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than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand
single men； nobody being secure； that his will who has such a
command is better than that of other men； though his force be a
hundred thousand times stronger。 And； therefore； whatever form the
commonwealth is under； the ruling power ought to govern by declared
and received laws； and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined
resolutions； for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in
the state of Nature if they shall have armed one or a few men with the
joint power of a multitude； to force them to obey at pleasure the
exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts； or
unrestrained； and till that moment； unknown wills； without having
any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions。 For
all the power the government has； being only for the good of the
society； as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure； so it
ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws； that both
the people may know their duty； and be safe and secure within the
limits of the law； and the rulers； too； kept within their due
bounds； and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to
employ it to purposes； and by such measures as they would not have
known； and own not willingly。
138。 Thirdly； the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of
his property without his own consent。 For the preservation of property
being the end of government； and that for which men enter into
society； it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should
have property； without which they must be supposed to lose that by
entering into society which was the end for which they entered into
it； too gross an absurdity for any man to own。 Men； therefore； in
society having property； they have such a right to the goods； which by
the law of the community are theirs； that nobody hath a right to
take them； or any part of them； from them without their own consent；
without this they have no property at all。 For I have truly no
property in that which another can by right take from me when he
pleases against my consent。 Hence it is a mistake to think that the
supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it
will； and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily； or take
any part of them at pleasure。 This is not much to be feared in
governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in
assemblies which are variable； whose members upon the dissolution of
the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country；
equally with the rest。 But in governments where the legislative is
in one lasting assembly； always in being； or in one man as in absolute
monarchies； there is danger still； that they will think themselves
to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community； and so
will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they
think fit from the people。 For a man's property is not at all
secure； though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of
it between him and his fellow…subjects； if he who commands those
subjects have power to take from any private man what part he
pleases of his property； and use and dispose of it as he thinks good。
139。 But government； into whosesoever hands it is put； being as I
have before shown； entrusted with this condition； and for this end；
that men might have and secure their properties； the prince or senate；
however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of
property between the subjects one amongst another； yet can never
have a power to take to themselves the whole； or any part of the
subjects' property； without their own consent； for this would be in
effect to leave them no property at all。 And to let us see that even
absolute power； where it is necessary； is not arbitrary by being
absolute； but is still limited by that reason and confined to those
ends which required it in some cases to be absolute； we need look no
farther than the common practice of martial discipline。 For the
preservation of the army； and in it of the whole commonwealth；
requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior
officer； and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most
dangerous or unreasonable of them； but yet we see that neither the
sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a
cannon； or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish； can
command that soldier to give him one penny of his money； nor the
general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post； or not
obeying the most desperate orders； cannot yet with all his absolute
power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's
estate； or seize one jot of his goods； whom yet he can command
anything； and hang for the least disobedience。 Because such a blind
obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his
power… viz。； the preservation of the rest； but the disposing of his
goods has nothing to do with it。
140。 It is true governments cannot be supported without great
charge； and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection
should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it。
But still it must be with his own consent… i。e。； the consent of the
majority； giving it either by themselves or their representatives
chosen by them； for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy
taxes on the people by his own authority； and without such consent
of the people； he thereby invades the fundamental law of property； and
subverts the end of government。 For what property have I in that which
another may by right take when he pleases to himself？
141。 Fourthly。 The legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands； for it being but a delegated power from the
people； they who have it cannot pass it over to others。 The people
alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth； which is by
constituting the legislative； and appointing in whose hands that shall
be。 And when the people have said； 〃We will submit； and be governed by
laws made by such men； and in such forms；〃 nobody else can say other
men shall make laws for them； nor can they be bound by any laws but
such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to
make laws for them。
142。 These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the
society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative
power of every commonwealth； in all forms of government。 First： They
are to govern by promulgated established laws； not to be varied in
particular cases； but to have one rule for rich and poor； for the
favourite at Court； and the countryman at plough。 Secondly： These laws
also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good
of the people。 Thirdly： They must not raise taxes on the property of
the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or
their deputies。 And this properly concerns only such governments where
the legislative is always in being； or at least where the people
have