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slaves； and then to take care of their liberty； and； when their chains
are on； tell them they may act like free men。 This； if barely so； is
rather mockery than relief； and men can never be secure from tyranny
if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it；
and； therefore； it is that they have not only a right to get out of
it； but to prevent it。
221。 There is； therefore； secondly； another way whereby
governments are dissolved； and that is； when the legislative； or the
prince； either of them act contrary to their trust。
For the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when they
endeavour to invade the property of the subject； and to make
themselves； or any part of the community； masters or arbitrary
disposers of the lives； liberties； or fortunes of the people。
222。 The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of
their property； and the end while they choose and authorise a
legislative is that there may be laws made； and rules set； as guards
and fences to the properties of all the society； to limit the power
and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society。 For
since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that
the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one
designs to secure by entering into society； and for which the people
submitted themselves to legislators of their own making： whenever
the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the
people； or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power； they put
themselves into a state of war with the people； who are thereupon
absolved from any farther obedience； and are left to the common refuge
which God hath provided for all men against force and violence。
Whensoever； therefore； the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society； and either by ambition； fear； folly； or
corruption； endeavour to grasp themselves； or put into the hands of
any other； an absolute power over the lives； liberties； and estates of
the people； by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the
people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends； and it
devolves to the people； who have a right to resume their original
liberty； and by the establishment of a new legislative （such as they
shall think fit）； provide for their own safety and security； which
is the end for which they are in society。 What I have said here
concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the
supreme executor； who having a double trust put in him； both to have a
part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law； acts
against both； when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as
the law of the society。 He acts also contrary to his trust when he
employs the force； treasure； and offices of the society to corrupt the
representatives and gain them to his purposes； when he openly
pre…engages the electors； and prescribes； to their choice； such whom
he has； by solicitation； threats； promises； or otherwise； won to his
designs； and employs them to bring in such who have promised
beforehand what to vote and what to enact。 Thus to regulate candidates
and electors； and new model the ways of election； what is it but to
cut up the government by the roots； and poison the very fountain of
public security？ For the people having reserved to themselves the
choice of their representatives as the fence to their properties；
could do it for no other end but that they might always be freely
chosen； and so chosen； freely act and advise as the necessity of the
commonwealth and the public good should； upon examination and mature
debate； be judged to require。 This； those who give their votes
before they hear the debate； and have weighed the reasons on all
sides； are not capable of doing。 To prepare such an assembly as
this； and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will；
for the true representatives of the people； and the law…makers of
the society； is certainly as great a breach of trust； and as perfect a
declaration of a design to subvert the government； as is possible to
be met with。 To which； if one shall add rewards and punishments
visibly employed to the same end； and all the arts of perverted law
made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of
such a design； and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties
of their country； it will be past doubt what is doing。 What power they
ought to have in the society who thus employ it contrary to the
trust that along with it in its first institution； is easy to
determine； and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any
such thing as this cannot any longer be trusted。
223。 To this； perhaps； it will be said that the people being
ignorant and always discontented； to lay the foundation of
government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people；
is to expose it to certain ruin； and no government will be able long
to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they
take offence at the old one。 To this I answer； quite the contrary。
People are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to
suggest。 They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the
acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to。 And
if there be any original defects； or adventitious ones introduced by
time or corruption； it is not an easy thing to get them changed；
even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it。 This
slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions
has in the many revolutions ＇that＇ have been seen in this kingdom；
in this and former ages； still kept us to； or after some interval of
fruitless attempts； still brought us back again to； our old
legislative of king； lords and commons； and whatever provocations have
made the crown be taken from some of our princes' heads； they never
carried the people so far as to place it in another line。
224。 But it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent
rebellion。 To which I answer：
First： no more than any other hypothesis。 For when the people are
made miserable； and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of
arbitrary power； cry up their governors as much as you will for sons
of Jupiter； let them be sacred and divine； descended or authorised
from Heaven； give them out for whom or what you please； the same
will happen。 The people generally ill treated； and contrary to
right； will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a
burden that sits heavy upon them。 They will wish and seek for the
opportunity； which in the change； weakness； and accidents of human
affairs； seldom delays long to offer itself He must have lived but a
little while in the world； who has not seen examples of this in his
time； and he must have read very little who cannot produce examples of
it in all sorts of governments in the world。
225。 Secondly： I answer； such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs。 Great mistakes in the ruling
part； many wrong and inconvenient la