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universality； cognition knows itself only as apprehension； as the identity on its own account
indeterminate of the Notion with itself； the filling； that is； the objectivity that is determined in and
for itself； is for it a datum； and what truly is is the actuality there before it independently of
subjective positing。 For the practical Idea； on the contrary； this actuality； which at the same time
confronts it as an insuperable limitation； ranks as something intrinsically worthless that must first
receive its true determination and sole worth through the ends of the good。 Hence it is only the will
itself that stands in the way of attainment of its goal； for it separates itself from cognition； and
external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being； the Idea of the good can
therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true。
But it makes this transition through itself。 In the syllogism of action； one premise is the immediate
relation of the good end to actuality which it seizes on； and in the second premise directs it as
an external means against the external actuality。
For the subjective Notion the good is the objective； actuality in its existence confronts is as an
insuperable limitation only in so far as it still has the character of immediate existence； not of
something objective in the sense of a being that is in and for itself； on the contrary； it is wither the
evil if the indifferent； the merely determinable； whose worth does not reside within it。 This abstract
being that confronts the good in the second premise has； however； already been sublated by the
practical Idea itself； the first premise of the latter's action is the immediate objectivity of the
Notion； according to which the end communicates itself to actuality without meeting any resistance
and is in simple identical relation with it。 Thus all that remains to be done is to bring together the
thoughts of its two premises。 To what has been already immediately accomplished by the
objective Notion in the first premise； the only addition made in the second premise is that it is
posited through mediation； and hence posited for the objective Notion。 Now just as in the end
relation in general； the realised end is also again merely a means； while conversely the means is
also the realised end； so similarly in the syllogism of the good； the second premise is immediately
already present implicitly in the first； but this immediacy is not sufficient； and the second premise
is already postulated for the first … the realisation of the good in the face of another actuality
confronting it is the mediation which is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the
accomplished actualisation of the good。
For it is only the first negation or the otherness of the Notion； an objectivity that would be a
submergence of the Notion in the externality； the second negation is the sublating of this otherness；
whereby the immediate realisation of the end first becomes the actuality the Notion is posited as
identical with itself； not with an other； and thus alone is posited as the free Notion。
Now if it is supposed that the end of the good is after all not realised through this mediation； this
signifies a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint occupied by it before its activity the standpoint
of an actuality determined as worthless and yet presupposed as real。 This relapse； which becomes
the progress to the spurious infinity； has its sole ground in the fact that in the sublating of that
abstract reality this sublating is no less immediately forgotten； or it is forgotten that this reality is in
fact already presupposed as an actuality that is intrinsically worthless and not objective。
This repetition of the presupposition of the end consequently assumes this character； that the
subjective bearing of the objective Notion is reproduced and made perpetual； with the result that
the finitude of the good in respect of its content as well as its form appears as the abiding truth；
and its actualisation appears as a merely individual act； and not as a universal one。 As a matter of
fact this determinateness has sublated itself in the actualisation of the good； what still limits the
objective Notion is its own view of itself； which vanishes by reflection on what its actualisation is
in itself。 Through this view it is only standing in its own way； and thus what it has to do is to turn；
not against an outer actuality； but against itself。
In other words； the activity in the second premise produces only a one…sided being…for…self； and
its product therefore appears as something subjective and individual； and consequently the first
presupposition is repeated in it。 But this activity is in truth no less the positing of the implicit
identity of the objective Notion and the immediate actuality。 This latter is determined by the
presupposition as having a phenomenal reality only； as being intrinsically worthless and simply and
solely determinable by the objective Notion。 When external actuality is altered by the activity of
the objective Notion and it determination therewith sublated； by that very fact the merely
phenomenal reality； the external determinability and worthlessness； are removed from that actuality
and it is posited as being in and for itself。
In this process the general presupposition is sublated； namely the determination of the good as a
merely subjective end limited in respect of content； the necessity of realising it by subjective
activity； and this activity itself。 In the result the mediation sublates itself； the result is an immediacy
that is not the restoration of the presupposition； but rather its accomplished sublation。 With this；
the Idea of the Notion that is determined in and for itself is posited as being no longer merely in the
active subject but as equally an immediate actuality； and conversely； this actuality is posited； as it is
in cognition； as an objectivity possessing a true being。
The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened by its presupposition； has
vanished along with the presupposition； hence the subject now exists as free； universal
self…identity； for which the objectivity of the Notion is a given objectivity immediately to hand；
no less truly than the subject knows itself as the Notion that is determined in and for itself。
Accordingly in this result cognition is restored and united with the practical Idea； the actuality
found as given is at the same time determined as the realised absolute end； but whereas in questing
cognition this subjectivity appeared merely as an objective world without the subjectivity of the
Notion； here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the
Notion。 This is the absolute Idea。
Book III （The Notion） Section 3 （The Idea）
Chapter 3 The Absolute Idea
The absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea。 Each
of these by itself is still one…sided； possessing the Idea only as a sought for beyond and an
unattained goal； each； therefore； is a synthesis of endeavour； and has； but equally has not；