按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
are themselves Notions and therefore the totality of its determinations； each side must run through
all these determinations and exhibit them within itself； whether in abstract or concrete form。 Now
in order to fix the sides of the judgment in a general way when their determination is altered； those
names are most serviceable which remain the same throughout the alteration。 The name however
stands over against the matter in hand or the Notion； this distinction presents itself in the judgment
as such； now the subject is in general the determinate； and is therefore more that which
immediately is； whereas the predicate expresses the universal； the essential nature or the Notion；
therefore the subject as such is； in the first instance； only a kind of name； for what it is is first
enunciated by the predicate which contains being in the sense of the Notion。 In the question： what
is this？ or： what kind of a plant is this？ what is often understood by the being enquired after； is
merely the name； and when this is learned one is satisfied and now knows what the thing is。 This is
being in the sense of the subject。 But the Notion； or at least the essence and the universal in
general； is first given by the predicate； and it is this that is asked for in the sense of the judgment。
Consequently； God； spirit； nature； or whatever it may be； is as the subject of a judgment at first
only the name； what such a subject is as regards its Notion is first enunciated in the predicate。
When enquiry is made as to the kind of predicate belonging to such subject； the act of judgment
necessarily implies an underlying Notion。 But this Notion is first enunciated by the predicate itself。
Properly speaking； therefore； it is the mere general idea that constitutes the presupposed meaning
of the subject and that leads to the naming of it； and in doing this it is contingent and a historical
fact； what is； or is not； to be understood by a name。 So many disputes about whether a predicate
does or does not belong to a certain subject are therefore nothing more than verbal disputes；
because they start from the form above mentioned； what lies at the base is so far nothing more
than the name。
We have now to examine； secondly； how the relation of subject and predicate in the judgment is
determined and how subject and predicate themselves are at first determined through this very
relation。 The judgment has in general for its sides totalities which to begin with are essentially
self…subsistent。 The unity of the Notion is； therefore； at first only a relation of self…subsistents； not
as yet the concrete and pregnant unity that has returned into itself from this reality； but only a
unity outside which the self…subsistent sides persist as extremes that are not sublated in it。 Now
consideration of the judgment can begin from the original unity of the Notion； or from the
self…subsistence of the extremes。 The judgment is the self…diremption of the Notion； this unity is；
therefore； the ground from which the consideration of the judgment in accordance with its true
objectivity begins。 It is thus the original division ＇Teilung＇ of what is originally one； thus the
word Urteil refers to what judgment is in and for itself。 But regarded from the side of externality；
the Notion is present in the judgment as Appearance； since its moments therein attain
self…subsistence； and it is on this external side that ordinary thinking tends to fasten。
From this subjective standpoint； then； subject and predicate are considered to be complete； each
on its own account； apart from the other： the subject as an object that would exist even if it did not
possess this predicate； the predicate as a universal determination that would exist even if it did not
belong to this subject。 From this standpoint； the act of judgment involves the reflection； whether
this or that predicate which is in someone's head can and should be attached to the object which
exists on its own account outside； the very act of judging consists in this； that only through it is a
predicate combined with a subject； so that； if this combination did not take place； each on its own
would still remain what it is； the latter an existent object； the former an idea in someone's head。
The predicate which is attached to the subject should； however； also belong to it； that is； be in and
for itself identical with it。 Through this significance of attachment； the subjective meaning of
judgment and the indifferent； outer subsistence of subject and predicate are sublated again： this
action is good； the copula indicates that the predicate belongs to the being of the subject and is
not merely externally combined with it。 In the grammatical sense； that subjective relationship in
which one starts from the indifferent externality of the subject and predicate has its complete
validity； for it is words that are here externally combined。 We may take this opportunity of
remarking； too； that though a proposition has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense；
this does not make it a judgment。 The latter requires that the predicate be related to the subject
as one Notion determination to another； and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual。 If
a statement about a particular subject only enunciates something individual； then this is a mere
proposition； For example； 'Aristotle died at the age of 73； in the fourth year of the 115th
Olympiad；' is a mere proposition； not a judgment。 It would partake of the nature of a judgment
only if doubt had been thrown on one of the circumstances； the date of the death； or the age of
that philosopher； and the given figures had been asserted on the strength of some reason or other。
In that case； these figures would be taken as something universal； as time that still subsists apart
from this particular content of the death of Aristotle； whether as time filled with some other
content； or even as empty time。 Similarly； the news that my friend N。 has died is a proposition； and
it would be a judgment only if there were a question whether he was really dead or only in a state
of catalepsy。
In the usual way of defining the judgment we may indeed accept the indeterminate expression
connection for the external copula； as also that the connected terms are at least supposed to be
notions。 But in other respects this definition is superficial in the extreme： not only； for example； that
in the disjunctive judgment more than two so…called notions are connected； but rather that the
definition is far better than its subject matter； for it is not notions at all that are meant； hardly
determinations of the Notion； but really only determinations of representational thought； it was
remarked in connection with the Notion in general and the determinate Notion； that what is usually
so named by no means deserves the name of Notion； where then should Notions come from in the
case of the judgment？ Above all； in this definition the essential feature of the judgment； namely； the
difference of its determinations； is passed over； still less does it take into account the relationship
of the judgment to the Notion。
As regards the further determination of the subject an