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filling。 But in the practical Idea it is as actual that it confronts the actual； but the certainty of itself
which the subject possesses in being determinate in and for itself is a certainty of its own actuality
and the non…actuality of the world； it is not only the world's otherness as an abstract universality
that is a nullity for the subject； but the world's individuality and the determination of its individuality。
The subject has here vindicated objectivity for itself； its immanent determinateness is the
objective； for it is the universality that is just as much absolutely determined； the formerly objective
world； on the contrary； is now only something posited； something immediately determined in
various ways； but because it is only immediately determined； the unity of the Notion is lacking in it
and it is； by itself； a nullity。
This determinateness contained in the Notion and in the likeness of the Notion； and including
within it the demand for an individual external actuality； is the good。 It comes upon the scene with
the worth of being absolute； because it is within itself the totality of the Notion； the objective that is
at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity。
This Idea is superior to the Idea of cognition already considered； for it possesses not only the
worth of the universal but also of the out…and…out actual。 It is an urge in so far as this actuality is
still subjective； positing its own self and not having at the same time the form of immediate
presupposition； its urge to realise itself is； strictly speaking； not to give itself objectivity this it
possesses within itself but merely this empty form of immediacy。 Hence the activity of the end is
not directed against itself in order to adopt and appropriate a given determination and by sublating
the determinateness of the external world to give itself reality in the form of external actuality。 The
Idea of the will as explicitly self…determining possesses the content within itself。 Now it is true tat
this is a determinate content and to that extent something finite and limited； self…determination is
essentially particularisation； since the reflection of the will into itself as a negative unity in general
is also individuality in the sense of the exclusion and presupposition of an other。 Nevertheless； the
particularity of the content is in the first instance infinite through the form of the Notion； whose own
determinateness it is； and in this content the Notion possesses its negative self…identity； and
therefore not merely a particular； but its own infinite individuality。 Consequently； the
above…mentioned finitude of the content in the practical Idea is tantamount to the latter being in
the first instance the not yet realised Idea； the Notion is； for the content； something that is in and
for itself； it is here the Idea in the form of objectivity that is for itself； on the one hand； the
subjective is for this reason no longer something merely posited； arbitrary or contingent； but an
absolute； but on the other hand； this form of concrete existence； being…for…self； has not yet the
form of the in…itself as well。 What thus appears in respect of form as such； as opposition； appears
in the form of the Notion reflected into simple identity； that is； appears in the content as its simple
determinateness； thus the good； although valid in and for itself； is some particular end； but an end
that has not to wait to receive its truth through its realisation； but is already on its own account the
true。
The syllogism of immediate realisation itself requires no detailed exposition here； it is altogether
the same as the syllogism of external purposiveness considered above； it is only the content that
constitutes the difference。 In external as in formal purposiveness； it was an indeterminate finite
content in general； here； though it is finite too； it is as such at the same time as absolutely valid
content。 But in regard to the conclusion； to the realised end； a further difference comes in。 The
finite end in its realisation； all the same； gets no further than a means； since in its beginning it is not
an end already determined in and for itself； it remains even when realised an end that is not in and
for itself。 If the good again is also fixed as something finite； if it is essentially such； then
notwithstanding its inner infinitude it cannot escape the destiny of finitude a destiny that manifests
itself in a number of forms。 The realised good is good by virtue of what it already is in the
subjective end； in its Idea； realisation gives it an external existence； but since his existence is
determined merely as an intrinsically worthless externality； in it the good has only attained a
contingent； destructible existence； not a realisation corresponding to its Idea。 Further； since in
respect of its content the good is restricted； there are several kinds of good； good in its concrete
existence is not only subject to destruction by external contingency and by evil； but by the collision
and conflict of the good itself。 From the side of the objective world presupposed for it； in the
presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the good consists； and which as a different
world goes its own way； the very realisation of the good is exposed to obstacles； obstacles which
may indeed even be insurmountable。
In this way； the good remains an ought…to…be； it is in and for itself； but being； as the ultimate
abstract immediacy； remains also confronting is in the form of a not…being。
The Idea of the realised good is； it is true； an absolute postulate； but it is no more than a
postulate； that is； the absolute afflicted with the determinateness of subjectivity。 There are still two
worlds in opposition； one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought； the
other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed
realm of darkness。 The complete elaboration of the unresolved contradiction between that
absolute end and the limitation of this actuality that insuperably opposes it； has been considered
in detail in the Phenomenology of Spirit。
As the Idea contains within itself the moment of complete determinateness； the other Notion with
which the Notion enters into relation in the Idea； possesses in its subjectivity also the moment of an
object； consequently the Idea enter here into the shape of self…consciousness and in this one
aspect coincides with the exposition of the same。
But what is still lacking in the practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself； namely；
that the moment of actuality in the Notion should have attained on its own account the
determination of external being。
Another way of regarding this defect is that the practical Idea still lacks the moment of the
theoretical Idea。 That is to say； in the latter there stands on the side of the subjective Notion … the
Notion that is in process of being intuited within itself by the Notion only the determination of
universality； cognition knows itself only as apprehension； as the identity on its own account
indeterminate of the Notion with itself； the