按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
to be out of subjection； and may constitute to themselves a new
legislative； as they think best； being in full liberty to resist the
force of those who； without authority； would impose anything upon
them。 Every one is at the disposure of his own will； when those who
had； by the delegation of the society； the declaring of the public
will； are excluded from it； and others usurp the place who have no
such authority or delegation。
213。 This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth；
who misuse the power they have； it is hard to consider it aright；
and know at whose door to lay it； without knowing the form of
government in which it happens。 Let us suppose； then； the
legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons：…
First； a single hereditary person having the constant； supreme；
executive power； and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the
other two within certain periods of time。 Secondly； an assembly of
hereditary nobility。 Thirdly； an assembly of representatives chosen；
pro tempore； by the people。 Such a form of government supposed； it
is evident：
214。 First； that when such a single person or prince sets up his own
arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the
society declared by the legislative； then the legislative is
changed。 For that being； in effect； the legislative whose rules and
laws are put in execution； and required to be obeyed； when other
laws are set up； and other rules pretended and enforced than what
the legislative； constituted by the society； have enacted； it is plain
that the legislative is changed。 Whoever introduces new laws； not
being thereunto authorised； by the fundamental appointment of the
society； or subverts the old； disowns and overturns the power by which
they were made； and so sets up a new legislative。
215。 Secondly； when the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time； or from acting freely； pursuant to those
ends for which it was constituted； the legislative is altered。 For
it is not a certain number of men… no； nor their meeting； unless
they have also freedom of debating and leisure of perfecting what is
for the good of the society； wherein the legislative consists； when
these are taken away； or altered； so as to deprive the society of
the due exercise of their power； the legislative is truly altered。 For
it is not names that constitute governments； but the use and
exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them； so that
he who takes away the freedom； or hinders the acting of the
legislative in its due seasons； in effect takes away the
legislative； and puts an end to the government。
216。 Thirdly； when； by the arbitrary power of the prince； the
electors or ways of election are altered without the consent and
contrary to the common interest of the people； there also the
legislative is altered。 For if others than those whom the society hath
authorised thereunto do choose； or in another way than what the
society hath prescribed； those chosen are not the legislative
appointed by the people。
217。 Fourthly； the delivery also of the people into the subjection
of a foreign power； either by the prince or by the legislative； is
certainly a change of the legislative； and so a dissolution of the
government。 For the end why people entered into society being to be
preserved one entire； free； independent society to be governed by
its own laws； this is lost whenever they are given up into the power
of another。
218。 Why； in such a constitution as this； the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident；
because he； having the force； treasure； and offices of the State to
employ； and often persuading himself or being flattered by others；
that； as supreme magistrate； he is incapable of control； he alone is
in a condition to make great advances towards such changes under
pretence of lawful authority； and has it in his hands to terrify or
suppress opposers as factious； seditious； and enemies to the
government； whereas no other part of the legislative； or people； is
capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative
without open and visible rebellion； apt enough to be taken notice
of； which； when it prevails； produces effects very little different
from foreign conquest。 Besides； the prince； in such a form of
government； having the power of dissolving the other parts of the
legislative； and thereby rendering them private persons； they can
never； in opposition to him； or without his concurrence； alter the
legislative by a law； his consent being necessary to give any of their
decrees that sanction。 But yet so far as the other parts of the
legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government； and
do either promote； or not； what lies in them； hinder such designs；
they are guilty； and partake in this； which is certainly the
greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another。
219。 There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved； and that is： When he who has the supreme executive power
neglects and abandons that charge； so that the laws already made can
no longer be put in execution； this is demonstratively to reduce all
to anarchy； and so effectively to dissolve the government。 For laws
not being made for themselves； but to be； by their execution； the
bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due
place and function。 When that totally ceases； the government visibly
ceases； and the people become a confused multitude without order or
connection。 Where there is no longer the administration of justice for
the securing of men's rights； nor any remaining power within the
community to direct the force； or provide for the necessities of the
public； there certainly is no government left。 Where the laws cannot
be executed it is all one as if there were no laws； and a government
without laws is； I suppose； a mystery in politics inconceivable to
human capacity； and inconsistent with human society。
220。 In these； and the like cases； when the government is dissolved；
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a
new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons；
or form； or both； as they shall find it most for their safety and
good。 For the society can never； by the fault of another； lose the
native and original right it has to preserve itself； which can only be
done by a settled legislative and a fair and impartial execution of
the laws made by it。 But the state of mankind is not so miserable that
they are not capable of using this remedy till it be too late to
look for any。 To tell people they may provide for themselves by
erecting a new legislative； when； by oppression； artifice； or being
delivered over to a foreign power； their old one is gone； is only to
tell them they may expect relief when it is too late； and the evil
is past cure。 This is； in effect； no more than to bid them first be
slaves； and then to take care of their liberty； and； when their chains
are on； tell the