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jority； but by a majority of at least two…thirds of both houses。〃
Public Officers Under The Control Of The Democracy In America Simple exterior of the American public officers … No official costume … All public officers are remunerated … Political consequences of this system … No public career exists in America … Result of this。
Public officers in the United States are commingled with the crowd of citizens； they have neither palaces； nor guards； nor ceremonial costumes。 This simple exterior of the persons in authority is connected not only with the peculiarities of the American character； but with the fundamental principles of that society。 In the estimation of the democracy a government is not a benefit； but a necessary evil。 A certain degree of power must be granted to public officers； for they would be of no use without it。 But the ostensible semblance of authority is by no means indispensable to the conduct of affairs； and it is needlessly offensive to the susceptibility of the public。 The public officers themselves are well aware that they only enjoy the superiority over their fellow…citizens which they derive from their authority upon condition of putting themselves on a level with the whole community by their manners。 A public officer in the United States is uniformly civil； accessible to all the world； attentive to all requests； and obliging in his replies。 I was pleased by these characteristics of a democratic government； and I was struck by the manly independence of the citizens； who respect the office more than the officer； and who are less attached to the emblems of authority than to the man who bears them。
I am inclined to believe that the influence which costumes really exercise； in an age like that in which we live； has been a good deal exaggerated。 I never perceived that a public officer in America was the less respected whilst he was in the discharge of his duties because his own merit was set off by no adventitious signs。 On the other hand； it is very doubtful whether a peculiar dress contributes to the respect which public characters ought to have for their own position； at least when they are not otherwise inclined to respect it。 When a magistrate （and in France such instances are not rare） indulges his trivial wit at the expense of the prisoner； or derides the predicament in which a culprit is placed； it would be well to deprive him of his robes of office； to see whether he would recall some portion of the natural dignity of mankind when he is reduced to the apparel of a private citizen。
A democracy may； however； allow a certain show of magisterial pomp； and clothe its officers in silks and gold； without seriously compromising its principles。 Privileges of this kind are transitory； they belong to the place； and are distinct from the individual： but if public officers are not uniformly remunerated by the State； the public charges must be entrusted to men of opulence and independence； who constitute the basis of an aristocracy； and if the people still retains its right of election； that election can only be made from a certain class of citizens。 When a democratic republic renders offices which had formerly been remunerated gratuitous； it may safely be believed that the State is advancing to monarchical institutions； and when a monarchy begins to remunerate such officers as had hitherto been unpaid； it is a sure sign that it is approaching toward a despotic or a republican form of government。 The substitution of paid for unpaid functionaries is of itself； in my opinion； sufficient to constitute a serious revolution。
I look upon the entire absence of gratuitous functionaries in America as one of the most prominent signs of the absolute dominion which democracy exercises in that country。 All public services； of whatsoever nature they may be； are paid； so that every one has not merely the right； but also the means of performing them。 Although； in democratic States； all the citizens are qualified to occupy stations in the Government； all are not tempted to try for them。 The number and the capacities of the candidates are more apt to restrict the choice of electors than the coneitions of the candidateship。
In nations in which the principle of election extends to every place in the State no political career can； properly speaking； be said to exist。 Men are promoted as if by chance to the rank which they enjoy； and they are by no means sure of retaining it。 The consequence is that in tranquil times public functions offer but few lures to ambition。 In the United States the persons who engage in the perplexities of political life are individuals of very moderate pretensions。 The pursuit of wealth generally diverts men of great talents and of great passions from the pursuit of power； and it very frequently happens that a man does not undertake to direct the fortune of the State until he has discovered his incompetence to conduct his own affairs。 The vast number of very ordinary men who occupy public stations is quite as attributable to these causes as to the bad choice of the democracy。 In the United States； I am not sure that the people would return the men of superior abilities who might solicit its support； but it is certain that men of this description do not come forward。
Arbitrary Power Of Magistrates Under The Rule Of The American Democracy
For what reason the arbitrary power of Magistrates is greater in absolute monarchies and in democratic republics than it is in limited monarchies …Arbitrary power of the Magistrates in New England。
In two different kinds of government the magistrates *a exercise a considerable degree of arbitrary power； namely； under the absolute government of a single individual； and under that of a democracy。 This identical result proceeds from causes which are nearly analogous。
＇Footnote a： I here use the word magistrates in the widest sense in which it can be taken； I apply it to all the officers to whom the execution of the laws is intrusted。＇
In despotic States the fortune of no citizen is secure； and public officers are not more safe than private individuals。 The sovereign； who has under his control the lives； the property； and sometimes the honor of the men whom he employs； does not scruple to allow them a great latitude of action； because he is convinced that they will not use it to his prejudice。 In despotic States the sovereign is so attached to the exercise of his power； that he dislikes the constraint even of his own regulations； and he is well pleased that his agents should follow a somewhat fortuitous line of conduct； provided he be certain that their actions will never counteract his desires。
In democracies； as the majority has every year the right of depriving the officers whom it has appointed of their power； it has no reason to fear any abuse of their authority。 As the people is always able to signify its wishes to those who conduct the Government； it prefers leaving them to make their own exertions to prescribing an invariable rule of conduct which would at once fetter their activity and the popular authority。
It may even be observed； on attentive consideration； that under the rule of a democracy the arbitrary pow