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transitory and untrue。 Although therefore the Idea has its reality in a material externality； this is not
an abstract being subsisting on its own account over against the Notion； on the contrary； it exists
only as a becoming through the negativity of indifferent being； as a simple determinateness of the
Notion。
This yields the following more precise definitions of the Idea。 First； it is the simple truth； the identity
of the Notion and objectivity as a universal in which the opposition and subsistence of the
particular is dissolved into its self…identical negativity and is equality with itself。 Secondly； it is the
relation of the explicit subjectivity of the simple Notion and its objectivity which is distinguished
therefrom； the former is essentially the urge to sublate this separation； and the latter is the
indifferent positedness； the subsistence that is in and for itself null。 As this relation； the Idea is the
process of sundering itself into individuality and its inorganic nature； and again of bringing this
inorganic nature under the power of the subject and returning to the first simple universality。 The
identity of the Idea with itself is one with the process； the thought which liberates actuality from
the illusory show of purposeless mutability and transfigures it into the Idea must not represent this
truth of actuality as a dead repose； as a mere picture； lifeless； without impulse or movement； as a
genius or number； or an abstract thought； by virtue of the freedom which the Notion attains in the
Idea； the Idea possesses within itself also the most stubborn opposition； its repose consists in the
security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes that opposition； in it
meeting with itself。
In the first instance； however； the Idea is once again only immediate or only in its Notion；
objective reality is； it is true； conformable to the Notion； but it is not yet liberated into the Notion；
and the latter does not exist explicitly for itself as Notion。
Thus though the Notion is soul； it is soul in the guise of an immediate； that is； its determinateness
does not appear as soul itself； it has not grasped itself as soul； it does not possess its objective
reality within itself； the Notion is as a soul that is not yet fully a soul。
At this first stage the Idea is Life： the Notion that； distinguished from its objectivity； simple within
itself； pervades its objectivity and； as its own end； possesses its means in the objectivity and posits
the latter as its means； yet is immanent in this means and is therein the realised end that is identical
with itself。 This Idea； on account of its immediacy； has individuality for the form of its existence。
But the reflection…into…self of its absolute process is the sublating of this immediate individuality；
thereby the Notion which； as universality in this individuality； is the inwardness of the latter；
converts the externality into universality； or posits its objectivity as being the same as itself。
In this second stage； the Idea is the Idea of the true and the good as cognition and volition。 In
the first instance； it is finite cognition and finite volition； in which the true and the good are still
distinguished and each appears as yet only as a goal。 The Notion has； in the first instance；
liberated itself into itself and as yet given itself only an abstract objectivity for its reality。 But the
process of this finite cognition and action converts the initially abstract universality into a totality；
whereby it becomes a complete objectivity。 Or； to consider it from the other side； finite； that is；
subjective spirit； makes for itself the presupposition of an objective world； just as life has such a
presupposition； but its activity consists in sublating this presupposition and converting it into a
positedness。 In this way its reality is for it the objective world； or conversely； the objective world
is the ideality in which it cognises itself。
Thirdly； spirit cognises the Idea as its absolute truth； as the truth that is in and for itself； the infinite
Idea in which cognition and action are equalised； and which is the absolute knowledge of itself。
Chapter 1 Life
The Idea of Life is concerned with a subject matter so concrete； and if you will； so real； that with it
we may seem to have overstepped the domain of logic as it is commonly conceived。 Certainly； if
logic were to contain nothing but empty； dead forms of thought； there could be no mention init at
all of such a content as the Idea of Life。 But if absolute truth is the subject matter of logic； and
truth as such is essentially in cognition； then cognition at least would have to be discussed。 So
called pure logic is usually followed up with an applied logic … a logic dealing with concrete
cognition； not to mention the mass of psychology and anthropology that it is often deemed
necessary to interpolate into logic。 But the anthropological and psychological side of cognition is
concerned with its manifested aspect； in which the Notion on its own account has not yet come
to have an objectivity the same as itself； that is； to have itself for object。 The part of logic that
treats of this concrete side does not belong to applied logic as such； if it did； then every science
would have to be dragged into logic； for each is an applied logic in so far as it consists in
apprehending its subject matter in forms of thought and the Notion。 The subjective Notion has
presuppositions which present themselves in psychological； anthropological and other forms。 But
to logic belong only the presuppositions of the pure Notion in so far as they have the form of pure
thoughts； of abstract essentialities； that is； the determinations of being and essence。 Similarly； in
respect of cognition； the Notion's apprehension of itself； logic will not deal with other shapes of its
presupposition but only with that which is itself Idea； this latter； however； necessarily falls to be
dealt with in logic。 Now this presupposition is the immediate Idea； for since cognition is the
Notion in so far as this is for itself but as a subjectivity is in relation to an objectivity； the Notion is
related to the Idea as presupposed or immediate Idea。 But the immediate Idea is life。
To this extent the necessity of treating of the Idea of life in logic would be based on the necessity；
otherwise recognised； too； of treating here of the concrete Notion of cognition。 But this Idea has
come upon the scene through the Notion's own necessity； the Idea； that which is true in and for
itself； is essentially the subject matter of logic； since it is at first to be considered in its immediacy； it
must be apprehended and cognised in this determinateness in which it is life； in order that its
treatment shall not be an empty affair devoid of determinate content。 All that we need perhaps to
remark is how far the logical view of life differs from any other scientific view of it； this is not the
place； however； to concern ourselves with how life is treated in the unphilosophical sciences； but
only with differentiating logical life as pure Idea from natural life which is dealt with in the
philosophy o