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In order to understand the consequences of this division； it is necessary to make a short distinction between the affairs of the Government。 There are some objects which are national by their very nature； that is to say； which affect the nation as a body； and can only be intrusted to the man or the assembly of men who most completely represent the entire nation。 Amongst these may be reckoned war and diplomacy。 There are other objects which are provincial by their very nature； that is to say； which only affect certain localities； and which can only be properly treated in that locality。 Such； for instance； is the budget of a municipality。 Lastly； there are certain objects of a mixed nature； which are national inasmuch as they affect all the citizens who compose the nation； and which are provincial inasmuch as it is not necessary that the nation itself should provide for them all。 Such are the rights which regulate the civil and political condition of the citizens。 No society can exist without civil and political rights。 These rights therefore interest all the citizens alike； but it is not always necessary to the existence and the prosperity of the nation that these rights should be uniform； nor； consequently； that they should be regulated by the central authority。
There are； then； two distinct categories of objects which are submitted to the direction of the sovereign power； and these categories occur in all well…constituted communities； whatever the basis of the political constitution may otherwise be。 Between these two extremes the objects which I have termed mixed may be considered to lie。 As these objects are neither exclusively national nor entirely provincial； they may be obtained by a national or by a provincial government； according to the agreement of the contracting parties； without in any way impairing the contract of association。
The sovereign power is usually formed by the union of separate individuals； who compose a people； and individual powers or collective forces； each representing a very small portion of the sovereign authority； are the sole elements which are subjected to the general Government of their choice。 In this case the general Government is more naturally called upon to regulate； not only those affairs which are of essential national importance； but those which are of a more local interest； and the local governments are reduced to that small share of sovereign authority which is indispensable to their prosperity。
But sometimes the sovereign authority is composed of preorganized political bodies； by virtue of circumstances anterior to their union； and in this case the provincial governments assume the control； not only of those affairs which more peculiarly belong to their province； but of all； or of a part of the mixed affairs to which allusion has been made。 For the confederate nations which were independent sovereign States before their union； and which still represent a very considerable share of the sovereign power； have only consented to cede to the general Government the exercise of those rights which are indispensable to the Union。
When the national Government； independently of the prerogatives inherent in its nature； is invested with the right of regulating the affairs which relate partly to the general and partly to the local interests； it possesses a preponderating influence。 Not only are its own rights extensive； but all the rights which it does not possess exist by its sufferance； and it may be apprehended that the provincial governments may be deprived of their natural and necessary prerogatives by its influence。
When； on the other hand； the provincial governments are invested with the power of regulating those same affairs of mixed interest； an opposite tendency prevails in society。 The preponderating force resides in the province； not in the nation； and it may be apprehended that the national Government may in the end be stripped of the privileges which are necessary to its existence。
Independent nations have therefore a natural tendency to centralization； and confederations to dismemberment。
It now only remains for us to apply these general principles to the American Union。 The several States were necessarily possessed of the right of regulating all exclusively provincial affairs。 Moreover these same States retained the rights of determining the civil and political competency of the citizens； or regulating the reciprocal relations of the members of the community； and of dispensing justice； rights which are of a general nature； but which do not necessarily appertain to the national Government。 We have shown that the Government of the Union is invested with the power of acting in the name of the whole nation in those cases in which the nation has to appear as a single and undivided power； as； for instance； in foreign relations； and in offering a common resistance to a common enemy； in short； in conducting those affairs which I have styled exclusively national。
In this division of the rights of sovereignty； the share of the Union seems at first sight to be more considerable than that of the States； but a more attentive investigation shows it to be less so。 The undertakings of the Government of the Union are more vast； but their influence is more rarely felt。 Those of the provincial governments are comparatively small； but they are incessant； and they serve to keep alive the authority which they represent。 The Government of the Union watches the general interests of the country； but the general interests of a people have a very questionable influence upon individual happiness； whilst provincial interests produce a most immediate effect upon the welfare of the inhabitants。 The Union secures the independence and the greatness of the nation； which do not immediately affect private citizens； but the several States maintain the liberty； regulate the rights； protect the fortune； and secure the life and the whole future prosperity of every citizen。
The Federal Government is very far removed from its subjects； whilst the provincial governments are within the reach of them all； and are ready to attend to the smallest appeal。 The central Government has upon its side the passions of a few superior men who aspire to conduct it； but upon the side of the provincial governments are the interests of all those second…rate individuals who can only hope to obtain power within their own State； and who nevertheless exercise the largest share of authority over the people because they are placed nearest to its level。 The Americans have therefore much more to hope and to fear from the States than from the Union； and； in conformity with the natural tendency of the human mind； they are more likely to attach themselves to the former than to the latter。 In this respect their habits and feelings harmonize with their interests。
When a compact nation divides its sovereignty； and adopts a confederate form of government； the traditions； the customs； and the manners of the people are for a long time at variance with their legislation； and the former tend to give a degree of influence to the central government which the latter forbids。 When a number of confederate states un