north america-2-第77章

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cation。　　In　the　first　place；　the　chairman　of　the　committee　is　in　no　way　bound　to　hold　any　communication　with　the　minister。　　He　is　simply　a　Senator；　and　as　such　has　no　ministerial　duties　and　can　have　none。　　He　holds　no　appointment　under　the　President；　and　has　no　palpable　connection　with　the　executive。　　And　then；　it　is　quite　as　likely　that　he　may　be　opposed　in　politics　to　the　minister　as　that　he　may　agree　with　him。　If　the　two　be　opposed　to　each　other　on　general　politics；　it　may　be　presumed　that　they　cannot　act　together　in　union　on　one　special　subject；　nor；　whether　they　act　in　union　or　do　not　so　act；　can　either　have　any　authority　over　the　other。　　The　minister　is　not　responsible　to　Congress；　nor　is　the　chairman　of　the　committee　in　any　way　bound　to　support　the　minister。　　It　is　presumed　that　the　chairman　must　know　the　minister's　secrets；　but　the　chairman　may　be　bound　by　party　considerations　to　use　those　secrets　against　the　minister。　The　system　of　committees　appears　to　me　to　be　good　as　regards　the　work　of　legislation。　　It　seems　well　adapted　to　effect　economy　of　time　and　the　application　of　special　men　to　special　services。　　But　I　am　driven　to　think　that　that　connection　between　the　chairmen　of　the　committees　and　the　ministers　which　I　have　attempted　to　describe　is　an　arrangement　very　imperfect　in　itself；　but　plainly　indicating　the　necessity　of　some　such　close　relation　between　the　executive　and　the　legislature　of　the　United　States　as　does　exist　in　the　political　system　of　Great　Britain。　　With　us　the　Queen's　minister　has　a　greater　weight　in　Parliament　than　the　President's　minister　could　hold　in　Congress；　because　the　Queen　is　bound　to　employ　a　minister　in　whom　the　Parliament　has　confidence。　　As　soon　as　such　confidence　ceases；　the　minister　ceases　to　be　minister。　　As　the　Crown　has　no　politics　of　its　own；　it　is　simply　necessary　that　the　minister　of　the　day　should　hold　the　politics　of　the　people　as　testified　by　their　representatives。　　The　machinery　of　the　President's　government　cannot　be　made　to　work　after　this　fashion。　　The　President　himself　is　a　political　officer；　and　the　country　is　bound　to　bear　with　his　politics　for　four　years；　whatever　those　politics　may　be。　　The　ministry　which　he　selects；　on　coming　to　his　seat；　will　probably　represent　a　majority　in　Congress；　seeing　that　the　same　suffrages　which　have　elected　the　President　will　also　have　elected　the　Congress。　　But　there　exists　no　necessity　on　the　part　of　the　President　to　employ　ministers　who　shall　carry　with　them　the　support　of　Congress。　　If；　however；　the　minister　sat　in　Congressif　it　were　required　of　each　minister　that　he　should　have　a　seat　either　in　one　House　or　in　the　otherthe　President　would；　I　think；　find　himself　constrained　to　change　a　ministry　in　which　Congress　should　decline　to　confide。　　It　might　not　be　so　at　first；　but　there　would　be　a　tendency　in　that　direction。　The　governing　powers　do　not　rest　exclusively　with　the　President　or　with　the　President　and　his　ministers；　they　are　shared　in　a　certain　degree　with　the　Senate；　which　sits　from　time　to　time　in　executive　session；　laying　aside　at　such　periods　its　legislative　character。　　It　is　this　executive　authority　which　lends　so　great　a　dignity　to　the　Senate；　gives　it　the　privilege　of　preponderating　over　the　other　House；　and　makes　it　the　political　safeguard　of　the　nation。　　The　questions　of　government　as　to　which　the　Senate　is　empowered　to　interfere　are　soon　told。　　All　treaties　made　by　the　President　must　be　sanctioned　by　the　Senate；　and　all　appointments　made　by　the　President　must　be　confirmed　by　the　Senate。　　The　list　is　short；　and　one　is　disposed　to　think；　when　first　hearing　it；　that　the　thing　itself　does　not　amount　to　much。　　But　it　does　amount　to　very　much；　it　enables　the　Senate　to　fetter　the　President；　if　the　Senate　should　be　so　inclined；　both　as　regards　foreign　politics　and　home　politics。　　A　Secretary　for　Foreign　Affairs　at　Washington　may　write　what　dispatches　he　pleases　without　reference　to　the　Senate；　but　the　Senate　interferes　before　those　dispatches　can　have　resulted　in　any　fact　which　may　be　detrimental　to　the　nation。　　It　is　not　only　that　the　Senate　is　responsible　for　such　treaties　as　are　made；　but　that　the　President　is　deterred　from　the　making　of　treaties　for　which　the　Senate　would　decline　to　make　itself　responsible。　　Even　though　no　treaty　should　ever　be　refused　its　sanction　by　the　Senate；　the　protecting　power　of　the　Senate　in　that　matter　would　not　on　that　account　have　been　less　necessary　or　less　efficacious。　　Though　the　bars　with　which　we　protect　our　house　may　never　have　been　tried　by　a　thief；　we　do　not　therefore　believe　that　our　house　would　have　been　safe　if　such　bars　had　been　known　to　be　wanting。　　And　then；　as　to　that　matter　of　State　appointments；　is　it　not　the　fact　that　all　governing　power　consists　in　the　selection　of　the　agents　by　whom　the　action　of　government　shall　be　carried　on？　　It　must　come　to　this；　I　imagine；　when　the　argument　is　pushed　home。　　The　power　of　the　most　powerful　man　depends　only　on　the　extent　of　his　authority　over　his　agents。　　According　to　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　the　President　can　select　no　agent　either　at　home　or　abroad；　for　purposes　either　of　peace　or　war；　or　to　the　employment　of　whom　the　Senate　does　not　agree　with　him。　Such　a　rule　as　this　should　save　the　nation　from　the　use　of　disreputable　agents　as　public　servants。　　It　might　perhaps　have　done　much　more　toward　such　salvation　than　it　has　as　yet　effected；　and　it　may　well　be　hoped　that　it　will　in　future　do　more。　Such　are　the　executive　powers　of　the　Senate；　and　it　is；　I　think；　remarkable　that　the　Senate　has　always　used　these　powers　with　extreme　moderation。　　It　has　never　shown　a　factious　inclination　to　hinder　government　by　unnecessary　interference；　or　a　disposition　to　clip　the　President's　wings　by　putting　itself　altogether　at　variance　with　him。　I　am　not　quite　sure　whether　some　fault　may　not　have　lain　on　the　other　side；　whether　the　Senate　may　not　have　been　somewhat　slack　in　exercising　the　protective　privileges　given　to　it　by　the　Constitution。　　And　here　I　cannot　but　remark　how　great　is　the　deference　paid　to　all　governors　and　edicts　of　government　throughout　the　United　States。　　One　would　have　been　disposed　to　think　that　such　a　feeling　would　be　stronger　in　an　old　country　such　as　Great　Britain　than　in　a　young　country　such　as　the　States。　　But　I　think　that　it　is　not　so。　　There　is　less　disposition　to　question　the　action　of　government　either　at　Washington　or　at　New　York；　than　there　is　in　London。　　Men　in　America　seem　to　be　content　when　they　have　voted　in　their　governors；　and　to　feel　that　for　them　all　political　action　is　over　until　the　time　shall　come　for　voting　for　others。　　And　this　feeling；　which　seems　to　prevail　among　the　people；　prevails　also　in　both　Houses　of　Congress。　　Bitter　denunciations　against　the　President's　policy　or　the　President's　ministers　are　seldom　heard。　Speeches　are　not　often　made　with　the　object　of　impeding　the　action　of　government。　　That　so　small　and　so　grave　a　body　as　the　Senate　should　abstain　from　factious　opposition　to　the　government　when　employed　on　executive　functions；　was　perhaps　to　be　expected。　　It　is　of　course　well　that　it　should　be　so。　　I　confess；　however；　that　it　has　appeared　to　me　that　the　Senate　has　not　used　the　power　placed　in　its　han