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ve power； which excites their hostility； and they attack the former without perceiving how nearly it is connected with the latter。
Hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor and his life in order to become the President of the United States； because the power of that office is temporary； limited； and subordinate。 The prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers in so desperate a game。 No candidate has as yet been able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people in his favor； for the very simple reason that when he is at the head of the Government he has but little power； but little wealth； and but little glory to share amongst his friends； and his influence in the State is too small for the success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the elevation of an individual to power。
The great advantage of hereditary monarchies is； that as the private interest of a family is always intimately connected with the interests of the State； the executive government is never suspended for a single instant； and if the affairs of a monarchy are not better conducted than those of a republic； at least there is always some one to conduct them； well or ill； according to his capacity。 In elective States； on the contrary； the wheels of government cease to act； as it were； of their own accord at the approach of an election； and even for some time previous to that event。 The laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the election； which may be conducted with such simplicity and rapidity that the seat of power will never be left vacant； but； notwithstanding these precautions； a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people。
At the approach of an election the head of the executive government is wholly occupied by the coming struggle； his future plans are doubtful； he can undertake nothing new； and the he will only prosecute with indifference those designs which another will perhaps terminate。 〃I am so near the time of my retirement from office；〃 said President Jefferson on the 21st of January； 1809 （six weeks before the election）； 〃that I feel no passion； I take no part； I express no sentiment。 It appears to me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute； and for which he will be responsible。〃
On the other hand； the eyes of the nation are centred on a single point； all are watching the gradual birth of so important an event。 The wider the influence of the executive power extends； the greater and the more necessary is its constant action； the more fatal is the term of suspense； and a nation which is accustomed to the government； or； still more； one used to the administrative protection of a powerful executive authority would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind。 In the United States the action of the Government may be slackened with impunity； because it is always weak and circumscribed。 *u
＇Footnote u： ＇This； however； may be a great danger。 The period during which Mr。 Buchanan retained office； after the election of Mr。 Lincoln； from November； 1860； to March； 1861； was that which enabled the seceding States of the South to complete their preparations for the Civil War； and the Executive Government was paralyzed。 No greater evil could befall a nation。 …Translator's Note。＇＇
One of the principal vices of the elective system is that it always introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the State。 But this disadvantage is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small。 In Rome the principles of the Government underwent no variation； although the Consuls were changed every year； because the Senate； which was an hereditary assembly； possessed the directing authority。 If the elective system were adopted in Europe； the condition of most of the monarchical States would be changed at every new election。 In America the President exercises a certain influence on State affairs； but he does not conduct them； the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the whole nation。 The political maxims of the country depend therefore on the mass of the people； not on the President alone； and consequently in America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of the Government。 But the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the elective system that it is still extremely perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the President extends。
The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power； who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to fulfil； ought to be empowered to choose his own agents； and to remove them at pleasure： the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the President more than they direct it。 The consequence of this arrangement is； that at every new election the fate of all the Federal public officers is in suspense。 Mr。 Quincy Adams； on his entry into office； discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his predecessor： and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single removable functionary employed in the Federal service to retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election。 It is sometimes made a subject of complaint that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an Administration depends upon that of the Ministers。 But in elective Governments this evil is far greater。 In a constitutional monarchy successive ministries are rapidly formed； but as the principal representative of the executive power does not change； the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds； the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system； but to substitute one system for another； as is done in America every four years； by law； is to cause a sort of revolution。 As to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of things； it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in America than elsewhere。 It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the United States that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life； but not of the means of subsistence。
I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system applied to the head of the State are augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it。 However the functions of the executive power may be restricted； it must always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the country； for a negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent。 The more precarious and the more perilous the position of a people becomes； the more absolute is the want of a fixed and consistent external policy； and the more dangerous does the elective system of the Chief Magistrate become。 The policy of the Americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple； for it may almost be said that no country stands in need of them