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＇Footnote d： It is needless to observe that I speak here of the democratic form of government as applied to a people； not merely to a tribe。＇
Charges Levied By The State Under The Rule Of The American Democracy
In all communities citizens divisible into three classes … Habits of each of these classes in the direction of public finances … Why public expenditure must tend to increase when the people governs … What renders the extravagance of a democracy less to be feared in America … Public expenditure under a democracy。
Before we can affirm whether a democratic form of government is economical or not； we must establish a suitable standard of comparison。 The question would be one of easy solution if we were to attempt to draw a parallel between a democratic republic and an absolute monarchy。 The public expenditure would be found to be more considerable under the former than under the latter； such is the case with all free States compared to those which are not so。 It is certain that despotism ruins individuals by preventing them from producing wealth； much more than by depriving them of the wealth they have produced； it dries up the source of riches； whilst it usually respects acquired property。 Freedom； on the contrary； engenders far more benefits than it destroys； and the nations which are favored by free institutions invariably find that their resources increase even more rapidly than their taxes。
My present object is to compare free nations to each other； and to point out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a State。
Communities； as well as organic bodies； are subject to certain fixed rules in their formation which they cannot evade。 They are composed of certain elements which are common to them at all times and under all circumstances。 The people may always be mentally divided into three distinct classes。 The first of these classes consists of the wealthy； the second； of those who are in easy circumstances； and the third is composed of those who have little or no property； and who subsist more especially by the work which they perform for the two superior orders。 The proportion of the individuals who are included in these three divisions may vary according to the condition of society； but the divisions themselves can never be obliterated。
It is evident that each of these classes will exercise an influence peculiar to its own propensities upon the administration of the finances of the State。 If the first of the three exclusively possesses the legislative power； it is probable that it will not be sparing of the public funds； because the taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to diminish the sum of superfluous enjoyment； and are； in point of fact； but little felt。 If the second class has the power of making the laws； it will certainly not be lavish of taxes； because nothing is so onerous as a large impost which is levied upon a small income。 The government of the middle classes appears to me to be the most economical； though perhaps not the most enlightened； and certainly not the most generous； of free governments。
But let us now suppose that the legislative authority is vested in the lowest orders： there are two striking reasons which show that the tendency of the expenditure will be to increase； not to diminish。 As the great majority of those who create the laws are possessed of no property upon which taxes can be imposed； all the money which is spent for the community appears to be spent to their advantage； at no cost of their own； and those who are possessed of some little property readily find means of regulating the taxes so that they are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor； although the rich are unable to take the same advantage when they are in possession of the Government。
In countries in which the poor *e should be exclusively invested with the power of making the laws no great economy of public expenditure ought to be expected： that expenditure will always be considerable； either because the taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them； or because they are levied in such a manner as not to weigh upon those classes。 In other words； the government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which lays on taxes escapes the payment of them。
＇Footnote e： The word poor is used here； and throughout the remainder of this chapter； in a relative； not in an absolute sense。 Poor men in America would often appear rich in comparison with the poor of Europe； but they may with propriety by styled poor in comparison with their more affluent countrymen。＇
It may be objected （but the argument has no real weight） that the true interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that of the wealthier portion of the community； since it cannot but suffer by the severe measures to which it resorts。 But is it not the true interest of kings to render their subjects happy； and the true interest of nobles to admit recruits into their order on suitable grounds？ If remote advantages had power to prevail over the passions and the exigencies of the moment； no such thing as a tyrannical sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever exist。
Again； it may be objected that the poor are never invested with the sole power of making the laws； but I reply； that wherever universal suffrage has been established the majority of the community unquestionably exercises the legislative authority； and if it be proved that the poor always constitute the majority； it may be added； with perfect truth； that in the countries in which they possess the elective franchise they possess the sole power of making laws。 But it is certain that in all the nations of the world the greater number has always consisted of those persons who hold no property； or of those whose property is insufficient to exempt them from the necessity of working in order to procure an easy subsistence。 Universal suffrage does therefore； in point of fact； invest the poor with the government of society。
The disastrous influence which popular authority may sometimes exercise upon the finances of a State was very clearly seen in some of the democratic republics of antiquity； in which the public treasure was exhausted in order to relieve indigent citizens； or to supply the games and theatrical amusements of the populace。 It is true that the representative system was then very imperfectly known； and that； at the present time； the influence of popular passion is less felt in the conduct of public affairs； but it may be believed that the delegate will in the end conform to the principles of his constituents； and favor their propensities as much as their interests。
The extravagance of democracy is； however； less to be dreaded in proportion as the people acquires a share of property； because on the one hand the contributions of the rich are then less needed； and； on the other； it is more difficult to lay on taxes which do not affect the interests of the lower classes。 On this account universal suffrage would be less dangerous in France than in England； because in the latter country the property on which taxes may be levied is vested in fewer hands。 America； where the great majority of the citizens pos