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providing citizens … they simply furnished functionaries。 With such
wheels combined together according to formula current between 1791 and
1795； the requisite work could not possibly be done。 As a consequence；
definitely and for a long time； any use of the two great liberal
mechanisms were doomed。 So long as the wheels remained of such poor
quality and the task so hard； both the election of local powers and
the division of the central power had to be abandoned。
IV。
Motives for suppressing the election of local powers。 … The Electors。
… Their egoism and partiality。 … The Elected。 … Their inertia；
corruption； and disobedience。
All were agreed on the first point。 If any still doubted； they had
only to open their eyes； fix them on the local authorities； watch them
as soon as born； and follow them throughout the exercise of their
functions。 … Naturally； in filling each office； the electors had
chosen a man of their own species and caliber； their fixed and
dominant disposition was accordingly well known； they were indifferent
to public matters and therefore their candidate was as indifferent as
themselves。 Had they shown too great a concern for the nation this
would have prevented their election； the State to them was a
troublesome moralist and remote creditor。 Their candidate must choose
between them and this intruder； side with them against it； and not act
as a pedagogue in its name or as bailiff on its behalf。 When power is
born on the spot and conferred to…day by constituents who are to
submit to it to…morrow as subordinates； they do not put the whip in
the hands of one who will flog them； they demand sentiments of him in
conformity with their inclinations； in any event they will not
tolerate in him the opposite ones。 From the beginning； this
resemblance between them and him is great； and it goes on increasing
from day to day because the creature is always in the hands of his
creators； subject to their daily pressure； he at last becomes as they
are； after a certain period they have shaped him in their image。 …
Thus the candidate…elect； from the start or very soon after； became a
confederate with his electors。 At one time； and this occurred
frequently； especially in the towns； he had been elected by a violent
sectarian minority； he then subordinated general interests to the
interests of a clique。 At another； and especially in the rural
districts； he had been elected by an ignorant and brutal majority；
when he accordingly subordinated general interests to those of a
village。 … If he chanced to be conscientious and somewhat intelligent
and was anxious to do his duty； he could not； he felt himself weak and
was felt to be weak；＇5＇ both authority and the means for exercising it
were wanting in him。 He had not the force which a power above
communicates to its delegates below； nobody saw behind him the
government and the army； his only resource was a national…guard； which
either shirked or refused to do its duty； and which often did not
exist at all。 … On the contrary； he could prevaricate； pillage； and
persecute for his own advantage and that of his clique with impunity；
for there was no restraint on him from above； the Paris Jacobins would
not be disposed to alienate the Jacobins of the province； they were
partisans and allies； and the government had few others； it was bound
to retain them； to let them intrigue and embezzle at will。
Suppose an extensive domain of which the steward is appointed； not by
the absent owner； but by his tenants； debtors； farmers； and
dependents： the reader may imagine whether rents will be paid and
debts collected； whether road…taxes will be worked out； what care will
be taken of the property； what its annual income will be to the owner；
how abuses of commission and omission will be multiplied indefinitely；
how great the disorder will be； the neglect； the waste； the fraud； the
injustice； and the license。 … The same in France；＇6＇ and for the same
reason：
* every public service disorganized； destroyed； or perverted；
* no justice； no police；
* authorities abstaining from prosecution； magistrates not daring to
condemn； a gendarmerie which receives no orders or which stands still；
* rural marauding become a habit；
* roving bands of brigands in forty…five departments；
* mail wagons and coaches stopped and pillaged even up to the environs
of Paris；
* highways broken up and rendered impassable；
* open smuggling； customs yielding nothing； national forests
devastated； the public treasury empty；＇7＇ its revenues intercepted
and expended before being deposited； taxes decreed and not collected；
* everywhere arbitrary assessments of real and personal estate； no
less wicked exemptions than overcharges；
* in many places no list prepared for tax assessments；
* communes which here and there； under pretext of defending the
republic against neighboring consumers； exempt themselves from both
tax and conscription；
* conscripts to whom their mayor gives false certificates of infirmity
and marriage； who do not turn out when ordered out； who desert by
hundreds on the way to headquarters； who form mobs and use guns in
defending themselves against the troops；…
such were the fruits of the system。
The government could not constrain rural majorities with the officials
chosen by the selfish and inept rural majorities。 Neither could it
repress the urban minorities with agents elected by the same partial
and corrupt urban minorities。 Hands are necessary； and hands as firm
as tenacious； to seize conscripts by the collar； to rummage the
pockets of taxpayers； and the State did not have such hands。 They were
required right away； if only to prepare and provide for urgent needs。
If the western departments had to be subdued and tranquilized； relief
furnished to Massena besieged in Genoa； Mélas prevented from invading
Provence； Moreau's army transported over the Rhine； the first thing
was to restore to the central government the appointment of local
authorities。
V。 Reasons for centralization。
Reasons for placing the executive central power in one hand。 … Sieyès'
chimerical combinations。 … Bonaparte's objections。
On this second point； the evidence was scarcely less。 … And clearly；
the moment the local powers owed their appointment to the central
powers； it is plain that the central executive power； on which they
depend； should be unique。 For； this great team of functionaries；
driven from aloft； could not have aloft several distinct drivers；
being several and distinct； the drivers would each pull his own way；
while the horses； pulling in opposite directions； would do nothing but
prance。 In this respect the combinations of Sieyès do not bear
examination。 A mere theorist and charged with preparing the plan of a
new constitution； he had reasoned as if the drivers on the box were
not men； but robots： perched above all； a grand…elector； a show
sovereign； with two place