the man versus the state-第31章

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made　of　land　by　individuals　or　by　groups　of　them；　and　decisions　of　the　majority　would　rightly　prevail　respecting　the　terms　on　which　portions　of　it　might　be　employed　for　raising　food；　for　making　means　of　communication；　and　for　other　purposes。　Even　at　present；　though　the　matter　has　been　complicated　by　the　growth　of　private　landownership；　yet；　since　the　State　is　still　supreme　owner　（every　landowner　being　in　law　a　tenant　of　the　Crown）　able　to　resume　possession；　or　authorize　compulsory　purchase；　at　a　fair　price；　the　implication　is　that　the　will　of　the　majority　is　valid　respecting　the　modes　in　which；　and　conditions　under　which；　parts　of　the　surface　or　sub…surface；　may　be　utilized：　involving　certain　agreements　made　on　behalf　of　the　public　with　private　persons　and　companies。　　　　　　Details　are　not　needful　here；　nor　is　it　needful　to　discuss　that　border　region　lying　between　these　classes　of　cases；　and　to　say　how　much　is　included　in　the　last　and　how　much　is　excluded　with　the　first。　For　present　purposes；　it　is　sufficient　to　recognize　the　undeniable　truth　that　there　are　numerous　kinds　of　actions　in　respect　of　which　men　would　not；　if　they　were　asked；　agree　with　anything　like　unanimity　to　be　bound　by　the　will　of　the　majority；　while　there　are　some　kinds　of　actions　in　respect　of　which　they　would　almost　unanimously　agree　to　be　thus　bound。　Here；　then；　we　find　a　definite　warrant　for　enforcing　the　will　of　the　majority　within　certain　limits；　and　a　definite　warrant　for　denying　the　authority　of　its　will　beyond　those　limits。　　　　　　But　evidently；　when　analysed；　the　question　resolves　itself　into　the　further　question　　What　are　the　relative　claims　of　the　aggregate　and　of　its　units？　Are　the　rights　of　the　community　universally　valid　against　the　individual？　or　has　the　individual　some　rights　which　are　valid　against　the　community？　The　judgment　given　on　this　point　underlies　the　entire　fabric　of　political　convictions　formed；　and　more　especially　those　convictions　which　concern　the　proper　sphere　of　government。　Here；　then；　I　propose　to　revive　a　dormant　controversy；　with　the　expectation　of　reaching　a　different　conclusion　from　that　which　is　fashionable。　

Says　Professor　Jevons；　in　his　work；　The　State　in　Relation　to　Labour　〃The　first　step　must　be　to　rid　our　minds　of　the　idea　that　there　are　any　such　things　in　social　matters　as　abstract　rights。〃　Of　like　character　is　the　belief　expressed　by　Mr　Matthew　Arnold；　in　his　article　on　copyright：　　〃An　author　has　no　natural　right　to　a　property　in　his　production。　But　then　neither　has　he　a　natural　right　to　anything　whatever　which　he　may　produce　or　acquire。〃（5*）　So；　too；　I　recently　read　in　a　weekly　journal　of　high　repute；　that　〃to　explain　once　more　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　'natural　right'　would　be　a　waste　of　philosophy。〃　And　the　view　expressed　in　these　extracts　is　commonly　uttered　by　statesmen　and　lawyers　in　a　way　implying　that　only　the　unthinking　masses　hold　any　other。　　　　　　One　might　have　expected　that　utterances　to　this　effect　would　have　been　rendered　less　dogmatic　by　the　knowledge　that　a　whole　school　of　legalists　on　the　Continent；　maintains　a　belief　diametrically　opposed　to　that　maintained　by　the　English　school。　The　idea　of　Natur…recht　is　the　root…idea　of　German　jurisprudence。　Now　whatever　may　be　the　opinion　held　respecting　German　philosophy　at　large；　it　cannot　be　characterized　as　shallow。　A　doctrine　current　among　a　people　distinguished　above　all　others　as　laborious　inquirers；　and　certainly　not　to　be　classed　with　superficial　thinkers；　should　not　be　dismissed　as　though　it　were　nothing　more　than　a　popular　delusion。　This；　however；　by　the　way。　Along　with　the　proposition　denied　in　the　above　quotations；　there　goes　a　counter…proposition　affirmed。　Let　us　see　what　it　is；　and　what　results　when　we　go　behind　it　and　seek　its　warrant。　　　　　　On　reverting　to　Bentham；　we　find　this　counter…proposition　overtly　expressed。　He　tells　us　that　government　fulfils　its　office　〃by　creating　rights　which　it　confers　upon　individuals：　rights　of　personal　security；　rights　of　protection　for　honour；　rights　of　property；〃　etc。（6*）　Were　this　doctrine　asserted　as　following　from　the　divine　right　of　kings；　there　would　be　nothing　in　it　manifestly　incongruous。　Did　it　come　to　us　from　ancient　Peru；　where　the　Ynca　〃was　the　source　from　which　evening　flowed〃；（7*）　or　from　Shoa　（Abyssinia）；　where　〃of　their　persons　and　worldly　substance　he　＇the　king＇　is　absolute　master〃；（8*）　or　from　Dahome；　where　〃all　men　are　slaves　to　the　king〃；（9*）　it　would　be　consistent　enough。　But　Bentham；　far　from　being　an　absolutist　like　Hobbes；　wrote　in　the　interests　of　popular　rule。　In　his　Constitutional　Code（10*）　he　fixes　the　sovereignty　in　the　whole　people；　arguing　that　it　is　best　〃to　give　the　sovereign　power　to　the　largest　possible　portion　of　those　whose　greatest　happiness　is　the　proper　and　chosen　object；〃　because　〃this　proportion　is　more　apt　than　any　other　that　can　be　proposed〃　for　achievement　of　that　object。　　　　　　Mark；　now；　what　happens　when　we　put　these　two　doctrines　together。　The　sovereign　people　jointly　appoint　representatives；　and　so　create　a　government；　the　government　thus　created；　creates　rights；　and　then；　having　created　rights；　it　confers　them　on　the　separate　members　of　the　sovereign　people　by　which　it　was　itself　created。　Here　is　a　marvellous　piece　of　political　legerdemain！　Mr　Matthew　Arnold；　contending；　in　the　article　above　quoted；　that　〃property　is　the　creation　of　law；〃　tells　us　to　beware　of　the　〃metaphysical　phantom　of　property　in　itself。〃　Surely；　among　metaphysical　phantoms　the　most　shadowy　is　this　which　supposes　a　thing　to　be　obtained　by　creating　an　agent；　which　creates　the　thing；　and　then　confers　the　thing　on　its　own　creator。！　　　　　　From　whatever　point　of　view　we　consider　it；　Bentham's　proposition　proves　to　be　unthinkable。　Government；　he　says；　fulfils　its　office　〃by　creating　rights。〃　Two　meanings　may　be　given　to　the　word　〃creating。〃　It　may　be　supposed　to　mean　the　production　of　something　out　of　nothing；　or　it　may　be　supposed　to　mean　the　giving　form　and　structure　to　something　which　already　exists。　There　are　many　who　think　that　the　production　of　something　out　of　nothing　cannot　be　conceived　as　effected　even　by　omnipotence；　and　probably　none　will　assert　that　the　production　of　something　out　of　nothing　is　within　the　competence　of　a　human　government。　The　alternative　conception　is　that　a　human　government　creates　only　in　the　sense　that　it　shapes　something　pre…existing。　In　that　case；　the　question　arises　　〃What　is　the　something　pre…existing　which　it　shapes？〃　Clearly　the　word　〃creating〃　begs　the　whole　question　　passes　off　an　illusion　on　the　unwary　reader。　Bentham　was　a　stickler　for　definiteness　of　expression；　and　in　his　Book　of　Fallacies　has　a　chapter　on　〃Impostor…terms。〃　It　is　curious　that　he　should　have　furnished　so　striking　an　illustration　of　the　perverted　belief　which　an　impostor…term　may　generate。　　　　　　But　now　let　us　overlook　these　various　impossibilities　of　thought；　and　seek　the　most　defensible　interpretation　of　Bentham's　view。　　　　　　It　may　be　said　that　the　totality　of　all　powers　and　rights；　originally　existed　as　an　undivided　whole　in　the　sovereign　people；　and　that　this　undivided　whole　is　given　in　trust　（as　Austin　would　say）　to　a　ruling　power；　appointed　by　the　sovereign　people；　for　the　purpose　of　di