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being open to others。 To gain the freedom of substance it is not sufficient to represent it as a
totality that is complete within itself and has nothing to receive from without。 On the contrary；
the mechanical ＇begrifflose＇； merely mirrored relation to itself is precisely a passivity towards
another。 Similarly determinateness； whether taken as the determinateness of something that is or
of a mirroring entity； that is a degree of the monad's own spontaneous development； is something
external； the degree that the development reaches has its limit in an other。 To shift the reciprocity
of substances on to a predetermined harmony means nothing more than to convert it into a
presupposition； that is； to withdraw it from the Notion。 The need to avoid the interaction of
substances was based on the moment of absolute self…subsistence and originality which was
made a fundamental assumption。 But since the positedness； the degree of development； does not
correspond to this in…itself； it has for that very reason its ground in an other。
When treating of the relationship of substantiality； we showed that it passes over into the causal
relationship。 But here what is； no longer has the determination of a substance； but of an object；
the causal relationship has been superseded in the Notion； the originality of one substance in
relation to the other has shown itself to be illusory； its action to be transition into the opposed
substance。 This relationship therefore has no objectivity。 Hence in so far as the one object is
posited in the form of subjective unity as active cause； this no longer counts as an original
determination but as something mediated； the active object has this its determination only by
means of another object。 Mechanism； since it belongs to the sphere of the Notion； has that
posited within it which proved to be the truth of the causal relationship； namely that the cause；
which is supposed to be the original and self…subsistent factor is essentially effect； positedness； as
well。 In mechanism therefore the causality of the object is immediately a non…originality； it is
indifferent to this its determination； therefore its being cause is for it something contingent。 To this
extent； one might indeed say that the causality of substances is only a subjective conception。 But
this causality as thus represented is precisely mechanism； for mechanism is this； that causality as
identical determinateness of different substances and hence as the extinction of their
self…subsistence in this identity； is a mere positedness； the objects are indifferent to this unity and
maintain themselves in face of it。 But； no less is this their indifferent self…subsistence also a mere
positedness； they are therefore capable of mixing and aggregating and of becoming； as an
aggregate； one object。 Through this indifference both to their transition and to their
self…subistence； substances are objects。
（a） The Formal Mechanical Process
（b） The Real Mechanical Process
（c） The Product of the Mechanical Process
C。 Absolute Mechanism
（a） The Centre
In the first place then the empty manifoldness of objects is gathered into objective individuality；
into the simple self…determining centre。 Secondly； in so far as the object as an immediate totality
retains its indifference to determinateness； the latter is present in it also as unessential or as a
mutual externality of many objects。 The prior； the essential determinateness； on the other hand；
constitutes the real middle term between the many mechanically interacting bodies； by which they
are united in and for themselves； and is their objective universality。 Universality exhibited itself at
first in the relationship of communication as present only through positing； but as objective
universality it is the pervading immanent essence of the objects。
In the material world it is the central body that is the genus； but it is the individual universality of
the single objects and their mechanical process。 The relationship in which the unessential single
bodies stand to one another is one of mutual thrust and pressure； this kind of relationship does
not hold between the central body and the objects whose essence it is； for their externality no
longer constitutes their basic determination。 Their identity with the central body is； therefore； rather
rest； namely； the being in their centre； this unity is their absolute Notion。 It remains； however；
merely an ought…to…be； since the externality of the objects which is still also posited does not
correspond to that unity。 Their consequent striving towards the centre is their absolute
universality； not a universality posited by communication； it constitutes the true rest that is itself
concrete and not posited from outside； into which the process of the non…self…subsistent bodies
must return。 That is why it is an empty abstraction to assume in mechanics that a body set in
motion would continue to move in a straight line to infinity if external resistance did not rob it of its
motion。 Friction； or whatever other form resistance takes； is only the manifestation of centrality；
for it is centrality that in an absolute manner brings the body back to itself； for the thing in contact
with which the moving body meets friction has the power of resistance solely through its union with
the centre。 In the spiritual sphere the centre and unity with the centre assume higher forms； but the
unity of the Notion and its reality which here； to begin with； is mechanical centrality； must there too
constitute the basic determination。
Thus the central body has ceased to be a mere object； for in the latter the determinateness is an
unessential element； for the central body no longer possesses the objective totality only implicitly
but also explicitly。 It can therefore be regarded as an individual。 Its determinateness is
essentially different from a mere order or arrangement and external connection of parts； as
determinateness in and for itself it is an immanent form； a self…determining principle in which the
objects inhere and by which they are bound together into a genuine One。
But this central individual is thus at first only a middle term which as yet has no true extremes； but
as negative unity of the total Notion it sunders itself into such。 Or in other words the previously
non…self…subsistent； self…external objects are likewise by the regress of the Notion determined into
individuals； the identity of the central body with itself which is still a striving； is infected with
externality which； being taken up into the centra body's objective individuality； has this latter
determination communicated to it。 Through this centrality of their own； these individuals placed
outside that first centre； are themselves centres for the non…self…subsistent objects。 These second
centres and the non…self…subsistent objects are brought into unity by the above absolute middle
term。
But the relative individual centres themselves also constitute the middle term of a second
syllogism； a middle term that on the one hand is subsumed under a higher extreme； namely the
objective universality and power of the absolute centre； and