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defined as a thing with properties； as a whole consisting of parts； as a substance with accidents； or
in terms of other relationships of reflection； but these relationships have been altogether
superseded already in the Notion； the object therefore has neither properties nor accidents； for
these are separable from the thing or the substance； whereas in the object the particularity is
absolutely reflected into the totality。 In the parts of a whole； there is indeed present that
self…subsistence which belongs to the differences of the object； but these differences are
themselves directly and essentially objects； totalities； that are not； like parts； determined as such in
contrast to the whole。
The object is therefore in the first instance indeterminate； in so far as it has no determinate
opposition in it； for it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity。 In so far as the
Notion is essentially determinate； the object possesses determinateness as a manifoldness
which though complete is otherwise indeterminate； that is； contains no relationships； and which
constitutes a totality that at first is similarly no further determined； sides or parts that may be
distinguished in it belong to an external reflection。 This quite indeterminate difference therefore
means only that there are a number of objects； each of which only contains its determinateness
reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself outwards。 Because this indeterminate
determinateness is essential to the object； the latter is within itself a plurality of this kind； and must
therefore be regarded as a composite or aggregate。 It does not however consist of atoms； for
these are not objects because they are not totalities。 The Leibnizian monad would be more of an
object since it is a total representation of the world； but confined within its intensive subjectivity
it is supposed at least to be essentially one within itself。 Nevertheless； the monad determined as an
exclusive one is only a principle that reflection assumes。 Yet the monad is an object； partly in
that the ground of its manifold representations — of the developed； that is； the posited
determinations of its merely implicit totality lies outside it； and partly also in that it is indifferent
to the monad that it constitutes an object along with others； it is thus in fact not exclusive or
determined for itself。
2。 As the object； then； in its determined being is a totality and yet on account of its
indeterminateness and immediacy is not the negative unity of that determined being； it is
indifferent to the determinations as individual； as determined in and for themselves； just as
these latter are themselves indifferent to one another。 These； therefore； are not comprehensible
from it nor from one another； its totality is the form of general reflectedness of its manifoldness into
individuality in general which is in its own self indeterminate。 The determinatenesses； therefore； that
it contains； do indeed belong to it； but the form that constitutes their difference and combines them
into a unity is an external； indifferent one； whether it be a mixture； or again an order； a certain
arrangement of parts and sides； all these are combinations that are indifferent to what is so
related。
Thus the object； like any determinate being in general； has the determinateness of its totality
outside it in other objects； and these in turn have theirs outside them； and so on to infinity。 The
return…into…self of this progression to infinity must indeed likewise be assumed and represented as
a totality； a world； but that world is nothing but the universality that is confined within itself by
indeterminate individuality； that is； a universe。
The object； therefore； being in its determinateness equally indifferent to it； it is the object's own
nature that points it outside and beyond itself to other objects for its determination； but to these
others； their determinant function is similarly a matter of indifference。 Consequently； a principle
of self…determination is nowhere to be found； determinism — the standpoint occupied by
cognition when it takes the object； just as we have found it here； to be the truth — assigns for each
determination of the object that of another object； but this other is likewise indifferent both to its
being determined and to its active determining。 For this reason determinism itself is also
indeterminate in the sense that it involves the progression to infinity； it can halt and be satisfied at
any point at will； because the object it has reached in its progress； being a formal totality； is shut up
within itself and indifferent to its being determined by another。 Consequently； the explanation of
the determination of an object and the progressive determining of the object made for the purpose
of the explanation； is only an empty word； since in the other object to which it advances there
resides no self…determination。
3。 Now as the determinateness of an object lies in an other； no determinate difference is to be
found between them； the determinateness is merely doubled； once in one object and again in the
other； something utterly identical； so that the explanation or comprehension is tautological。 This
tautology is an external futile see…saw； since the determinateness obtains from the objects which
are indifferent to it no peculiar distinctiveness and is therefore only identical； there is before us only
one determinateness； and its being doubled expresses just this externality and nullity of a
difference。 But at the same time the objects are self…subsistent in regard to one another； therefore
in the identity above…mentioned they remain absolutely external to one another。 Here； then； we
have the manifest contradiction between the complete mutual indifference of the objects and the
identity of their determinateness； or the contradiction of their complete externality in the
identity of their determinateness。 This contradiction is； therefore； the negative unity of a number
of objects which； in that unity； simply repel one another： this is the mechanical process。
B。 The Mechanical Process
If objects are regarded merely as self…enclosed totalities； they cannot act on one another。 In this
determination they are the same thing as the monads； which for this very reason were thought of
as exercising no influence whatever on one another。 But the concept of a monad is； just for this
reason； a defective reflection。 For first it is a determinate conception of the monad's merely
implicit totality； as a certain degree of the development and positedness of its representation of
the world； it is determinate； now while it is a self…enclosed totality； it is also indifferent to this
determinateness； therefore the determinateness is not its own； but one that is posited by another
object。 Secondly it is an immediate in general； in so far as it is supposed to be merely a
mirroring entity； its relation to itself is therefore abstract universality； hence it is a determinate
being open to others。 To gain the freedom of substance it is not sufficient to represent it as a
totality that is complete within itself and has nothing to rece