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position upon the executive authority within the limits which had been prescribed to it。
In the Constitutions of all the States the judicial power is that which remains the most independent of the legislative authority； nevertheless； in all the States the Legislature has reserved to itself the right of regulating the emoluments of the judges； a practice which necessarily subjects these magistrates to its immediate influence。 In some States the judges are only temporarily appointed； which deprives them of a great portion of their power and their freedom。 In others the legislative and judicial powers are entirely confounded； thus the Senate of New York； for instance； constitutes in certain cases the Superior Court of the State。 The Federal Constitution； on the other hand； carefully separates the judicial authority from all external influences； and it provides for the independence of the judges； by declaring that their salary shall not be altered； and that their functions shall be inalienable。
The practical consequences of these different systems may easily be perceived。 An attentive observer will soon remark that the business of the Union is incomparably better conducted than that of any individual State。 The conduct of the Federal Government is more fair and more temperate than that of the States； its designs are more fraught with wisdom； its projects are more durable and more skilfully combined； its measures are put into execution with more vigor and consistency。
I recapitulate the substance of this chapter in a few words： The existence of democracies is threatened by two dangers； viz。； the complete subjection of the legislative body to the caprices of the electoral body； and the concentration of all the powers of the Government in the legislative authority。 The growth of these evils has been encouraged by the policy of the legislators of the States； but it has been resisted by the legislators of the Union by every means which lay within their control。
Characteristics Which Distinguish The Federal Constitution Of The United States Of America From All Other Federal Constitutions American Union appears to resemble all other confederations … Nevertheless its effects are different … Reason of this … Distinctions between the Union and all other confederations … The American Government not a federal but an imperfect national Government。
The United States of America do not afford either the first or the only instance of confederate States； several of which have existed in modern Europe； without adverting to those of antiquity。 Switzerland； the Germanic Empire； and the Republic of the United Provinces either have been or still are confederations。 In studying the constitutions of these different countries； the politician is surprised to observe that the powers with which they invested the Federal Government are nearly identical with the privileges awarded by the American Constitution to the Government of the United States。 They confer upon the central power the same rights of making peace and war； of raising money and troops； and of providing for the general exigencies and the common interests of the nation。 Nevertheless the Federal Government of these different peoples has always been as remarkable for its weakness and inefficiency as that of the Union is for its vigorous and enterprising spirit。 Again； the first American Confederation perished through the excessive weakness of its Government； and this weak Government was； notwithstanding； in possession of rights even more extensive than those of the Federal Government of the present day。 But the more recent Constitution of the United States contains certain principles which exercise a most important influence； although they do not at once strike the observer。
This Constitution； which may at first sight be confounded with the federal constitutions which preceded it； rests upon a novel theory； which may be considered as a great invention in modern political science。 In all the confederations which had been formed before the American Constitution of 1789 the allied States agreed to obey the injunctions of a Federal Government； but they reserved to themselves the right of ordaining and enforcing the execution of the laws of the Union。 The American States which combined in 1789 agreed that the Federal Government should not only dictate the laws； but that it should execute it own enactments。 In both cases the right is the same； but the exercise of the right is different； and this alteration produced the most momentous consequences。
In all the confederations which had been formed before the American Union the Federal Government demanded its supplies at the hands of the separate Governments； and if the measure it prescribed was onerous to any one of those bodies means were found to evade its claims： if the State was powerful； it had recourse to arms； if it was weak； it connived at the resistance which the law of the Union； its sovereign； met with； and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability。 Under these circumstances one of the two alternatives has invariably occurred； either the most preponderant of the allied peoples has assumed the privileges of the Federal authority and ruled all the States in its name； *p or the Federal Government has been abandoned by its natural supporters； anarchy has arisen between the confederates； and the Union has lost all powers of action。 *q
＇Footnote p： This was the case in Greece； when Philip undertook to execute the decree of the Amphictyons； in the Low Countries； where the province of Holland always gave the law； and； in our own time； in the Germanic Confederation； in which Austria and Prussia assume a great degree of influence over the whole country； in the name of the Diet。＇
＇Footnote q： Such has always been the situation of the Swiss Confederation； which would have perished ages ago but for the mutual jealousies of its neighbors。＇
In America the subjects of the Union are not States； but private citizens： the national Government levies a tax； not upon the State of Massachusetts； but upon each inhabitant of Massachusetts。 All former confederate governments presided over communities； but that of the Union rules individuals； its force is not borrowed； but self…derived； and it is served by its own civil and military officers； by its own army； and its own courts of justice。 It cannot be doubted that the spirit of the nation； the passions of the multitude； and the provincial prejudices of each State tend singularly to diminish the authority of a Federal authority thus constituted； and to facilitate the means of resistance to its mandates； but the comparative weakness of a restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in the Federal system。 In America； each State has fewer opportunities of resistance and fewer temptations to non…compliance； nor can such a design be put in execution （if indeed it be entertained） without an open violation of the laws of the Union； a direct interruption of the ordinary course of justice； and a bold declaration of revolt； in a word； without taking a decisive step which men hesitate to adopt。
In all former confederations the privileges of the Union furnished more elements of disc