single name; have a number of meanings。 Accordingly just as; in



counting; those who are not clever in manipulating their counters



are taken in by the experts; in the same way in arguments too those



who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both



in their own discussions and when they listen to others。 For this



reason; then; and for others to be mentioned later; there exists



both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real。 Now for



some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise; than to be



wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the



semblance of wisdom without the reality; and the sophist is one who



makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them; then; it is



clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man



rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so。 To reduce it to



a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a



thing; himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and



to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these



accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer;



and the other upon the securing of one。 Those; then; who would be



sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it



is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man



seem to be wise; and this is the purpose they happen to have in view。



  Clearly; then; there exists a class of arguments of this kind; and



it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists。



Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophistical



arguments; and how many in number are the elements of which this



faculty is composed; and how many branches there happen to be of



this inquiry; and the other factors that contribute to this art。







                                 2







  Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes:



  Didactic; Dialectical; Examination…arguments; and Contentious



arguments。 Didactic arguments are those that reason from the



principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions



held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust):



dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generally



accepted; to the contradictory of a given thesis:



examination…arguments are those that reason from premisses which are



accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess



knowledge of the subject is bound to know…in what manner; has been



defined in another treatise: contentious arguments are those that



reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that



appear to be generally accepted but are not so。 The subject; then;



of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics;



while that of dialectic arguments and examination…arguments has been



discussed elsewhere: let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used



in competitions and contests。



                                 3







  First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who



argue as competitors and rivals to the death。 These are five in



number; refutation; fallacy; paradox; solecism; and fifthly to



reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling…i。e。 to constrain



him to repeat himself a number of times: or it is to produce the



appearance of each of these things without the reality。 For they



choose if possible plainly to refute the other party; or as the second



best to show that he is committing some fallacy; or as a third best to



lead him into paradox; or fourthly to reduce him to solecism; i。e。



to make the answerer; in consequence of the argument; to use an



ungrammatical expression; or; as a last resort; to make him repeat



himself。







                                 4







  There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the



language used; while some are independent of language。 Those ways of



producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language



are six in number: they are ambiguity; amphiboly; combination;



division of words; accent; form of expression。 Of this we may assure



ourselves both by induction; and by syllogistic proof based on



this…and it may be on other assumptions as well…that this is the



number of ways in which we might fall to mean the same thing by the



same names or expressions。 Arguments such as the following depend upon



ambiguity。 'Those learn who know: for it is those who know their



letters who learn the letter
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