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middle term must itself be the totality of the end。 It has been seen that the determination of end in
the means is at the same time reflection…into…self； it is in so far formal self…relation； since the
determinateness； as real indifference； is posited as the objectivity of the means。 But for this
very reason； this； in one respect； pure subjectivity； is at the same time also activity。 In the
subjective end the negative relation…to…self is still identical with determinateness as such； with
content and externality。 But in the incipient objectification of the end； in the becoming…other of the
simple Notion； these moments separate themselves； or conversely； it is in such separation that this
becoming…other or externality consists。
Consequently； this whole middle term is itself the totality of the syllogism； in which the abstract
activity and the external means constitute the extremes； and their middle term is constituted by that
determinateness of the object by the end； which makes it a means。 But further； universality is the
relation of the activity of the end and the means。 The means is an object； in itself the totality of
the Notion； it has no power of resistance against the end； as it has in the first instance against
another immediate object。 To the end； therefore； which is the posited Notion； it is absolutely
penetrable； and receptive of this communication； because it is in itself identical with the end。 But
now it is also posited as penetrable by the Notion； for in centrality it is an object striving towards
the negative unity； similarly in chemism； it is as a neutral and also as a different object； no longer
self…subsistent。 Its lack of self…subsistence consists precisely in its being only in itself the totality of
the Notion； but the latter is a being…for…self。 Consequently the object has the character of being
powerless against the end and of serving it； the end is the object's subjectivity or soul； that has in
the object its external side。
The object； being in this manner immediately subjected to the end； is not an extreme of the
syllogism； but this relation constitutes one of its premises。 But the means has also a side from
which it still has self…subsistence as against the end。 The objectivity that is connected with the end
in the means is still external to it； because it is only immediately so connected； and therefore the
presupposition still persists。 The activity of the end through the means is for that reason still
directed against this presupposition； and the end is activity and no longer merely an urge and a
striving； precisely because the moment of objectivity is posited in the means in its determinateness
as something external； and the simple unity of the Notion now has this objectivity as such in itself。
C。 The Realised End
1。 The end in its relation to the means is already reflected into itself； but its objective return into
itself is not yet posited。 The activity of the end through its means is still directed against objectivity
as an original presupposition； the nature of this activity is precisely this； to be indifferent to the
determinateness。 Were the activity again to consist in merely determining the immediate objectivity；
the product would again be merely a means； and so on to infinity； the outcome would be only a
means suitable to the end； but not the objectivity of the end itself。 Therefore the end which is active
in its means； in determining the immediate object must not do so as a determinant external to it；
and consequently the object must spontaneously conform to the unity of the Notion； in other
words； the former external activity of the end through its means must determine itself as mediation
and sublate its own self。
The relation of the activity of the end through the means to the external object is in the first instance
the second premise of the syllogism — an immediate relation of the middle term to the other
extreme。 It is immediate because the middle term has an external object in it and the other
extreme is another such object。 The means is effective and potent against the latter because its
own object is connected with the self…determining activity； while for the other object the immediate
determinateness that it possesses is an indifferent one。 Their process in this relation is none other
than the mechanical or chemical one； in this objective externality the previous relationships emerge
but under the dominance of the end。 These processes； however； as they themselves showed；
spontaneously return into the end。 if； therefore； in the first instance； the relation of the means to the
external object it has to work upon is an immediate one； it has already at an earlier stage exhibited
itself as a syllogism； the end having proved itself to be their true middle term and unity。 As；
therefore； the means is the object that stands on the side of the end and has within it the activity of
the end； the mechanism that is found here is at the same time the return of objectivity into itself；
into the Notion； which however is already presupposed as the end； the negative attitude of
purposive activity towards the object is thus not an external attitude； but the alteration and
transition of objectivity in its own self into the end。
That the end relates itself immediately to an object and makes it a means； as also that through this
means it determines another object； may be regarded as violence ＇Gewalt＇ in so far as the end
appears to be of quite another nature than the object； and the two objects similarly are mutually
independent totalities。 But that the end posits itself in a mediate relation with the object and
interposes another object between itself and it； may be regarded as the cunning of reason。 The
finitude of rationality has； as remarked； this side； that the end enters into relationship with the
presupposition； that is； with the externality of the object。 In the immediate relation to the object；
it would itself enter into the sphere of mechanism or chemism and thereby be subject to
contingency and the loss of its determination as the Notion that is in and for itself。 But as it is； it
puts forward an object as means； allows it to wear itself out in its stead； exposes it to attrition and
shields itself behind it from mechanical violence。
Further； since the end is finite it has a finite content； accordingly it is not an absolute； nor simply
something that in its own nature is rational。 But the means is the external middle term of the
syllogism which is the realisation of the end； in the means； therefore； the rationality in it manifests
itself as such by maintaining itself in this external other； and precisely through this externality。 To
this extent the means is superior to the finite ends of external purposiveness： the plough is more
honourable than are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends。 The tool
lasts； while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten。 In his tools man possesses
power over external nature； even though in respect of his ends he is； on the contrary； subject to it。
But the end does not merely keep outside the mechanical process； rather it maintains itself in it