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firmly in mind can we grasp the objective return of the Notion into itself； that is； the true
objectification of the Notion…grasp that each of the single moments through which this mediation
runs its course is itself the entire syllogism of those moments。
Thus the original inner externality of the Notion through which it is self…repellent unity； the end and
the striving of the end towards objectification； is the immediate positing or presupposition of an
external object； the _self…determination is also the determination of an external object not
determined by the Notion； and conversely； the latter determination is self…determination； that is；
externality sublated and posited as internal…or the certainty of the unessentiality of the external
object。 Of the second relation； the determination of the object as means； it has just been shown
how it is within itself the mediation of the end in the object with itself。 Similarly； the third relation；
mechanism； which proceeds under the dominance of the end and sublates the object by the
object； is on the one hand a sublating of the means； of the object already posited as sublated and
is therefore a second sublating and a reflection…into…self； while on the other hand it is a first
determining of the external object。 The latter； as has been remarked； is the production again in the
realised end only of a means； the subjectivity of the finite Notion； contemptuously rejecting the
means； has attained to） nothing better in its goal。 But this reflection that the end is reached in the
means； and that in the fulfilled end； means and mediation are preserved； is the last result of the
external end…relation； a result in which that relation has sublated itself； and which it has exhibited
as its truth。 The third syllogism that was considered last is distinguished by the fact that it is； in the
first place； the subjective purposive activity of the preceding syllogisms； but is also the
spontaneous sublation of external objectivity； and therewith of externality in general； and hence is
the totality in its positedness。
First we saw subjectivity； the Notion's being…for…self； pass over； into its in…itself； objectivity； to
be followed by the reappearance in the latter of the negativity of the Notion's being…for…self； in that
negativity the Notion has determined itself in such a manner that its particularity is an external
objectivity； or it has determined itself as a simple concrete unity whose externality is its
self…determination。 The movement of the end has now reached the stage where the moment of
externality is not merely posited in the Notion； where the end is not merely an ought…to…be and a
striving to realise itself； but as a concrete totality is identical with the； immediate objectivity。 This
identity is on the one hand the simple Notion and the equally immediate objectivity； but on the
other hand； it is just as essentially a mediation； and only through the latter as a self…sublating
mediation is it that simple immediacy； the Notion is therefore essentially this： to be distinct as an
explicit identity from its implicit objectivity； and thereby to possess externality； yet in this external
totality to be the totality's self…determining identity。 As such； the Notion is now the Idea。
BOOK III： The Doctrine of the Notion
Section Three： The Idea
Life … Cognition … The Absolute Idea
The Idea is the adequate Notion； that which is objectively true； or the true as such。 When
anything whatever possesses truth； it possesses it through its Idea； or； something possesses truth
only in so far as it is Idea。 The expression 'idea' has often been employed in philosophy as in
ordinary life for 'notion'； indeed； even for a mere ordinary conception： 'I have no idea yet of this
lawsuit； building； neighbourhood'； means nothing more than the ordinary conception。 Kant has
reclaimed the expression Idea for the notion of reason。 Now according to Kant； the notion of
reason is supposed to be the notion of the unconditioned； but a notion transcendent in regard to
phenomena； that is； no empirical use can be made of such notion that is adequate to it。 The
notions of reason are to serve for the comprehension of perceptions； the notions of the
understanding for understanding them。 But in fact； if the latter really are Notions； then they are
Notions … they enable one to comprehend ； and an understanding of perceptions by means of
notions of the understanding will be a comprehension of them。
But if understanding is only a determining of perceptions by such categories as for example whole
and parts； force； cause； and the like； it signifies only a determining by reflection； and similarly； by
understanding can be meant only the specific representation of a completely determined sensuous
content； thus when someone； having been directed that at the end of the wood he must turn left；
replies 'I understand'； understanding means nothing more than the grasping of something in
pictorial thought and in memory。 'Notion of reason'； too； is a somewhat clumsy expression； for
the Notion is something altogether rational； and in so far as reason is distinguished from
understanding and the Notion as such； it is the totality of the Notion and of objectivity。 In this
sense the Idea is the rational； it is the unconditioned； because only that has conditions which
essentially relates itself to an objectivity； but an objectivity that it has not itself determined but
which still confronts it in the form of indifference and externality； just as the external end still had
conditions。
Reserving then the expression 'Idea' for the objective or real Notion and distinguishing it from the
Notion itself and still more from mere pictorial thought； we must also reject even more vigorously
that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual； and true thoughts are said to
be only ideas。 If thoughts are merely subjective and contingent； they certainly have no further
value； but in this respect they are not inferior to temporal and contingent actualities which likewise
have no further value than that of contingencies and phenomena。 On the other hand if； conversely；
the Idea is not to have the value of truth； because in regard to phenomena it is transcendent； and
no congruent object can be assigned to it in the world of sense； this is an odd misunderstanding
that would deny objective validity to the Idea because it lacks that which constitutes Appearance；
namely； the untrue being of the objective world。 In regard to practical Ideas； Kant recognises
that 'nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher than the vulgar appeal to an
experience that allegedly conflicts with the Idea。 This very experience would not even exist if； for
example； political institutions had been established at the proper time in conformity with Ideas； and
if crude conceptions； crude just because they had been drawn from experience； had not taken the
place of Ideas and so nullified every good intention。' Kant regards the Idea as a necessity and as
the goal which； as the archetype； it must be our endeavour to set up for a maximum and to which
we must