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know the nature of things； and are the wisest of the Hellenes； and
as such are met together in this city； which is the metropolis of
wisdom； and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city；
should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity； but
should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind I
pray and advise you； Protagoras； and you； Socrates； to agree upon a
compromise。 Let us be your peacemakers。 And do not you； Socrates；
aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse； if Protagoras
objects； but loosen and let go the reins of speech； that your words
may be grander and more becoming to you。 Neither do you； Protagoras；
go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into
an ocean of words； but let there be a mean observed by both of you。 Do
as I say。 And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or
overseer or president； he will keep watch over your words and will
prescribe their proper length。
This proposal was received by the company with universal approval；
Callias said that he would not let me off； and they begged me to
choose an arbiter。 But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse
would be unseemly； for if the person chosen was inferior； then the
inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better； or if he was
equal； neither would that be well； for he who is our equal will do
as we do； and what will be the use of choosing him？ And if you say；
〃Let us have a better then；〃…to that I answer that you cannot have any
one who is wiser than Protagoras。 And if you choose another who is not
really better； and whom you only say is better； to put another over
him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy
reflection on him； not that； as far as I am concerned； any
reflection is of much consequence to me。 Let me tell you then what I
will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you
desire。 If Protagoras is not disposed to answer； let him ask and I
will answer； and I will endeavour to show at the same time how； as I
maintain； he ought to answer： and when I have answered as many
questions as he likes to ask； let him in like manner answer me； and if
he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question
asked of him； you and I will unite in entreating him； as you entreated
me； not to spoil the discussion。 And this will require no special
arbiter…all of you shall be arbiters。
This was generally approved； and Protagoras； though very much
against his will； was obliged to agree that he would ask questions；
and when he had put a sufficient number of them； that he would
answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies。 He began
to put his questions as follows：…
I am of opinion； Socrates； he said； that skill in poetry is the
principal part of education； and this I conceive to be the power of
knowing what compositions of the poets are correct； and what are
not； and how they are to be distinguished； and of explaining when
asked the reason of the difference。 And I propose to transfer the
question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry；
we will speak as before of virtue； but in reference to a passage of
a poet。 Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian：
Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good； built
four…square in hands and feet and mind； a work without a flaw。
Do you know the poem？ or shall I repeat the whole？
There is no need； I said； for I am perfectly well acquainted with
the ode…I have made a careful study of it。
Very well； he said。 And do you think that the ode is a good
composition； and true？
Yes； I said； both good and true。
But if there is a contradiction； can the composition be good or
true？
No； not in that case； I replied。
And is there not a contradiction？ he asked。 Reflect。
Well； my friend； I have reflected。
And does not the poet proceed to say； 〃I do not agree with the
word of Pittacus； albeit the utterance of a wise man： Hardly can a man
be good〃？ Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet。
I know it。
And do you think； he said； that the two sayings are consistent？
Yes； I said； I think so （at the same time I could not help fearing
that there might be something in what he said）。 And you think
otherwise？
Why； he said； how can he be consistent in both？ First of all；
premising as his own thought； 〃Hardly can a man become truly good〃；
and then a little further on in the poem； forgetting； and blaming
Pittacus and refusing to agree with him； when he says； 〃Hardly can a
man be good；〃 which is the very same thing。 And yet when he blames him
who says the same with himself； he blames himself； so that he must
be wrong either in his first or his second assertion。
Many of the audience cheered and applauded this。 And I felt at first
giddy and faint； as if I had received a blow from the hand of an
expert boxer； when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering；
and to confess the truth； I wanted to get time to think what the
meaning of the poet really was。 So I turned to Prodicus and called
him。 Prodicus； I said； Simonides is a countryman of yours； and you
ought to come to his aid。 I must appeal to you； like the river
Scamander in Homer； who； when beleaguered by Achilles； summons the
Simois to aid him； saying：
Brother dear； let us both together stay the force of the hero。
And I summon you； for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end
of Simonides。 Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides； by the
application of your philosophy of synonyms； which enables you to
distinguish 〃will〃 and 〃wish；〃 and make other charming distinctions
like those which you drew just now。 And I should like to know
whether you would agree with me； for I am of opinion that there is
no contradiction in the words of Simonides。 And first of all I wish
that you would say whether； in your opinion； Prodicus； 〃being〃 is
the same as 〃becoming。〃
Not the same； certainly； replied Prodicus。
Did not Simonides first set forth； as his own view； that 〃Hardly can
a man become truly good〃？
Quite right； said Prodicus。
And then he blames Pittacus； not； as Protagoras imagines； for
repeating that which he says himself； but for saying something
different from himself。 Pittacus does not say as Simonides says；
that hardly can a man become good； but hardly can a man be good： and
our friend Prodicus would maintain that being； Protagoras； is not
the same as becoming； and if they are not the same； then Simonides
is not inconsistent with himself。 I dare say that Prodicus and many
others would say； as Hesiod says；
On the one hand； hardly can a man become good；
For the gods have made virtue the rewa