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he borrows the strength of the government for his own purposes。 In the former case the feeble resources of an individual are in action； in the latter； the State itself； with all its immense influence； is busied in the work of corruption and cabal。 The private citizen； who employs the most immoral practices to acquire power； can only act in a manner indirectly prejudicial to the public prosperity。 But if the representative of the executive descends into the combat； the cares of government dwindle into second…rate importance； and the success of his election is his first concern。 All laws and all the negotiations he undertakes are to him nothing more than electioneering schemes； places become the reward of services rendered； not to the nation； but to its chief； and the influence of the government； if not injurious to the country； is at least no longer beneficial to the community for which it was created。
It is impossible to consider the ordinary course of affairs in the United States without perceiving that the desire of being re… elected is the chief aim of the President； that his whole administration； and even his most indifferent measures； tend to this object； and that； as the crisis approaches； his personal interest takes the place of his interest in the public good。 The principle of re…eligibility renders the corrupt influence of elective government still more extensive and pernicious。
In America it exercises a peculiarly fatal influence on the sources of national existence。 Every government seems to be afflicted by some evil which is inherent in its nature； and the genius of the legislator is shown in eluding its attacks。 A State may survive the influence of a host of bad laws； and the mischief they cause is frequently exaggerated； but a law which encourages the growth of the canker within must prove fatal in the end； although its bad consequences may not be immediately perceived。
The principle of destruction in absolute monarchies lies in the excessive and unreasonable extension of the prerogative of the crown； and a measure tending to remove the constitutional provisions which counterbalance this influence would be radically bad； even if its immediate consequences were unattended with evil。 By a parity of reasoning； in countries governed by a democracy； where the people is perpetually drawing all authority to itself； the laws which increase or accelerate its action are the direct assailants of the very principle of the government。
The greatest proof of the ability of the American legislators is； that they clearly discerned this truth； and that they had the courage to act up to it。 They conceived that a certain authority above the body of the people was necessary； which should enjoy a degree of independence； without； however； being entirely beyond the popular control； an authority which would be forced to comply with the permanent determinations of the majority； but which would be able to resist its caprices； and to refuse its most dangerous demands。 To this end they centred the whole executive power of the nation in a single arm； they granted extensive prerogatives to the President； and they armed him with the veto to resist the encroachments of the legislature。
But by introducing the principle of re…election they partly destroyed their work； and they rendered the President but little inclined to exert the great power they had vested in his hands。 If ineligible a second time； the President would be far from independent of the people； for his responsibility would not be lessened； but the favor of the people would not be so necessary to him as to induce him to court it by humoring its desires。 If re… eligible （and this is more especially true at the present day； when political morality is relaxed； and when great men are rare）； the President of the United States becomes an easy tool in the hands of the majority。 He adopts its likings and its animosities； he hastens to anticipate its wishes； he forestalls its complaints； he yields to its idlest cravings； and instead of guiding it； as the legislature intended that he should do； he is ever ready to follow its bidding。 Thus； in order not to deprive the State of the talents of an individual； those talents have been rendered almost useless； and to reserve an expedient for extraordinary perils； the country has been exposed to daily dangers。
Federal Courts *b
＇Footnote b： See chap。 VI； entitled 〃Judicial Power in the United States。〃 This chapter explains the general principles of the American theory of judicial institutions。 See also the Federal Constitution； Art。 3。 See 〃The Federalists；〃 Nos。 78…83； inclusive； and a work entitled 〃Constitutional Law；〃 being a view of the practice and jurisdiction of the courts of the United States； by Thomas Sergeant。 See Story； pp。 134； 162； 489； 511； 581； 668； and the organic law of September 24； 1789； in the 〃Collection of the Laws of the United States；〃 by Story； vol。 i。 p。 53。＇
Political importance of the judiciary in the United States … Difficulty of treating this subject … Utility of judicial power in confederations … What tribunals could be introduced into the Union … Necessity of establishing federal courts of justice … Organization of the national judiciary … The Supreme Court … In what it differs from all known tribunals。
I have inquired into the legislative and executive power of the Union； and the judicial power now remains to be examined； but in this place I cannot conceal my fears from the reader。 Their judicial institutions exercise a great influence on the condition of the Anglo…Americans； and they occupy a prominent place amongst what are probably called political institutions： in this respect they are peculiarly deserving of our attention。 But I am at a loss to explain the political action of the American tribunals without entering into some technical details of their constitution and their forms of proceeding； and I know not how to descend to these minutiae without wearying the curiosity of the reader by the natural aridity of the subject； or without risking to fall into obscurity through a desire to be succinct。 I can scarcely hope to escape these various evils； for if I appear too lengthy to a man of the world； a lawyer may on the other hand complain of my brevity。 But these are the natural disadvantages of my subject； and more especially of the point which I am about to discuss。
The great difficulty was； not to devise the Constitution to the Federal Government； but to find out a method of enforcing its laws。 Governments have in general but two means of overcoming the opposition of the people they govern； viz。； the physical force which is at their own disposal； and the moral force which they derive from the decisions of the courts of justice。
A government which should have no other means of exacting obedience than open war must be very near its ruin； for one of two alternatives would then probably occur： if its authority was small and its character temperate； it would not resort to violence till the last extremity； and it would connive at a number of partial acts of insubordination； in which case the State would gradually fall into anarchy； if it was enterprising and powerfu