按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
pleasure or create pleasure？
Certainly； he said。
Then my meaning is； that in as far as they are pleasant they are
good； and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself。
According to your favourite mode of speech； Socrates； 〃Let us
reflect about this；〃 he said； and if the reflection is to the point；
and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same； then
we will agree； but if not； then we will argue。
And would you wish to begin the enquiry？
I said； or shall I begin？
You ought to take the lead； he said； for you are the author of the
discussion。
May I employ an illustration？ I said。 Suppose some one who is
enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of
another：…he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers； and then
he says； Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better
view：…that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation。
Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure； I am
minded to say to you： Uncover your mind to me； Protagoras； and
reveal your opinion about knowledge； that I may know whether you agree
with the rest of the world。 Now the rest of the world are of opinion
that knowledge is a principle not of strength； or of rule； or of
command： their notion is that a man may have knowledge； and yet that
the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger； or
pleasure； or pain； or love； or perhaps by fear；…just as if knowledge
were a slave； and might be dragged about anyhow。 Now is that your
view？ or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding
thing； which cannot be overcome； and will not allow a man； if he
only knows the difference of good and evil； to do anything which is
contrary to knowledge； but that wisdom will have strength to help him？
I agree with you； Socrates； said Protagoras； and not only so； but I；
above all other men； am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the
highest of human things。
Good； I said； and true。 But are you aware that the majority of the
world are of another mind； and that men are commonly supposed to
know the things which are best； and not to do them when they might？
And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that
when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain； or
pleasure； or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning。
Yes； Socrates； he replied； and that is not the only point about
which mankind are in error。
Suppose； then； that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform
them what is the nature of this affection which they call 〃being
overcome by pleasure；〃 and which they affirm to be the reason why they
do not always do what is best。 When we say to them： Friends； you are
mistaken； and are saying what is not true； they would probably
reply： Socrates and Protagoras； if this affection of the soul is not
to be called 〃being overcome by pleasure；〃 pray； what is it； and by
what name would you describe it？
But why； Socrates； should we trouble ourselves about the opinion
of the many； who just say anything that happens to occur to them？
I believe； I said； that they may be of use in helping us to discover
how courage is related to the other parts of virtue。 If you are
disposed to abide by our agreement； that I should show the way in
which； as I think； our recent difficulty is most likely to be
cleared up； do you follow； but if not； never mind。
You are quite right； he said； and I would have you proceed as you
have begun。
Well then； I said； let me suppose that they repeat their question；
What account do you give of that which； in our way of speaking； is
termed being overcome by pleasure？ I should answer thus： Listen； and
Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you。 When men are overcome
by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant；
and they； knowing them to be evil； nevertheless indulge in them； would
you not say that they were overcome by pleasure？ They will not deny
this。 And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again： 〃In
what way do you say that they are evil…in that they are pleasant and
give pleasure at the moment； or because they cause disease and poverty
and other like evils in the future？ Would they still be evil； if
they had no attendant evil consequences； simply because they give
the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature？〃…Would they not
answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is
immediately given by them； but on account of the after
consequences…diseases and the like？
I believe； said Protagoras； that the world in general would answer
as you do。
And in causing diseases do they not cause pain？ and in causing
poverty do they not cause pain；…they would agree to that also； if I am
not mistaken？
Protagoras assented。
Then I should say to them； in my name and yours： Do you think them
evil for any other reason； except because they end in pain and rob
us of other pleasures：…there again they would agree？
We both of us thought that they would。
And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view；
and say： 〃Friends； when you speak of goods being painful； do you not
mean remedial goods； such as gymnastic exercises； and military
service； and the physician's use of burning； cutting； drugging； and
starving？ Are these the things which are good but painful？〃…they would
assent to me？
He agreed。
〃And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest
immediate suffering and pain； or because； afterwards； they bring
health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of
states and power over others and wealth？〃…they would agree to the
latter alternative； if I am not mistaken？
He assented。
〃Are these things good for any other reason except that they end
in pleasure； and get rid of and avert pain？ Are you looking to any
other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good？〃…they
would acknowledge that they were not？
I think so； said Protagoras。
〃And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good； and avoid pain as
an evil？〃
He assented。
〃Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good： and
even pleasure you deem an evil； when it robs you of greater
pleasures than it gives； or causes pains greater than the pleasure。
If； however； you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end
or standard； you will be able to show us that standard。 But you have
none to show。〃
I do not think that they have； said Protagoras。
〃And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain？ You call
pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it
has； or gives pleasures greater than the pains： then if you have
some standard other than pleasu