按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
than knowledge； and that knowledge； in whatever existing； must have
the advantage over pleasure and all other things； and then you said
that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has
knowledge； and we refused to allow this； and you rejoined： O
Protagoras and Socrates； what is the meaning of being overcome by
pleasure if not this？…tell us what you call such a state：…if we had
immediately and at the time answered 〃Ignorance；〃 you would have
laughed at us。 But now； in laughing at us； you will be laughing at
yourselves： for you also admitted that men err in their choice of
pleasures and pains； that is； in their choice of good and evil； from
defect of knowledge； and you admitted further； that they err； not only
from defect of knowledge in general； but of that particular
knowledge which is called measuring。 And you are also aware that the
erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance。 This；
therefore； is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure；…ignorance；
and that the greatest。 And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and
Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance； but you；
who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause；
and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught； neither go
yourselves； nor send your children； to the Sophists； who are the
teachers of these things…you take care of your money and give them
none； and the result is； that you are the worse off both in public and
private life：…Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in
general： And now I should like to ask you； Hippias； and you； Prodicus；
as well as Protagoras （for the argument is to be yours as well as
ours）； whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not？
They all thought that what I said was entirely true。
Then you agree； I said； that the pleasant is the good； and the
painful evil。 And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce
his distinction of names； whether he is disposed to say pleasurable；
delightful； joyful。 However； by whatever name he prefers to call them；
I will ask you； most excellent Prodicus； to answer in my sense of
the words。
Prodicus laughed and assented； as did the others。
Then； my friends； what do you say to this？ Are not all actions
honourable and useful； of which the tendency is to make life
painless and pleasant？ The honourable work is also useful and good？
This was admitted。
Then； I said； if the pleasant is the good； nobody does anything
under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and
is also attainable； when he might do the better。 And this
inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance； as the
superiority of a man to himself is wisdom。
They all assented。
And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived
about important matters？
To this also they unanimously assented。
Then； I said； no man voluntarily pursues evil； or that which he
thinks to be evil。 To prefer evil to good is not in human nature；
and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils； no one will
choose the greater when he may have the less。
All of us agreed to every word of this。
Well； I said； there is a certain thing called fear or terror； and
here； Prodicus； I should particularly like to know whether you would
agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil。
Protagoras and Hippias agreed； but Prodicus said that this was
fear and not terror。
Never mind； Prodicus； I said； but let me ask whether； if our
former assertions are true； a man will pursue that which he fears when
he is not compelled？ Would not this be in flat contradiction to the
admission which has been already made； that he thinks the things which
he fears to be evil； and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that
which he thinks to be evil？
That also was universally admitted。
Then； I said； these； Hippias and Prodicus； are our premisses； and
I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he
said at first。 I do not mean in what he said quite at first； for his
first statement； as you may remember； was that whereas there were five
parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them； each of
them had a separate function。 To this； however； I am not referring；
but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues
four were nearly akin to each other； but that the fifth； which was
courage； differed greatly from the others。 And of this he gave me
the following proof。 He said： You will find； Socrates； that some of
the most impious； and unrighteous； and intemperate； and ignorant of
men are among the most courageous； which proves that courage is very
different from the other parts of virtue。 I was surprised at his
saying this at the time； and I am still more surprised now that I have
discussed the matter with you。 So I asked him whether by the brave
he meant the confident。 Yes； he replied； and the impetuous or goers。
（You may remember； Protagoras； that this was your answer。）
He assented。
Well then； I said； tell us against what are the courageous ready
to go…against the same dangers as the cowards？
No； he answered。
Then against something different？
Yes； he said。
Then do cowards go where there is safety； and the courageous where
there is danger？
Yes； Socrates； so men say。
Very true； I said。 But I want to know against what do you say that
the courageous are ready to go…against dangers； believing them to be
dangers； or not against dangers？
No； said he； the former case has been proved by you in the
previous argument to be impossible。
That； again； I replied； is quite true。 And if this has been
rightly proven； then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers；
since the want of self…control； which makes men rush into dangers； has
been shown to be ignorance。
He assented。
And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that
about which they are confident； so that； in this point of view； the
cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things。
And yet； Socrates； said Protagoras； that to which the coward goes is
the opposite of that to which the courageous goes； the one； for
example； is ready to go to battle； and the other is not ready。
And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful？ I said。
Honourable； he replied。
And if honourable； then already admitted by us to be good； for all
honourable actions we have admitted to be good。
That is true； and to that opinion I shall always adhere。
True； I said。 But which of the two are they who； as you say； are
unwilling to go to war； which is a good and honourable thing？
The cowards； he replied。
And what is good and honourable； I said；