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although other Sophists conceal their profession； you proclaim in
the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and
education； and are the first who demanded pay in return。 How then
can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these
subjects； and ask questions and consult with you？ I must； indeed。
And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about
the questions which I was asking you at first； and also to have your
help in considering them。 If I am not mistaken the question was
this： Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness
five names of the same thing？ or has each of the names a separate
underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function；
no one of them being like any other of them？ And you replied that
the five names were not the names of the same thing； but that each
of them had a separate object； and that all these objects were parts
of virtue； not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each
other and the whole of which they are parts； but as the parts of the
face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another； and
have each of them a distinct function。 I should like to know whether
this is still your opinion； or if not； I will ask you to define your
meaning； and I shall not take you to task if you now make a
different statement。 For I dare say that you may have said what you
did only in order to make trial of me。
I answer； Socrates； he said； that all these qualities are parts of
virtue； and that four out of the five are to some extent similar；
and that the fifth of them； which is courage； is very different from
the other four； as I prove in this way： You may observe that many
men are utterly unrighteous； unholy； intemperate； ignorant； who are
nevertheless remarkable for their courage。
Stop； I said； I should like to think about that。 When you speak of
brave men； do you mean the confident； or another sort of nature？
Yes； he said； I mean the impetuous； ready to go at that which others
are afraid to approach。
In the next place； you would affirm virtue to be a good thing； of
which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher。
Yes； he said； I should say the best of all things； if I am in my
right mind。
And is it partly good and partly bad； I said； or wholly good？
Wholly good； and in the highest degree。
Tell me then； who are they who have confidence when diving into a
well？
I should say； the divers。
And the reason of this is that they have knowledge？
Yes； that is the reason。
And who have confidence when fighting on horseback…the skilled
horseman or the unskilled？
The skilled。
And who when fighting with light shields…the peltasts or the
nonpeltasts？
The peltasts。 And that is true of all other things； he said； if that
is your point： those who have knowledge are more confident than
those who have no knowledge； and they are more confident after they
have learned than before。
And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant； I said； of these
things； and yet confident about them？
Yes； he said； I have seen such persons far too confident。
And are not these confident persons also courageous？
In that case； he replied； courage would be a base thing； for the men
of whom we are speaking are surely madmen。
Then who are the courageous？ Are they not the confident？
Yes； he said； to that statement I adhere。
And those； I said； who are thus confident without knowledge are
really not courageous； but mad； and in that case the wisest are also
the most confident； and being the most confident are also the bravest；
and upon that view again wisdom will be courage。
Nay； Socrates； he replied； you are mistaken in your remembrance of
what was said by me。 When you asked me； I certainly did say that the
courageous are the confident； but I was never asked whether the
confident are the courageous； if you had asked me； I should have
answered 〃Not all of them〃： and what I did answer you have not
proved to be false； although you proceeded to show that those who have
knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had
knowledge； and more courageous than others who have no knowledge；
and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom。
But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength
is wisdom。 You might begin by asking whether the strong are able；
and I should say 〃Yes〃； and then whether those who know how to wrestle
are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to
wrestle； and more able after than before they had learned； and I
should assent。 And when I had admitted this； you might use my
admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is
strength； whereas in that case I should not have admitted； any more
than in the other； that the able are strong； although I have
admitted that the strong are able。 For there is a difference between
ability and strength； the former is given by knowledge as well as by
madness or rage； but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of
the body。 And in like manner I say of confidence and courage； that
they are not the same； and I argue that the courageous are
confident； but not all the confident courageous。 For confidence may be
given to men by art； and also； like ability； by madness and rage；
but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the
soul。
I said： You would admit； Protagoras； that some men live well and
others ill？
He assented。
And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief？
He does not。
But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life； will he not in
that case have lived well？
He will。
Then to live pleasantly is a good； and to live unpleasantly an evil？
Yes； he said； if the pleasure be good and honourable。
And do you； Protagoras； like the rest of the world； call some
pleasant things evil and some painful things good？…for I am rather
disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant；
if they have no consequences of another sort； and in as far as they
are painful they are bad。
I do not know； Socrates； he said； whether I can venture to assert in
that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the
painful the evil。 Having regard not only to my present answer； but
also to the whole of my life； I shall be safer； if I am not
mistaken； in saying that there are some pleasant things which are
not good； and that there are some painful things which are good； and
some which are not good； and that there are some which are neither
good nor evil。
And you would call pleasant； I said； the things which participate in
pleasure or create pleasure？
Certainly； he said。