representative government-第22章

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ledge　does　not　come　by　intuition。　There　are　many　rules　of　the　greatest　importance　in　every　branch　of　public　business　（as　there　are　in　every　private　occupation）；　of　which　a　person　fresh　to　the　subject　neither　knows　the　reason　or　even　suspects　the　existence；　because　they　are　intended　to　meet　dangers　or　provide　against　inconveniences　which　never　entered　into　his　thoughts。　I　have　known　public　men；　ministers；　of　more　than　ordinary　natural　capacity；　who　on　their　first　introduction　to　a　department　of　business　new　to　them；　have　excited　the　mirth　of　their　inferiors　by　the　air　with　which　they　announced　as　a　truth　hitherto　set　at　nought；　and　brought　to　light　by　themselves；　something　which　was　probably　the　first　thought　of　everybody　who　ever　looked　at　the　subject；　given　up　as　soon　as　he　had　got　on　to　a　second。　It　is　true　that　a　great　statesman　is　he　who　knows　when　to　depart　from　traditions；　as　well　as　when　to　adhere　to　them。　But　it　is　a　great　mistake　to　suppose　that　he　will　do　this　better　for　being　ignorant　of　the　traditions。　No　one　who　does　not　thoroughly　know　the　modes　of　action　which　common　experience　has　sanctioned　is　capable　of　judging　of　the　circumstances　which　require　a　departure　from　those　ordinary　modes　of　action。　The　interests　dependent　on　the　acts　done　by　a　public　department；　the　consequences　liable　to　follow　from　any　particular　mode　of　conducting　it；　require　for　weighing　and　estimating　them　a　kind　of　knowledge；　and　of　specially　exercised　judgment；　almost　as　rarely　found　in　those　not　bred　to　it；　as　the　capacity　to　reform　the　law　in　those　who　have　not　professionally　studied　it。　　　All　these　difficulties　are　sure　to　be　ignored　by　a　representative　assembly　which　attempts　to　decide　on　special　acts　of　administration。　At　its　best；　it　is　inexperience　sitting　in　judgment　on　experience；　ignorance　on　knowledge：　ignorance　which　never　suspecting　the　existence　of　what　it　does　not　know；　is　equally　careless　and　supercilious；　making　light　of；　if　not　resenting；　all　pretensions　to　have　a　judgment　better　worth　attending　to　than　its　own。　Thus　it　is　when　no　interested　motives　intervene：　but　when　they　do；　the　result　is　jobbery　more　unblushing　and　audacious　than　the　worst　corruption　which　can　well　take　place　in　a　public　office　under　a　government　of　publicity。　It　is　not　necessary　that　the　interested　bias　should　extend　to　the　majority　of　the　assembly。　In　any　particular　case　it　is　of　ten　enough　that　it　affects　two　or　three　of　their　number。　Those　two　or　three　will　have　a　greater　interest　in　misleading　the　body；　than　any　other　of　its　members　are　likely　to　have　in　putting　it　right。　The　bulk　of　the　assembly　may　keep　their　hands　clean；　but　they　cannot　keep　their　minds　vigilant　or　their　judgments　discerning　in　matters　they　know　nothing　about；　and　an　indolent　majority；　like　an　indolent　individual；　belongs　to　the　person　who　takes　most　pains　with　it。　The　bad　measures　or　bad　appointments　of　a　minister　may　be　checked　by　Parliament；　and　the　interest　of　ministers　in　defending；　and　of　rival　partisans　in　attacking；　secures　a　tolerably　equal　discussion：　but　quis　custodiet　custodes？　who　shall　check　the　Parliament？　A　minister；　a　head　of　an　office；　feels　himself　under　some　responsibility。　An　assembly　in　such　cases　feels　under　no　responsibility　at　all：　for　when　did　any　member　of　Parliament　lose　his　seat　for　the　vote　he　gave　on　any　detail　of　administration？　To　a　minister；　or　the　head　of　an　office；　it　is　of　more　importance　what　will　be　thought　of　his　proceedings　some　time　hence　than　what　is　thought　of　them　at　the　instant：　but　an　assembly；　if　the　cry　of　the　moment　goes　with　it；　however　hastily　raised　or　artificially　stirred　up；　thinks　itself　and　is　thought　by　everybody　to　be　completely　exculpated　however　disastrous　may　be　the　consequences。　Besides；　an　assembly　never　personally　experiences　the　inconveniences　of　its　bad　measures　until　they　have　reached　the　dimensions　of　national　evils。　Ministers　and　administrators　see　them　approaching；　and　have　to　bear　all　the　annoyance　and　trouble　of　attempting　to　ward　them　off。　　　The　proper　duty　of　a　representative　assembly　in　regard　to　matters　of　administration　is　not　to　decide　them　by　its　own　vote；　but　to　take　care　that　the　persons　who　have　to　decide　them　shall　be　the　proper　persons。　Even　this　they　cannot　advantageously　do　by　nominating　the　individuals。　There　is　no　act　which　more　imperatively　requires　to　be　performed　under　a　strong　sense　of　individual　responsibility　than　the　nomination　to　employments。　The　experience　of　every　person　conversant　with　public　affairs　bears　out　the　assertion；　that　there　is　scarcely　any　act　respecting　which　the　conscience　of　an　average　man　is　less　sensitive；　scarcely　any　case　in　which　less　consideration　is　paid　to　qualifications；　partly　because　men　do　not　know；　and　partly　because　they　do　not　care　for；　the　difference　in　qualifications　between　one　person　and　another。　When　a　minister　makes　what　is　meant　to　be　an　honest　appointment；　that　is　when　he　does　not　actually　job　it　for　his　personal　connections　or　his　party；　an　ignorant　person　might　suppose　that　he　would　try　to　give　it　to　the　person　best　qualified。　No　such　thing。　An　ordinary　minister　thinks　himself　a　miracle　of　virtue　if　he　gives　it　to　a　person　of　merit；　or　who　has　a　claim　on　the　public　on　any　account；　though　the　claim　or　the　merit　may　be　of　the　most　opposite　description　to　that　required。　Il　fallait　un　calculateur；　ce　fut　un　danseur　qui　l'obtint；　is　hardly　more　of　a　caricature　than　in　the　days　of　Figaro；　and　the　minister　doubtless　thinks　himself　not　only　blameless　but　meritorious　if　the　man　dances　well。　Besides；　the　qualifications　which　fit　special　individuals　for　special　duties　can　only　be　recognised　by　those　who　know　the　individuals；　or　who　make　it　their　business　to　examine　and　judge　of　persons　from　what　they　have　done；　or　from　the　evidence　of　those　who　are　in　a　position　to　judge。　When　these　conscientious　obligations　are　so　little　regarded　by　great　public　officers　who　can　be　made　responsible　for　their　appointments；　how　must　it　be　with　assemblies　who　cannot？　Even　now；　the　worst　appointments　are　those　which　are　made　for　the　sake　of　gaining　support　or　disarming　opposition　in　the　representative　body：　what　might　we　expect　if　they　were　made　by　the　body　itself？　Numerous　bodies　never　regard　special　qualifications　at　all。　Unless　a　man　is　fit　for　the　gallows；　he　is　thought　to　be　about　as　fit　as　other　people　for　almost　anything　for　which　he　can　offer　himself　as　a　candidate。　When　appointments　made　by　a　public　body　are　not　decided；　as　they　almost　always　are；　by　party　connection　or　private　jobbing；　a　man　is　appointed　either　because　he　has　a　reputation；　often　quite　undeserved；　for　general　ability；　or　frequently　for　no　better　reason　than　that　he　is　personally　popular。　　　It　has　never　been　thought　desirable　that　Parliament　should　itself　nominate　even　the　members　of　a　Cabinet。　It　is　enough　that　it　virtually　decides　who　shall　be　prime　minister；　or　who　shall　be　the　two　or　three　individuals　from　whom　the　prime　minister　shall　be　chosen。　In　doing　this　it　merely　recognises　the　fact　that　a　certain　person　is　the　candidate　of　the　party　whose　general　policy　commands　its　support。　In　reality；　the　only　thing　which　Parliament　decides　is；　which　of　two；　or　at　most　three；　parties　or　bodies　of　men；　s