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The magistrates of the township； as well as those of the county； are bound to communicate their acts to the central government in a very small number of predetermined cases。 *o But the central government is not represented by an individual whose business it is to publish police regulations and ordinances enforcing the execution of the laws； to keep up a regular communication with the officers of the township and the county； to inspect their conduct； to direct their actions； or to reprimand their faults。 There is no point which serves as a centre to the radii of the administration。
＇Footnote o： The town committees of schools are obliged to make an annual report to the Secretary of the State on the condition of the school。 See Act of March 10； 1827； vol。 iii。 p。 183。＇
Chapter V： Necessity Of Examining The Condition Of The States … Part II
What； then； is the uniform plan on which the government is conducted； and how is the compliance of the counties and their magistrates or the townships and their officers enforced？ In the States of New England the legislative authority embraces more subjects than it does in France； the legislator penetrates to the very core of the administration； the law descends to the most minute details； the same enactment prescribes the principle and the method of its application； and thus imposes a multitude of strict and rigorously defined obligations on the secondary functionaries of the State。 The consequence of this is that if all the secondary functionaries of the administration conform to the law； society in all its branches proceeds with the greatest uniformity： the difficulty remains of compelling the secondary functionaries of the administration to conform to the law。 It may be affirmed that； in general； society has only two methods of enforcing the execution of the laws at its disposal： a discretionary power may be entrusted to a superior functionary of directing all the others； and of cashiering them in case of disobedience； or the courts of justice may be authorized to inflict judicial penalties on the offender： but these two methods are not always available。
The right of directing a civil officer presupposes that of cashiering him if he does not obey orders； and of rewarding him by promotion if he fulfils his duties with propriety。 But an elected magistrate can neither be cashiered nor promoted。 All elective functions are inalienable until their term is expired。 In fact； the elected magistrate has nothing either to expect or to fear from his constituents； and when all public offices are filled by ballot there can be no series of official dignities； because the double right of commanding and of enforcing obedience can never be vested in the same individual； and because the power of issuing an order can never be joined to that of inflicting a punishment or bestowing a reward。
The communities therefore in which the secondary functionaries of the government are elected are perforce obliged to make great use of judicial penalties as a means of administration。 This is not evident at first sight； for those in power are apt to look upon the institution of elective functionaries as one concession； and the subjection of the elected magistrate to the judges of the land as another。 They are equally averse to both these innovations； and as they are more pressingly solicited to grant the former than the latter； they accede to the election of the magistrate； and leave him independent of the judicial power。 Nevertheless； the second of these measures is the only thing that can possibly counterbalance the first； and it will be found that an elective authority which is not subject to judicial power will； sooner or later； either elude all control or be destroyed。 The courts of justice are the only possible medium between the central power and the administrative bodies； they alone can compel the elected functionary to obey； without violating the rights of the elector。 The extension of judicial power in the political world ought therefore to be in the exact ratio of the extension of elective offices： if these two institutions do not go hand in hand； the State must fall into anarchy or into subjection。
It has always been remarked that habits of legal business do not render men apt to the exercise of administrative authority。 The Americans have borrowed from the English； their fathers； the idea of an institution which is unknown upon the continent of Europe： I allude to that of the Justices of the Peace。 The Justice of the Peace is a sort of mezzo termine between the magistrate and the man of the world； between the civil officer and the judge。 A justice of the peace is a well…informed citizen； though he is not necessarily versed in the knowledge of the laws。 His office simply obliges him to execute the police regulations of society； a task in which good sense and integrity are of more avail than legal science。 The justice introduces into the administration a certain taste for established forms and publicity； which renders him a most unserviceable instrument of despotism； and； on the other hand； he is not blinded by those superstitions which render legal officers unfit members of a government。 The Americans have adopted the system of the English justices of the peace； but they have deprived it of that aristocratic character which is discernible in the mother…country。 The Governor of Massachusetts *p appoints a certain number of justices of the peace in every county； whose functions last seven years。 *q He further designates three individuals from amongst the whole body of justices who form in each county what is called the Court of Sessions。 The justices take a personal share in public business； they are sometimes entrusted with administrative functions in conjunction with elected officers； *r they sometimes constitute a tribunal； before which the magistrates summarily prosecute a refractory citizen； or the citizens inform against the abuses of the magistrate。 But it is in the Court of Sessions that they exercise their most important functions。 This court meets twice a year in the county town； in Massachusetts it is empowered to enforce the obedience of the greater number *s of public officers。 *t It must be observed； that in the State of Massachusetts the Court of Sessions is at the same time an administrative body； properly so called； and a political tribunal。 It has been asserted that the county is a purely administrative division。 The Court of Sessions presides over that small number of affairs which； as they concern several townships； or all the townships of the county in common； cannot be entrusted to any one of them in particular。 *u In all that concerns county business the duties of the Court of Sessions are purely administrative； and if in its investigations it occasionally borrows the forms of judicial procedure； it is only with a view to its own information； *v or as a guarantee to the community over which it presides。 But when the administration of the township is brought before it； it always acts as a judicial body； and in some few cases as an official assembly。
＇Footnote p： We shall hereafter learn what a Governor is： I shall content myself with remarking